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ABSTRACT
IMPROVING PROCESSES USING STATIC ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES
FEBRUARY 2011
BIN CHEN
B.Sc., PEKING UNIVERSITY, CHINA
M.Sc., PEKING UNIVERSITY, CHINA
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lori A. Clarke and Professor George S. Avrunin
Real-world processes often undergo improvements to meet certain goals, such as
coping with changed requirements, eliminating defects, improving the quality of the
products, and reducing costs. Identifying and evaluating the defects or errors in the
process, identifying the causes of such defects, and validating proposed improvements
all require careful analysis of the process. Human-intensive processes, where human
contributions require considerable domain expertise and have a significant impact on
the success or failure of the overall mission, are of particular concern because they can
be extremely complex and may be used in critical, including life-critical, situations.
To date, the analysis support for such processes is very limited. If done at all, it is
usually performed manually and can be extremely time-consuming, costly and error-
prone. There has been considerable success lately in using static analysis techniques
vi
to analyze hardware systems, software systems, and manufacturing processes. This
thesis explores how such analysis techniques can be automated and employed to
effectively analyze life-critical, human-intensive processes.
In this thesis, we investigated two static analysis techniques: Finite-State Verifica-
tion (FSV) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). We proposed a process analysis framework
that is capable of performing both FSV and FTA on rigorously defined processes. Al-
though evaluated for processes specified in the Little-JIL process definition language,
this is a general framework independent of the process definition language. For FSV,
we developed a translation-based approach that is able to take advantage of existing
FSV tools. The process definition and property to be evaluated are translated into
the input model and property representation accepted by the selected FSV tool. Then
the FSV tool is executed to verify the model against the property representation. For
FTA, we developed a template-based approach to automatically derive fault trees
from the process definition. In addition to showing the feasibility of applying these
two techniques to processes, much effort has been put on improving the scalability
and the usability of the framework so that it can be easily used to analyze complex
real-world processes. To scale the analysis, we investigated several optimizations that
are able to dramatically reduce the translated models for FSV tools and speed up
the verification. We also developed several optimizations for the fault tree derivation
to make the generated fault tree much more compact and easier to understand and
analyze. To improve the usability, we provided several approaches that make analysis
results easier to understand.
We evaluated this framework based on the Little-JIL process definition language
and employed it to analyze two real-world, human-intensive processes: an in-patient
blood transfusion process and a chemotherapy process. The results show that the
framework can be used effectively to detect defects in such real-world, human-intensive
processes.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Processes pervade our society. Products are produced by various manufacturing
processes; software is developed following software development processes; govern-
ment or business services are provided via established processes; and healthcare is
delivered through different medical processes. Likewise, processes in many other do-
mains can be identified quite readily. Although different terminology might be used
in different application domains, a process usually consists of a set of tasks that co-
ordinate and communicate with each other to achieve certain goals and objectives,
where a task defines a specific unit of work performed by an agent that can be either
a human (e.g., a software developer or a medical practitioner) or automated (e.g., a
piece of software or a electronic device).
Real-world processes often undergo continuous improvements to meet certain
goals, such as coping with changed requirements, eliminating defects, increasing the
quality of the products, and reducing costs. As suggested by industrial process im-
provement practices (e.g., [106]), effective process improvements need to be carried
out incrementally through continuous improvement iterations, as opposed to radical
re-engineering. A process improvement iteration usually involves five major steps:
1) define the concrete problem to be solved; 2) measure the process performance if
necessary; 3) identify and evaluate the root causes of the problem; 4) change the
process to address the root causes; 5) validate that no errors are introduced and the
changes indeed solve the problem.
1
Analysis plays a critical role in this incremental process improvement. Identifying
and evaluating the root causes of the problem require careful analysis of the process.
In addition, since errors may be introduced by changes to the process, analysis should
be carried out to detect such errors before the modified process is deployed. Analyses
are usually performed based on the specification of the process. In many domains,
processes are defined in natural language, perhaps supplemented by diagrams or other
informal notations. Processes defined with such informality are often ambiguous, in-
complete or inconsistent, preventing many formal analyses from being applied on
these processes. Even the analyses that can be applied have to be performed manu-
ally and can be highly time-consuming and costly. Such informal analyses may also
produce inaccurate or even incorrect results, leading to ill-advised changes that fail
to achieve the improvement goal. To date many process definition languages have
been developed to formally define processes, but their support for analysis is still
very limited.
Human-intensive processes, where “the human contributions require considerable
domain expertise and have a significant impact on the success or failure of the over-
all mission” [34], are of particular concern because they can be extremely complex
and prone to errors. Medical processes are excellent examples of human-intensive
processes that involve many different types of medical professionals, such as doctors
and nurses with different specializations and roles, pharmacists, lab technicians, and
support staff. Such processes usually contain complex interactions and constraints
between human agents and their collaborating hardware and software agents. These
agents often perform their activities in parallel, introducing substantial amounts of
concurrency and communication into the process. During the execution of the pro-
cess, exceptional conditions may arise requiring specialized exception handling actions
that may vary considerably depending upon the circumstances. Dealing with such
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concerns can make human-intensive processes extremely complex, presenting a great
challenge for analysis.
Many human-intensive processes, like medical processes, are used in critical, in-
cluding life-critical, situations. Even a small defect in such a process may lead to
hazards that threaten human life. A hazard is “a state or set of conditions of the
system that, together with certain other conditions in the environment, will lead
inevitably to an accident” [80]. One fundamental requirement of developing or im-
proving such a process, therefore, is to prevent or control the potential hazards. A
variety of analysis techniques have been developed to identify potential hazards, as-
sess their effect, and identify and evaluate the causal factors that could lead to the
hazards [80]. Some of these have achieved considerable success lately in analyzing
complex hardware systems, software systems, or processes in certain manufacturing
industries. We believe that these analysis techniques can also be employed effectively
to analyze life-critical human-intensive processes. We also believe that some of these
analysis techniques may be automated if the process is specified in a language that
has precisely defined semantics.
In this thesis, we investigate how two selected analysis techniques, Finite-State
Verification (FSV) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), can be automated and applied to
analyze human-intensive processes. Both of these are static analysis techniques, in
that they are performed without actually executing the system. Such static analysis
techniques can be very costly for large systems. Finite-State Verification (FSV) has
been successfully applied to analyze complex hardware and software systems. It is
able to systematically detect errors by exhaustively checking all possible executions
of a system against a property that formally defines a specific aspect of the system
behavers. When the property is violated, a violation trace will usually be provided
to show how the violation occurs. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is widely used in many
industries, including the nuclear industry and the aerospace industry. It is used
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to produce fault trees that systematically identify and evaluate all possible events
in a system that could lead to given hazards. Once a fault tree has been derived,
qualitative and quantitative analysis can be applied to provide information that can
be used to identify weakness in the process. For instance, Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs)
can be computed to show sets of events that are sufficient to cause the hazard to
occur.
We developed an analysis framework that is capable of performing both FSV and
FTA on processes specified in a process definition language with precisely defined
semantics. For FSV, we developed a translation-based approach that is able to take
advantage of existing FSV tools. The process definition is first translated into the in-
put model of the selected FSV tool. The property is also translated into the property
representation accepted by the FSV tool. Then the FSV tool is executed to verify
the model against the property representation. For FTA, we proposed a template-
based approach to derive the fault tree from the process definition. We also provided
support for computing MCSs and generating representations that help process de-
velopers to easily understand MCSs. This design of this process analysis framework
is independent of the process definition language. We implemented and evaluated
this framework using the Little-JIL process definition language. Little-JIL is a gen-
eral process definition language well suited to capture the full complexity inherent
in human-intensive processes. It provides support for abstraction, composition, and
restricted, well-formed control flow constructs that are able to capture the rich con-
trol models needed for human behaviors. It also has extensive support for exception
handling, a major aspect of many processes, particularly human-intensive processes.
Furthermore, Little-JIL has well-defined semantics that facilitate the two kinds of
analysis that we want to apply. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• To make human-intensive process analysis techniques easier to apply and less
prone to human error, we provide automated support for two of them. For FSV,
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translators are implemented to automatically translate process definitions as
well as the associated property specifications to input representations of various
existing FSV tools. For FTA, an automatic fault tree derivation algorithm has
been developedd to construct fault trees from process definitions. Furthermore,
Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs), which are critical for evaluating fault trees, are also
computed automatically.
• We proposed several optimizations to scale the analysis. For FSV, optimizations
are performed during the translation, dramatically reducing the translated mod-
els and speeding up the verification. For FTA, optimizations performed during
the fault tree derivation make the derived fault tree much smaller.
• To improve the usability, we provided several approaches that make analysis
results easier to understand. For FSV, a counter-example trace produced by
the underlying FSV tool is represented as an execution of the input model of the
FSV tool. Due to the translation and optimizations used to create this model,
such counter-example traces can be hard to understand. To address this issue,
we developed a high-level process trace generator that generates a high-level
process trace from a counter-example trace. In addition, we proposed several
graphic representations to show the high-level process traces to the analysts.
For FTA, the high-level process trace generator is also used in FTA to generate
high-level process traces from a MCS. The high-level process trace shows how
the events in the MCS can cause a hazard to happen. In addition to the high-
level process trace, we also developed an approach to create a sub fault tree for
a MCS to help the analyst to understand the MCS.
• We evaluated the proposed process analysis framework by applying our imple-
mentation of the framework to two real-world medical processes: an in-patient
blood transfusion process and a chemotherapy process. The results showed
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that the framework can be used to effectively detect the defects in such real-
world human-intensive processes. The FSV detected a large number of errors
in the process definitions and the property specifications. More interestingly, it
identified a subtle error in the chemotherapy process itself. Through FTA, we
discovered a single point of failure in the chemotherapy process.
It should be noted that although discussions in this thesis are based on our imple-
mentation for Little-JIL, most of the issues as well as the approaches that we proposed
to handle those issues, are also applicable to other process definition languages.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background
and related work of process improvement, process modeling, finite-state verification,
and fault tree analysis. Chapter 3 describes the architecture of our translation-based
process verification framework. The focus of this chapter is put on the translation and
the optimizations, as well as certain related issues. Chapter 4 discusses the automatic
fault tree derivation algorithm for processes. It also briefly talks about the evaluation
of fault trees. Chapter 5 presents the high-level process trace generator as well as two
visual representations for high-level process traces. Chapter 6 introduces the two case
studies used in the evaluation of our approach, and it discusses the results and some
observations based on this experience. Finally, Chapter 7 presents our conclusions
and discusses potential future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The first part of this chapter presents a brief history as well as an overview of the
state-of-the-art of process improvement research and practice in the manufacturing
domain and the software development domain. The second part introduces the Little-
JIL language - the process definition language that we used in our research. A survey
of the most influential process modeling languages from various domains is then given.
The last part discusses the backgrounds and related work of two analysis techniques:
Finite-State Verification and Fault-Tree Analysis.
2.1 Process Improvement
Process improvement has long been studied and practiced in manufacturing indus-
tries. Various approaches have been proposed and adopted, resulting in significant
improvements in the quality and the productivity associated with these processes.
Encouraged by the success of industrial manufacturing process improvement, the
software development community is trying to adapt those approaches to improve the
software development process. This section focuses on the process improvement in
these two domains.
2.1.1 Industrial Process Improvement
In the early 20th century, the practice to improve product quality in manufac-
turing industries focused on product inspection. Specifically, the product quality
was improved by identifying and then fixing or removing finished products with low
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quality. The cost, however, was also increased because of the extra effort involved
in product inspection. To improve product quality without increasing the cost, the
manufacturing processes had to be changed to produce fewer low quality products.
This required systematic measurement and analysis of the processes. Walter Andrew
Shewhart, known as the father of statistical quality control, was the first to bring
statistical control into product process improvement [117]. He pointed out that de-
graded quality products are the results of variation in the manufacturing process.
Such variation has two kinds of distinct causes: common causes which he called
“chance causes”, and special causes which he called “assignable causes”. Common
causes are factors that are constantly present in the process, and special causes are
unusual conditions or factors from outside the process. To improve the processes,
the first step is to eliminate the special causes and bring the process under statistical
control. Once the process is in statistical control, which means that it becomes stable
and predictable, analysis can be taken to identify the common causes. Then changes
to the process can be made in response to those common causes to further reduce
the variation. Shewhart developed the control chart to distinguish common causes
and special causes. A control chart is a graphic display of the values of a selected
variable in the process over time. If the process is in statistical control, the values
should distribute consistently within certain ranges in the control chart. Any abnor-
mal pattern in the control chart, therefore, suggests the presence of the special cause.
Note that the control chart only indicates the existence of special causes. It does not
show what special causes actually cause the abnormal patterns. The manager or the
process designer would need to consider all possible conditions or factors to identify
the special cause with the help of control charts. Shewhart’s idea was developed into
Statistical Process Control (SPC) and the control chart is still the primary tool for
SPC.
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Figure 2.1. DMAIC Model
William Edwards Deming applied SPC to improve production in the United States
during World War II. From 1950, he taught top management in Japan how to improve
manufacturing and business processes using various statistical methods. His theory
was described in his book “Out of the Crisis” [41]. The primary limitation of SPC is
that it only provides a way to monitor and measure the performance of processes. It
does not show how to improve the processes. Therefore, Deming proposed fourteen
key principles for management to improve manufacturing and business processes.
The basic idea is to apply incremental process improvement as opposed to radical
re-engineering. The improvement should be based on analyzing the whole process as
a system instead of focusing on optimization of some parts of the process.
In 1986, Bill Smith at Motorola introduced Six Sigma [106] to standardize the
practices, including ones developed by Shewhart and Deming, to systematically im-
prove processes. The core of Six Sigma is the DMAIC model for process improvement.
DMAIC stands for the five steps performed by the process improvement team (see
Figure 2.1):
• Define the concrete problem to be solved. Problems typically are inefficiency,
high cost, or certain defects in the product.
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• Measure process performance. Various techniques are performed to collect
data/information about the existing process.
• Analyze the data/information to determine the root causes of the problem.
• Improve the process by changing the process to address the root causes. It is
often necessary to iterate through the Measure-Analyze-Improve steps until the
problem is solved.
• Control the improved process to sustain its performance.
2.1.2 Software Process Improvement
The success of the industrial manufacturing process improvement approaches en-
couraged people to apply them to software development processes. Those approaches,
however, were not directly applicable because the software development process has
some characteristics that distinguish it from the traditional manufacturing processes.
The software development process involves many intellectual design activities as well
as communication and coordination of humans. Therefore, many approaches have
been proposed to improve software process development. Among these, the most
widely known and used are the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [97] [98], which has
been superseded by the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) [125] [124],
and the Software Process Improvement and Capability dEtermination (SPICE) [44].
Realizing that the quality of a software product is mainly determined by the
software development process used to produce it, the Software Engineering Institute
(SEI) at Carnegie-Mellon University developed CMM to evaluate the maturity of
software development processes. The CMM defines five maturity levels for software
development processes [97]. Processes with a higher maturity level are considered to
have higher predictability of timely production of high quality software products.
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1. Initial The software products are developed in an ad hoc, sometimes even
chaotic, way. Success depends on individual effort and is unpredictable.
2. Repeatable For a project, basic project management processes are used to keep
track of cost, schedule and functionality. This enables the repetition of earlier
successes on projects with similar applications.
3. Defined A standard software process is defined. Management and engineering
activities in this process are documented, standardized and integrated. All
projects are developed and maintained by an approved and tailored version of
this standard process.
4. Managed Both the software process and the product are quantitatively mea-
sured and controlled.
5. Optimizing Once the process is in control, continuous process improvement can
be implement to remove defects or incorporate new ideas and technologies based
on the quantitative feedback.
Except for Level 1, each maturity level is associated with several predefined Key
Process Areas (KPA). KPAs identify the issues that must be addressed to achieve a
maturity level. For example, to achieve level 4, two KPAs, Software Quality Man-
agement and Quantitative Process Management, must be satisfied. For each KPA,
CMM provides several Key Practices that “describe the infrastructure and activities
that contribute most to the effective implementation and institutionalization of the
key process area.” [97]. These activities reflect best practices that successful projects
have demonstrated to achieve the KPA.
The CMM is also intended to be used as a framework to guide an organization to
improve its processes. First, the current status of the software development process in
an organization is determined by evaluating and assessing the organization’s practices
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in terms of KPAs at each level. The assessment also help the organization to identify
the highest priority KPAs that need to be focused on to achieve a higher level of
maturity. The Key Practices then can be followed to implements those KPAs.
After the adoption and usage of the CMM to improve the software development
processes in many organizations, the CMM was adapted for other disciplines such
as system engineering, risk management, and personnel management etc. The use
of multiple models within one organization is problematic because of the overlap
and inconsistencies among those models. Therefore, the CMM Integration (CMMI)
Project was formed to integrate the various CMMs into a single integrated frame-
work. Three widely adopted models, the Capability Maturity Model for Software
(SW-CMM) V2.0 (Draft C) [70], the Systems Engineering Capability Model (EIA/IS
731) [13], and the Integrated Product Development Capability Maturity Model (IPD-
CMM) V0.98a (Draft) [69], are integrated into the first version of CMMI. The CMMI
framework was designed to be flexible enough to support the integration of models
for other disciplines in the future.
SPICE described in ISO/IEC 15504 was developed by the Joint Technical Sub-
committee between ISO (International Organization for Standardization) and IEC
(International Electrotechnical Commission). It is a software process assessment and
improvement framework similar to CMMI. Compared with CMMI, the SPICE frame-
work not only defines five capability level for processes, but also explicitly distin-
guishes different kinds of processes. SPICE divides processes into five process cat-
egories: customer-supplier, engineering, supporting, management, and organization.
Another difference is that SPICE focuses on software development processes while
CMMI is more generic.
CMM and SPICE are basically best practices based approaches where the best
practices only reflect common practices used in previous successful projects. Careful
adoption of such best practices might indeed increase the chance that a project will
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be successful. Instead of being an honest self assessment method, however, maturity
or capability levels are often misinterpreted as the rank of a company. Therefore,
without careful investigation, some companies spend a lot of effort to adjust their
processes and produce the required documents just to fit into a higher maturity level.
2.2 Process Modeling
Process modeling plays a critical role in process improvement. A well specified
process model facilitates effective communication, training, and application of the
process. It also provides a solid basis for further analysis to identify weaknesses and
defects and to guide the improvement of the process. In our research, we choose
the Little-JIL process definition language [26] to define processes because it provides
supports for the complex behaviors that often arise in processes, such as concurrency
and exception handling, and has well-defined semantics that facilitate the kinds of
analysis that we want to apply. In addition, Little-JIL has a visual representations
that can be relatively easily understood by domain experts, including those outside
of computer science.
2.2.1 Little-JIL Process Definition Language
A Little-JIL process definition consists of three components, an artifact specifi-
cation, a resource specification, and a coordination specification. The artifact spec-
ification contains the items that are the focus of the activities carried out by the
process. The resource specification specifies the agents and capabilities that sup-
port performing the activities. The coordination specification ties these together by
specifying which agents and supplementary capabilities perform which activities on
which artifacts at which time(s). A Little-JIL coordination specification has a visual
representation, but is precisely defined using finite-state automata, which makes it
amenable to definitive analyses. Among the features of Little-JIL that distinguish
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Figure 2.2. Little-JIL Step
it from most process languages are its 1) use of abstraction to support scalability
and clarity, 2) use of scoping to make step parameterization clear, 3) facilities for
specifying parallelism, 4) capabilities for dealing with exceptional conditions, and 5)
clarity in specifying iteration. The analysis capabilities developed for this thesis use
the information in the coordination specification, so only this aspect of Little-JIL is
defined here.
A coordination specification consists of hierarchically decomposed steps (see Fig-
ure 2.2), where a step represents a task to be done by an assigned agent. Each step
has an interface specifying its input/output artifacts, the resources it requires, the
exceptions it throws, etc. A step with no sub-steps is called a leaf step and represents
an activity to be performed by an agent, without any guidance from the process.
Non-leaf Little-JIL steps may be decomposed into two kinds of substeps, ordi-
nary substeps and exception handlers. Ordinary substeps define how the step is to be
executed and are connected to their parent by edges that may be annotated by speci-
fications of the artifacts that flow between parent and substep and also by cardinality
specifications. Cardinality specifications define the number of times the substep is
instantiated, and may be a fixed number, a Kleene *, a Kleene +, or a Boolean ex-
14
pression (indicating whether the substep is to be instantiated). Exception handlers
define how exceptions thrown by the step’s descendants are handled.
A non-leaf step has a sequencing badge (an icon on the left of the step bar; e.g., the
right arrow in Figure 2.2) that defines the order of substep execution. For example,
a sequential step (right arrow) indicates that substeps execute from left to right. A
parallel step (equal sign) indicates that substeps execute in any (possibly interleaved)
order, although the order may be constrained by such factors as the lack of needed
inputs. A choice step (circle slashed with a horizontal line) indicates a choice among
alternative substeps. A try step (right arrow with an X on its tail) indicates the
sequence in which substeps are to be tried as alternatives.
A Little-JIL step can be optionally preceded or succeeded by a pre-requisite, repre-
sented by a down arrowhead to the left of the step bar, or a post-requisite, represented
by an up arrowhead to the right of the step bar. Pre-requisites check if the step execu-
tion context is appropriate before starting execution of the step, and post-requisites
check if the completed step execution satisfied its goals. The failure of a requisite
triggers an exception.
Channels are message passing buffers, directly connecting specified source step(s)
with specified destination step(s). Channels are used to synchronize and pass artifacts
among concurrently executing steps.
In a Little-JIL process, each step is defined exactly once. A step, however, may be
used multiple times. These uses are represented by step references. A step reference
is represented as a step bar without arrowheads that represent pre-requisite and post-
requisite.
Although originally developed to define software development and maintenance
processes, Little-JIL can also used to define process in other domains. It has been
applied to define medical processes [65] [28], labor-management negotiation processes
[93], election processes [109], and scientific data processing processes [21]. The work
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Figure 2.3. Simplified Blood Transfusion Process
in each domain has exposed several inadequacies of Little-JIL, such as the lack of
good support for specifying timing constraints and transactions, but has confirmed
the general applicability of this language.
Little-JIL is chosen as the process definition language in the implementation of
our process analysis framework because it is well suited to capture the full com-
plexity inherent in human-intensive processes that our analysis framework targets.
It provides support for abstraction, composition, and restricted, well-formed control
flow constructs that are able to capture the rich control models needed for human
behaviors. It also has extensive support for exception handling, a major aspect of
many processes, particularly human-intensive processes. Furthermore, Little-JIL has
well-defined semantics that facilitate the two kinds of analysis that we want to apply.
Figure 2.3 shows the coordination specification of a simplified blood transfusion
process defined in Little-JIL. The root step “Blood Transfusion Process” is a sequen-
tial step, meaning that its four sub-steps need to be carried out in order from left
to right. The step “Obtain Patient’s Blood Type” is a try step. When this step is
started, its first sub-step “Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type” will be executed.
If the patient’s blood type is already presented in the lab’s database, “Contact Lab
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for Patient’s Blood Type” is completed. This also completes the parent step “Obtain
Patient’s Blood Type”. The nurse can then go ahead to pick up the blood product
from the blood bank. On the other hand, if the patient’s blood type is not avail-
able, an exception PatientBloodTypeUnavailable will be thrown. In the parent step
“Obtain Patient’s Blood Type”, there is an exception handler that is able to handle
exception PatientBloodTypeUnavailable. The exception handler has a continue con-
trol flow badge represented by the right arrow, which indicates that the next sub-step
of “Obtain Patient’s Blood Type” need to be executed to test patient’s blood type.
Once the blood product is picked up, step “Perform Bedside Check” is executed to
first identify the patient and then check the blood product. If the patient is not the
one who needs the blood, “Identify Patient” throws an exception WrongPatient. The
parent step “Perform Bedside Check” does not have an exception handler to handle
this exception, so it will be terminated and re-throw this exception. Since the root
step also does not have an appropriate exception handler, exception WrongPatient
eventually terminates the whole process. Since step “Check Blood Product ” is a par-
allel step, its two sub-steps may run in parallel. If the blood product is expired, step
“Check Expiration Date” throws an exception BloodExpired. For step “Check Product
Info Match Patient Info”, an exception WrongBlood will be thrown if the info (i.e.
patient’s name, patient’ birthday, and patient’ blood type) on the blood product tag
does not match the patient’s info. Similar to exception WrongPatient, BloodExpired
and WrongBlood will also terminate the whole proces because they do not have ap-
propriate exception handlers. After “Perform Bedside Check” completes, step “Infuse
Blood” is executed to infuse the blood product to the patient. This process will be
used as a running example in the discussion of the implementation of our process
analysis framework.
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2.2.2 Other Process Modeling Languages
A wide range of process modeling languages and formalisms have been proposed
both in various domains. Here, we only provide an overview of several most widely
used languages.
2.2.2.1 BPEL
Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) [11] is a business process modeling
language developed by IBM, BEA, SAP, Siebel and Microsoft, and contains features
from two previous language: IBM’s Web Service Flow Language (WSFL) [81] and
Microsoft’s XLANG [129]. BPEL is designed to specify business processes built on
applications encapsulated in web services. It provides various constructs borrowed
from imperative programming languages, such as Java, to glue the distributed web
services together to achieve certain business goals.
A BPEL process model is a composition of activities. An activity is either a
basic activity or a structured activity. A set of predefined basic activities are used to
define the atomic behaviors of a process. For instances, an invoke activity invokes
an operation of a service (either synchronously or asynchronously), a receive activity
simply waits for a matched message from a service, and a reply activity sends a
message to a service. The other basic activities include assign (assign message data),
wait (wait for a certain period of time), empty (just do nothing), throw (signal faults),
terminate (terminate the whole process) etc.
A structured activity is composed of a set of activities and defines the control
flow on those activities. BPEL provides several kinds of structured activities to
capture the most commonly used control flow patterns, including sequence (sequen-
tial execution), flow (parallel execution), switch (conditional branching), pick (non-
deterministic choice), and while (iterative execution).
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In BPEL, a scope can be defined to wrap an activity. During the execution of the
activity contained in the scope, faults might be triggered either by the throw activities
or invoke activities. A fault handler can be attached to the scope to intercept and
handle specific kind of faults occurring within the scope. In some situations, to
keep the process in a consistent state, a fault hander may require certain completed
activity in another scope to be reversed. To achieve this, a compensation handler can
be attached to the scope wrapped around that activity. The compensation handler
will be invoked to reverse the completed activity when a compensate signal from the
fault handler is received.
BPEL processes are specified using XML and can be executed by an execution
engine. XML is designed to facilitate data passing and processing between computers,
but it is difficult for humans to write and understand directly. To solve this problem,
the Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) [61] is proposed to provide a stan-
dardized graphic notation for BPEL. A process in BPMN is represented as a Business
Process Diagram (BPD), which is basically a flow chart with notations tailored for
elements in BPEL. Like many other flow chart representations, a BPD tries to display
everything in the process, including message passing, event handling, and control-flow
etc. For a large process, the BPD quickly becomes too complicated to specify and
manage. Another problem with BPMN is that a BPD has to be translated into BPEL
to be executed. Since formal semantics of the BPMN are not defined in the BPMN
specification, many subtle details are actually decided by the translator. Therefore,
the resulting BPEL process might not accurately reflect the intention of the process
designer.
As mentioned above, BPEL is primarily designed to define business processes
based on web services. It does not support processes that involve user interaction.
An BPEL extension BPEL4People [77], therefore, is proposed to incorporate human
activities into the process definition.
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2.2.2.2 UML
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [63] is a visual specification language
for modeling the object-oriented(OO) software design. It is intended to unify the
different OO design modeling approaches and serve as a standard modeling notation
for software developers to document and communicate the design. The first version of
UML was based on Booch’s method [20], the Object Modeling Technique [113] and the
Object-Oriented Software Engineering method [73]. After that, more individuals and
organizations joined the development and many new features have been incorporated.
It is currently an independent standard developed and maintained by the Object
Management Group(OMG).
Instead of defining one single notation that can be used to model all aspects of
the software system design, UML offers various types of diagrams to model different
facets of the design. Structural diagrams, such as class diagrams, component dia-
grams, and object diagrams, can be used to model the static structures of the system
(e.g. objects, operations, and relationships). Behavior diagrams, such as statechart
diagrams, activity diagrams, and sequence diagrams, are able to specify the dynamic
behavior of the elements in the system. Details about those diagrams can be found
in [63]. Since each UML diagram only provides a specific view of the entire system,
a complete model of a system in UML need to include a collection of diagrams. On
the other hand, those UML diagrams are not designed to be orthogonal. The same
elements or behavior may be modeled using different diagrams. Therefore, not all of
the standard UML diagrams are required to be used in the model.
Because of its rich notations as well as flexibility and extensibility, UML is not
restricted to modeling the design of OO software system. For instance, SysML [62] is
a customized subset and interpretation of UML used for systems engineering model-
ing. People have also used UML as a process modeling language to model processes
for different domains. In [68], Hruby explained how to use UML to define business
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processes by mapping various business workflow concepts to UML concepts. For ex-
ample, business objects can be mapped to classes and objects in UML, and workflows
can be modeled using the UML sequence diagram and the UML activity diagram.
In [78] and [92], clinical practice guidelines or processes are modeled using UML ac-
tivity diagrams complemented by other diagrams such as class diagrams. The UML
activity diagram is a variation of a control flow graph that shows the overall flow of
control in the system.
There are several problems that arise when using UML as a process modeling
language. Since a process model will probably need to be represented using several
different kinds of UML diagrams, it might be problematic to ensure the completeness
and consistency of the overall model. In addition, the semantics of the UML activity
diagram, which is used by many approaches to represent the process logic, is still
described informally in the current version of UML. In fact, a few issues have been
found during attempts to formalize the semantics of the activity diagram(e.g. [122]
and [49]).
2.2.2.3 Petri Nets
Invented in 1962 by Carl Adam Petri in his dissertation [102] (English translation
[103]), the Petri net is a well known formalism for the specification and analysis
of concurrent, discrete-event systems. It provides graphical annotations that have
precisely defined semantics. This facilitates the rigorous analysis of the Petri net
models. Many Petri net based approaches have been proposed to model software
development processes, such as SLANG [16], FUNSOFT Nets [47], and SoftPM [88].
SLANG [16] is a Petri net based software process modeling language developed at
Politecnico di Milano and CEFRIEL. It is a part of a software process environment
SPADE [15] that supports software process design, analysis, and enactment. SLANG
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is based on Environment/Relationship (ER) net [58], which is a high-level extension
of the Petri net formalism.
A SLANG process specification consists of Process Type definitions and Process
Activity definitions. Process types define the static structure of the process. The
types of all artifacts used in the process are described in a similar way with the class
description represented with an object-oriented type hierarchy. Process activities
define the dynamic behavior of the process. Each process activity definition consists
of an interface and an implementation. An activity interacts with the other activities
in the process through its interface, which contains a set of starting events and a set
of ending events. Those events are represented as transitions. An activity is invoked
when one of the starting events occurs and produces an ending event when it finishes.
The interface also includes a set of places that are used for parameter passing. The
implementation of an activity then defines how input parameters are transformed into
output parameters using ER nets.
One interesting feature of SLANG is that it supports modeling the dynamic
changes of a process. Activities in SLANG are treated as artifacts and can be ma-
nipulated by other activities. Therefore, activities can be changed or created on the
fly.
Although Petri net approaches like SLANG are highly expressive, they are awk-
ward in specifying some common aspects of processes, such as exception handling and
resource management. Furthermore, graphical annotations of Petri nets are very low-
level. It is difficult to specify and understand complex processes using such notations,
even for experts.
2.2.2.4 Rule-Based
Rule-based process modeling languages, such as the one used in MARVEL [76],
are based on features from languages used for knowledge-based systems. MARVEL is
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a software development environment that provides automated execution support for
the developers.
In MARVEL, objects used by a software development process (e.g. modules,
procedures, and design documents) are stored in a database called the object base.
The types of objects are defined as an object-oriented type hierarchy. A type definition
of a object consists of a set of attributes indicating status of the object and activities
that can be performed on the object.
The software development process is defined as a set of rules. Each rule consists of
an activity, a precondition, and a postcondition. The activity represents a development
task that may be performed by a tool (e.g. compile a module) or by a developer (e.g.
edit a module). An activity will be executed only if the associated precondition
is satisfied. The execution of the activity may have different results. The effects
of these results are captured by the postcondition. The postcondition consists of
several mutually exclusive assertions. Each assertion reflects the effect of one result.
For example, compiling a module may succeed or fail. Therefore, the postcondition
contains two assertions. One assertion indicates that the compiled attribute of the
module must be true if the compilation succeeds. The other asserts that the error
attribute of the module has to be true if the compilation fails. Both the precondition
and the postcondition are first-order predicates in terms of the object attributes.
A process is executed through forward chaining and backward chaining. Forward
chaining is applied when a rule finishes. Depending on the result, one assertion in
the postcondition of the rule becomes true. This triggers the runtime environment to
evaluate preconditions that might be affected by that assertion. Rules with precondi-
tions being satisfied are enabled and will be executed. Backward chaining is triggered
when a user attempts to invoke a rule whose precondition is not satisfied. The runtime
environment identifies rules whose postconditions might satisfy this precondition and
attempts to execute them. These rules may in turn cause further backward chain-
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ing. This procedure continues until the precondition of the rule invoked by the user
is satisfied, or a notification is reported to the user indicating the rule cannot be
executed.
In rule-based process modeling languages like MARVEL, the control flow of a
process is implicit. Therefore, they do not have the problem of defining uncommon
flow of control as in many other languages. This, however, is also a major weakness.
It is difficult for users to specify and understand a process defined as a set of such
rules.
2.2.2.5 Medical Guideline Modeling Languages
Medical guidelines (or medical protocols) are emerging as an important technology
to increase the quality of heath-care in modern medical practice. Derived from up-to-
date best practice, medical guidelines are essentially processes that provide medical
practitioners with decision options and respective courses of actions about appropriate
health-care for specific circumstances. In recent years, a large number of medical
guidelines have been published (e.g. [5] [6]). The problem is that these guidelines are
usually informally described and are often ambiguous, incomplete, and inconsistent.
To address this problem, a large number of medical guideline specification languages
as well as supporting systems have been developed to specify, manage, analysis, and
execute medical guidelines (e.g. the Arden Syntax [121], GLARE [128], GLIF [22]
[100], Asbru [116], PROforma [123], EON [91], GUIDE [107], and PRODIGY [75]).
The OpenClinical website [7] gives a relatively complete list of the most influential
approaches, and the paper [99] compares several major approaches. Here, we focus
on the medical guideline modeling languages used in a few selected approaches.
GLARE is a medical guideline acquisition, representation and execution system
developed by Terenziani at University of Piemonte Orientale A. Avogadro, Italy [128].
A medical guideline specification in GLARE is defined in terms of actions. GLARE
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distinguishes between atomic actions and composite actions. Atomic actions are el-
ementary steps in a guideline. There are four types of atomic actions: work actions
(basic tasks performed by physicians), query actions (data acquisition), decision ac-
tions (decisions to choose alternatives), and conclusion actions (output of a decision
action). Composite actions are composed of sub-actions (atomic or composite). The
execution order of the sub-actions are specified using the pre-defined control rela-
tions: sequence, controlled, alternative, and repetition. The controlled relation allows
the user to define flexible temporal constraints, such as “A during B”, “start of A
at least 1 hour after the beginning of B”, etc. These flexible temporal constraints
could introduce inconsistency into the medical guideline specification. To solve this
problem, a temporal reasoning algorithm is used to check the consistency of the spec-
ification. GLARE also provides simple failure and exceptions handling mechanism,
such as restart, abort, and suspend. To enhance the user-friendliness, a visual editor
was developed for users to specify the guideline. In the editor, the structural decom-
position of a guideline is displayed by a tree and the control flow is represented by a
variation of a flowchart. Compared to Little-JIL, GLARE lacks explicit agent speci-
fications and adequate artifact flow specifications. Its exception handling mechanism
is also relatively weaker than the one in Little-JIL.
GLIF (GuideLine Interchange Format) is a structured medical guideline repre-
sentation language developed by the InterMed Collaboratory at Stanford Univer-
sity [22] [100]. A GLIF guideline contains an Algorithm, represented as a flowchart
that captures the temporal ordering of clinical steps. There are four kinds of steps
in GLIF: action steps (representing tasks to be performed by medical professionals),
decision steps (indicating decision points to choose alternatives), branch and synchro-
nization steps (modeling multiple simultaneous paths), patient-state step (explicitly
characterizing patient’s clinical state). The action steps can be nested steps that
contain subguidelines. An expression language is provided for representing decision
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criteria, triggering events, exceptional conditions, and states. In the most recent ver-
sion, GLIF3, a guideline can be specified in three levels of abstraction: the conceptual
level, the computable level, and the implementable level. The conceptual level focus
on the control flows of the guideline, represented as a flowchart. Many details, such
as decision criteria, relevant patient data, and iteration information are added to the
specification at the computable level, which allows the validation and simulation of the
guideline. At the implementable level, actions and data in the guideline are mapped
to existing procedures and electronic medical records in a specific institute so that the
guideline can be incorporated into the institutional information system. The main
problem with GLIF is that the flowchart representation is cumbersome for capturing
large guidelines with complex exceptional control flows.
Asbru is a medical guideline specification language used in the Asgaard project,
which was collaboratively developed at Ben Gurion University and the Vienna Uni-
versity of Technology [116]. A guideline in Asbru is called a “plan”. Similar to many
other languages, a plan can be further decomposed into sub-plans. There are three
kinds of decomposable plans: sequential, concurrent, and cyclical. A plan that is not
decomposed needs to be executed by the user or by an external call to a computer
program. The semantics of a plan is rigorously defined by a state-transition system.
One important feature of Asbru is that it provides rich real-time annotations that
enables the expression of uncertainty in the starting time, ending time, and duration
of a time interval, with the use of absolute, relative, and even cyclical reference an-
notations. This uncertainty allows a plan to capture the essence of a guideline but
leaves room for execution-time flexibility. Since Asbru was designed to be a text-
based, machine-readable language, it is difficult for humans to understand. Another
limitation is that it lacks support for exception handling.
PROforma [123] was developed at the Advanced Computation Laboratory of Can-
cer Research, UK. The basic building block of a guideline definition in PROforma is
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the task. A task specification includes title, identifier (name and parameters), descrip-
tion, goal, trigger conditions, pre-conditions, post-conditions, and etc. PROforma
supports four types of tasks: plan, decision, action, and enquiry. A plan is a compo-
sition of sub-tasks. The tasks in a guideline are organized hierarchically into plans.
A decision is a point at which certain decision needs to be made to determine an
alternative to take. An action represents some procedure that needs to be carried
out by a medical professional or a computer system. An enquiry represents a point
at which data needs to be acquired. A flowchart-based graphic representation is also
provided to enhance the uder-friendliness. Like other flowchart-based representation,
this approach is not intuitive for modeling large guideline with complex exceptional
control flows.
2.3 Finite-State Verification
In this section, we first give a brief introduction to finite-state verification. Then
we discuss several existing finite-state verification tools. Finally, we present selected
approaches that apply finite-state verification techniques to analyze business processes
and medical processes.
2.3.1 Introduction to Finite-State Verification
Finite-state verification(FSV) is a static analysis technique that has been suc-
cessfully applied to detect errors in complex software systems. Such systems often
contain complex control flows and data flows among different components. For con-
current systems, the system behavior could be more complicated because even with
the same input, the non-determinism of task scheduling may lead to different orders
in which instructions from different tasks are executed, causing the concurrent sys-
tem to produce different results. Subtle errors in such systems often involve intricate
interactions between various components. In addition, some errors only manifest
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themselves under a few specific schedules. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to find
such errors. Testing is the most widely used method for identify errors in software
systems. For most systems, however, only a tiny fraction of the possible executions
can be tested. FSV, on the other hand, is able to systematically detect certain kind
of errors by exhaustively checking all possible executions against a given property.
FSV involves a finite-state model, a property, and a verification engine. The
model, which is constructed from the system of interest, represents all possible rele-
vant executions of the system. A property specifies an invariant that should always
hold in the system. FSV is able to verify a large class of properties called temporal
properties. A temporal property, which prescribes the temporal ordering of certain
events in the system, can be rigorously defined using formalisms including Linear-time
Temporal Logic(LTL) [105], Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [32], and automata [43].
Although slightly different from each other in terms of expressivity, these formalisms
are all able to capture most of the safety properties and the liveness properties. Infor-
mally, a safety property specifies that something bad never happens during execution
of a system. A liveness property, on the other hand, states that something good
will eventually happen. It is important to note that one property only defines a
partial specification of system’s correctness. Thus, verification of a system usually
requires a set of properties. Given a property and a model, the verification engine
explores all executions through the model and checks whether the property holds on
each execution. If the property does not hold, a counter-example trace through the
model is produced to show a scenario where the property is violated. By studying the
counter-example trace, the analyst can pinpoint the source of the error in the system.
The analyst then can fix the error and try again. Note that finite-state verification is
only able to identify errors with respect to the given properties. It cannot guarantee
the complete correctness of the system. Errors may remain undetected if their corre-
sponding property is not provided. The benefit of FSV is that by ensuring that the
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system satisfies the important and relevant properties, we increase our confidence in
the correctness of the system.
The major issue faced by FSV is the state explosion problem. During verification,
the explored states of the system need to be stored so that they will not be visited
again. This prevents the FSV from being applied to large systems that have extremely
huge state spaces. To attack this problem, many optimizations have been proposed,
such as abstraction [40] [60], partial order reduction [33] [59], and symbolic methods
[87]. It has been shown that FSV can often scale up to handle a lot of very large
software systems with the help of these optimizations.
Similar to the software systems, real world processes often tend to be complex,
concurrent, and exception-prone. This suggests that FSV might as well be effective
in identifying errors in processes.
2.3.2 Finite-State Verification Tools
A variety of finite-state verification tools have been developed to verify software
systems. Here, we discuss several selected approaches that exploit different algorithms
for verification to give an idea of the range of approaches.
2.3.2.1 SPIN
SPIN is a widely used distributed system verification tool based on reachabil-
ity analysis [67]. It accepts system models specified in a modeling language called
Promela (Process Meta Language). A Promela model consists of a set of processes
that communicate synchronously or asynchronously with each other using channels
and global variables. The property to be verified can be written in standard Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) [105]. To verify the property, SPIN performs a Depth First
Search (DFS) to visit each state that is reachable from the initial state. States ex-
plored during the search are stored so that they will not be visited again. To speed
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up the verification and save the memory, SPIN provides several optimizations such
as partial order reduction, state compression, and bitstate hashing.
2.3.2.2 SMV
Instead of representing states explicitly, the Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) [87]
uses a data structure called Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) to compactly encode a
set of states. A BDD [25] is a directed acyclic graph that denotes a Boolean function,
a compact representation of a set of the states that correspond to the assignments that
make the function true. In addition, the transition relations can also be represented
as Boolean functions and hence be encoded using BDDs. The verification, therefore,
can be performed using efficient BDD operations. SMV is able to check properties
expressed in a branching-time temporal logic called Computation Tree Logic [32].
The Cadence SMV [2], which is an extension of SMV, supports a more expressive
modeling language and compositional verification. Another extension called NuSMV
combines BDD-based model checking and SAT-based model checking [30].
2.3.2.3 FLAVERS
FLow Analysis for VERification of Systems (FLAVERS) is a finite-state veri-
fication tool developed to verify event-based, behavioral properties of concurrent
systems [43]. In FLAVERS, the system is automatically abstracted into a concise
event-based model that explicitly represents inter-task communication, synchroniza-
tion, and event orderings. Then a polynomial-time, data-flow analysis algorithm is
applied to determine whether the system satisfies a given property defined as a finite-
state automaton. Unlike many other approaches that directly verify the complete
system model, FLAVERS exploits an incremental procedure through which analysis
of increasing precision can be constructed. First, a very small abstract model is con-
structed and verified. This abstract model might be adequate to verify the property.
If the counter-example trace produced is an infeasible trace, the current model is not
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precise enough. In this case, the counter-example trace can be used to select a con-
straint to refine the model, and the refined model is verified again. This procedure
continues until no violation of the property is found, or a feasible counter-example
is reported. Usually, properties can be verified without using the complete system
model. Therefore, this approach often seems to scale quite successfully.
2.3.2.4 INCA
The Inequality Necessary Conditions Analysis (INCA) applies integer linear pro-
gramming techniques to the verification of concurrent programs [37]. In this ap-
proach, the system model is turned into a set of inequalities that describe the legal
flow through the system. The complement of the property, which is supposed to hold
for the system, is also represented as an inequality. Then integer linear programming
techniques can be applied to determine whether there exists a solution for those in-
equalities or not. A computed solution indicates a violation of the property because
it represents a legal flow through the system that also satisfies the complement of the
property. Although the integer linear programming has an exponential complexity
in the worst case, INCA is often able to verify large systems because the inequalities
generated are usually extremely simple.
2.3.2.5 LTSA
The Labeled Transition System Analyzer (LTSA) was designed to modeling and
analyzing the behavior of systems represented by labeled transition systems (LTSs)
[84]. In LTSA, a concurrent system is modeled by a set of interacting processes,
where a process is described textually as a finite-state process (FSP) that consist
of sequences of events. The behavior of the concurrent system is captured by the
composition, or cross-product, of all FSPs in the system. A property in LTSA is
specified as an FSP in the same way as a process except for the additional ERROR
state. Any sequence of events that reaches the ERROR state indicates a violation
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of the property. Checking for violation of a property is performed on-the-fly while
computing the composite FSP of all processes FSPs and the property FSP.
2.3.2.6 Bandera
As discussed above, most verification tools only accept models specified in their
own specification languages (e.g. state machines, label transition systems). They
cannot be directly applied to verify software systems that are written in high-level
programming languages such as Java. To address this issue, Bandera [38] is proposed
to verify Java program using existing verification tools such as SPIN and SMV. It
employs a two-stage translation approach to translate a Java program into the input
models of various verification tools. The Java program is first translated into an
intermediate representation called Bandera Intermediate Representation (BIR) [36].
The BIR modeling language is a guarded-command language for describing state-
transition systems and was intended to support translation into the input languages
of a variety of verification tools. The BIR is further translated into the input models
of various verification tools. Then the resulting input models can be verified against
given properties by the corresponding verification tools. If a property does not hold,
a violation trace is provided to show how the property is violated.
To enhance the scalability, optimizations such as slicing and abstraction are per-
formed during the Java to BIR translation to remove control points, variables, and
data structures that are irrelevant for checking a given property. Since the input
model is considerably different from the original Java program after the translation
and optimizations, the violation trace provided by the underlying verification tool is
usually very difficult to understand for the analyst. To solve this problem, Bandera
maps violation traces produced by the underlying verification tools back to traces
through the original Java program.
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At a high-level, our implementation of the process verification functionality in
our process analysis framework is very similar to Bandera. Our implementation first
translates Little-JIL processes into BIR models and then to input models for var-
ious verification tools. In addition, we also apply optimizations in the translation
to enhance the scalability and generate high-level Little-JIL traces from low-level
violation traces. A main difference is that our implementation targets Little-JIL pro-
cesses instead of Java program. Because of this, the optimizations that we propose
are quite different from the ones used in Bandera. Further more, we use a search
algorithm to generate the high-level trace from the violation traces, as oppose to the
reverse-mapping approach in Bandera.
2.3.3 Verification of Business Process
Different formalisms, such as Petri nets, finite-state automata, and process alge-
bra, etc., have been exploited to formally define the semantics of BPEL, allowing
formal verification to be applied to BPEL processes.
In [119], Stahl provided a mapping of BPEL constructs to Petri net patterns. A
tool called BPEL2PN has been implemented to automatically translate BPEL pro-
cesses into Petri nets [66]. While the control flow of the BPEL processes is preserved
by the translation, messages and data are abstracted as black tokens. The Petri nets
then can be verified using the Low Level Petri Net Analyzer(LoLA) [115]. LoLA is
able to analyze various Petri net general properties, such as reachability and bound-
edness [50]. It also supports the verification of process specific properties specified in
the branching time temporal logic CTL. As pointed out by the authors, the direct
translation does not scale because the models generated contain too many details that
are not relevant to the property. Therefore, it is necessary to apply optimizations in
the translation to reduce the size of the models.
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Ouyang et. al developed a similar approach, called BPEL2PNML, [95] that trans-
lates BPEL into the Petri Net Markup Language (PNML) [133]. This approach also
focuses on the translation of the control flow of BPEL processes. The resulting model
can be verified by WofBPEL tool [94]. WofBPEL is able to perform three kinds of
general analysis: detecting unreachable activities, detecting multiple activities that
may consume the same message, and checking whether a message may eventually be
consumed.
Colored Petri Nets (CP-nets) [74] have also been used for formalizing the semantics
of BPEL. CP-nets extend the ordinary Petri nets by providing high-level constructs
for data manipulation, which makes a CP-nets model of a business process more
compact than the corresponding Petri nets model. Yang et. al proposed a set of rules
that map most of the BPEL activity constructs to the CP-nets [137]. The verification
of CP-net models can then be performed using existing CP-nets verification tools.
Fu, Bultan and Su developed the Web Service Analysis Tool (WSAT) to verify
BPEL processes [56]. A BPEL process is first translated to a guarded automata
model. The guarded automata model is further mapped to Promela and verified
by SPIN. As opposed to most other work, which only focuses on translating the
control flow of the process, WSAT is able to handle data manipulation using XPath
expressions. This allows the verification of properties about message content [55].
Since SPIN is a finite-state verification tool, the size of the input queues has to
be bound during the translation to achieve a finite model. This usually makes the
verification unsound. They proved that for certain kind of processes with unbounded
input queues, the verification of a bounded model is sound [54]. They called such
processes “synchronizable” processes and gave several sufficient conditions that can
be used to decide whether a process is “synchronizable” or not.
Nakajima also used SPIN to verify BPEL processes [118]. First, a BPEL activity
is translated into an extended finite automaton. Then, the automaton is represented
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in Promela. During the translation, some abstraction techniques are used to reduce
the resulting model.
Arias-Fisteus, Fernandez and Kloos develop a tool called VERBUS that trans-
late BPEL processes into finite-state machines [51]. These finite-state machines are
subsequently mapped onto Promela and the input language for SMV and NuSMV.
Foster, Uchitel, Magee, and Kramer have developed the tool LTSA-WS [52], an
extension of LTSA, to verify BPEL processes. The activities of BPEL are translated
into FSPs and verified by LTSA.
2.3.4 Verification of Medical Processes
A few approaches have been proposed to apply formal methods, mostly finite-state
verification, to improve the quality of medical guidelines.
In [126], to analyze a medical guideline, the text description of the guideline
is first turned into an Asbru model with the help of domain experts. Asbru [116]
is specification language specific for modeling medical guidelines. Its semantics is
formally defined using Structural Operational Semantics (SOS) [104]. This allows the
Asbru model to be translated to a formal representation for the interactive theorem
prover KIV [14]. KIV is able to verify properties specified using a variant of interval
temporal logic (ITL) [90]. If a property does not hold, a counter example is provided to
show how the property is violated. This approach was applied to two real-life medical
protocols, a jaundice protocol and a diabetes mellitus protocol, and several flaws in
the jaundice protocol were detected during the verification. The major problem with
this approach is that it is not fully automatic. Some encodings have to be performed
by the analyst for the translation. Moreover, in many cases, KIV might require the
analyst to provide additional assumptions to complete a proof of the property.
In [17], the Asbru model is translated into the input language of the SMV model
checker and verified by Cadence SMV. A simple data abstraction is proposed to
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abstract the data flow and time. This allows the translation to be performed au-
tomatically. The abstraction, however, might introduce infeasible counter-example
paths. If this occurs, the analyst has to manually refine the model to eliminate the
infeasible counter-example paths. This work also used the jaundice protocol as an
example and found errors in it.
In [127], the clinical guideline defined in GLARE [89] is translated to a Promela
[67] representation and verified by the SPIN model checker. As a proof of concept
paper, no details of the evaluation were presented.
2.4 Fault-Tree Analysis
2.4.1 Introduction to Fault-Tree Analysis
During execution, faults might occur in components of a system due to hardware
failures, human errors, etc. Those faults might propagate through the system and
eventually cause hazards to occur. In the context of safety analysis, a hazard refers to
an unsafe state of the system that will lead inevitably to a serious accident if certain
conditions in the environment are presented. To prevent or control the potential
hazards, one needs to understand what hazards could occur in the system and how
they could happen. A variety of hazard analysis techniques have been developed to
identify potential hazards, assess their effect, and identify and evaluate the causal
factors related to the hazards [80]. Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) [131] is a hazard
analysis technique used to systematically identify and evaluate all possible causes of
a given hazard.
Given a hazard, a fault tree is produced to show all the parallel and sequential
combinations of events that could lead to the hazard. The basic elements of a fault
tree are events and gates. Events are used to represent faults, such as component
failures, human errors, or other pertinent conditions in the system or environment.
Figure 2.4 shows symbols of several commonly used events and gates. Basic events
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Figure 2.4. Fault Tree Elements
Figure 2.5. Fault Tree Example
are basic initiating faults or conditions. Undeveloped events are events that are not
developed any further, either because necessary information for deriving the fault
tree leading to these events is unavailable or because these events are considered to
have insignificant consequence. Basic events and undeveloped events are also called
primary events because they require no further development. As opposed to primary
events, intermediate events are events that need to be developed. An intermediate
event is developed by investigating the system to identify the immediate, necessary,
and sufficient events that cause this event, and then connecting those events to it via
a proper gate. In a fault tree, events are connected using gates. Each gate connects
one or more input events to a single output event. The output event of an AND gate
occurs if all of the input events occur. While the output event of an OR gate occurs
if any of the input events occurs. Figure 2.5 shows an example fault tree.
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Typically, FTA involves 3 steps:
1. Modeling the system. The system model is usually specified using a flow graph.
It prescribes the boundary and granularity of the analysis.
2. Constructing a fault tree. Given the system model, the fault tree construction
process starts with the TOP event, which is an intermediate event representing
the given hazard. For each intermediate event, all immediate and necessary
events that could lead to this event are identified and connected to this event
using appropriate gates. These new events themselves may be intermediate
events and need to be developed. This process continues until all leaf nodes in
the fault tree are primary events.
3. Evaluating the fault tree. Once a fault tree has been derived, qualitative and
quantitative analysis can be applied to provide information, such as specific
sequences and sets of events that are sufficient to cause a hazard and overall
system vulnerability to a hazardous outcome resulting from the occurrence of
a particular event. This information can then be used as guidance for improve-
ment of the design or implementation of the system.
Once a fault tree has been derived, Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) for this fault tree
can be computed. An MCS contains a minimal set of primary events that ensure that
the hazard will occur. The MCSs may indicate certain weakness of the process and
provide guidance for improvement of the design or implementation of the system. For
instance, if a MCS only contains one event, the process is exposed to the single point
of failure – the hazard will definitely occur if the event occurs. Therefore subsequent
changes might need to be made to the process to remove these weaknesses. There
exists many tools, such as Espresso [3], OpenFTA [8], and Galileo [4], that can be
used to compute the MCSs.
38
2.4.2 Related Work of Fault-Tree Analysis
Fault-Tree Analysis was first developed by H.A.Watson of Bell Labs for the US. Air
Force to study the Minutemen Launch Control System [48]. It then was adopted and
extensively applied by the Boeing Company for designing and evaluation commercial
aircrafts. Following its adoption by aerospace industry, FTA became widely used in
many other industries, such as the nuclear power industry, the chemical industry, and
the automotive industry.
To our knowledge, Leveson was the first to apply FTA to safety analysis of software
systems. In [27], Leveson et al. proposed to use fault trees to guide the analyst to
identify errors that cause an Ada program to produce incorrect outputs. The fault
tree is constructed using templates, one for each kind of statements in Ada. The
incorrect output of the program is represented as the top event. Then the set of
causes that might occur in the previous statements are derived using the appropriate
template. By inspecting the code, the analyst may eliminate some causes that are
inconsistent with the corresponding statement. The remaining causes can then be
further developed until the errors are identified.
Many other template-based approaches have been proposed for different languages
thereafter. For instance, [53] presented a set of fault tree derivation templates for
Pascal. Leveson et al. designed a fully automatic fault tree derivation tool that uses
templates to generate fault trees from the Requirements State Machine Language
(RSML) specifications [108]. The approach by Pai et al. is able to automatically
derives fault trees from UML models [96]. This approach requires the dependency
relationships to be explicitly specified in addition to the UML model. In [85], McK-
elvin et al. described an algorithm that produces fault trees from Fault Tolerant Data
Flow (FTDF) models.
Instead of using templates, some approaches, such as [82] and [86], use model
checking to generate fault trees. In these approaches, explicit state machine models
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need to be incorporated into the system model to represent all possible faults that
may occur within components. Given a system model and a hazardous output, a
model checking tool is applied to verify the system model against the property that
states that the given hazardous output will never occur. The fault tree then can
be constructed using the resulting violation paths. For each violation path, events
in this path are connected to an intermediate event representing this path using an
AND gate. Then events that represent all violation paths are connected to the TOP
event using an OR gate. One problem with these approaches is that there may be an
infinite number of paths. In their papers, however, the authors do not explain how
their approaches deal with this problem.
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CHAPTER 3
FINITE-STATE VERIFICATION
A human-intensive process often requires coordinating the efforts of many differ-
ent parties who often perform their activities in parallel. This introduces substantial
amounts of concurrency and communication into the process. Moreover, a human-
intensive process also has to cope with various exceptional situations during the exe-
cution of the process. Handling of exceptions often leads to diversion of the normal
control flow and causes the processes to be even more complicated. Such complexity
increases the risk of errors in a process. Software engineers will readily note that the
software development community already deals with the creation of complex proce-
dures (e.g., complex software systems) that present a range of difficulties analogous
to those found in processes. This suggests that the finite-state verification techniques
used in software engineering to detect errors in complex, distributed systems might be
effective in analyzing processes. In fact, many approaches have already been proposed
to apply finite-state verification to processes, several of which have been discussed in
the previous chapter. In these approaches, a process definition is first translated into
the input model of an existing finite-state verification tool. Then the verification
tool is executed to verify the model against given properties. The existing process
verification approaches that we have investigated have the following issues.
• Flexibility: Most approaches translate process definitions to models of a
single selected verification tool. Since each existing verification tool has its own
strengths and weaknesses, being tied to a specific tool limits the verification
capability of these approaches.
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• Scalability: Many approaches only demonstrate the feasibility of applying
finite-state verification to analyze processes. They do not address the state-
explosion problem that is frequently encountered in verifying complex human-
intensive processes. Such approaches will frequently fail to work as the processes
become more complicated.
• Usability: Most approaches do not pay much attention to usability issues.
Since the process definition is translated into the input model of the underlying
verification tool, to verify the process, the properties need to be specified in
terms of constructs in the translated model. This requires the users to have a
fair understanding of the translation. Moreover, when a property is violated,
the verification tool will produce a violation trace that shows how the violation
occurs. Such violation traces are hard to understand due to the significant
difference between the process definition and the translated input model.
To address these issues, we proposed a general process analysis framework that
can be adapted to verify processes defined in different process definition languages
using different finite-state verification tools.
3.1 Process Verification Framework
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of the general process verification framework.
At a high-level this framework works as follows. It first translates the given process
definition into the model recognized by the underlying verification tool. During the
translation, several optimizations are applied to reduce the model. Similarly, the
property is also translated into the representation fitting with the verification tool.
The underlying verification tool is then invoked to verify the translated model against
the translated property. If the property does not hold for the process, the verification
tool will produce a violation trace, showing how the property is violated. This low-
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Figure 3.1. Process Verification Framework
level violation trace is automatically turned into the corresponding high-level trace
through the original process, which is presented to the analyst via various graph
representations.
At a high-level the framework can be viewed as consisting of five components, as
indicated by dashed rounded rectangles in Figure 3.1, each intended to address one
or more of the issues listed above. These components are:
• Process Translation A two-stage translation approach is employed to address
the flexibility issue. The process definition is first translated into a General
Intermediate Model Representation (GIMR). The GIMR is then translated into
the input model of the selected verification tool. The GIMR is a low-level
representation that contains simple constructs that can be easily translated
into input models of various verification tools.
• Optimizations To address the scalability issue, optimizations are applied to
reduce the model during the translation. An optimization can either be per-
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formed during the process-to-GIMR translation (Pre-GIMR optimization) or
be performed during the GIMR-to-verifier-model translation (Post-GIMR opti-
mization). Pre-GIMR optimizations are able to achieve considerable reduction
because they can exploit specific features of the process definition language. Be-
ing performed during the process-to-GIMR translation also allows Pre-GIMR
optimizations to benefit all verification tools. Post-GIMR optimizations, on the
other hand, are able to take advantage of features specific to the input modeling
languages of the corresponding verification tools. Unlike Pre-GIMR optimiza-
tions, Post-GIMR optimizations are only applicable to specific verification tools.
• Property Translation Instead of requiring the analyst to encode a property
with respect to the input model of the underlying tool, to better support usabil-
ity we ask the analyst to specify the property in terms of constructs in the pro-
cess definition. The property translation component automatically translates
this high-level property specification into the equivalent property representation
accepted by the selected verification tool.
• High-Level Trace Generation As noted, the violation trace is usually very
difficult to understand for the analyst. To address this useability problem,
the high-level trace generation component generates a trace over the original
process based on the violation trace produced by the verification tool. Since
the high-level trace represents an execution through the original process, it is
much easier to understand.
• Trace Visualization Since human-intensive processes are often very complex,
the high-level traces may be lengthy and verbose. To help the analyst to quickly
identifying the error indicated by violation traces and thus help the useability,
the trace visualization displays traces using graphic representations that allow
the analyst to easily navigate the traces.
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This framework is designed to support verifying processes defined in different pro-
cess definition languages. To support a new process definition language, one needs to
implement Process-to-GIMR Translation in the Process Translation component. Cer-
tain Pre-GIMR Optimizations can also be provided to reduce the translated GIMR
models. In addition, one needs to implement a High-Level Trace Generation com-
ponent and a Trace Visualization component to generate and display the high-level
traces through the process defined in the target process definition language from vio-
lation traces produced by the verification tool. The rest of the framework, including
GIMR-to-Verifier-Model Translation, Post-GIMR Optimizations and Property Trans-
lation, can be reused for different process definition languages.
The framework is also designed to support different verification tools. Process-to-
GIMR Translation, Pre-GIMR Optimizations, and Trace Visualization can be reused
for different underlying verification tools. To support a new verification tool, one
needs to implement a GIMR-to-Verifier-Model Translation component, a Property
Translation component, and a High-Level Trace Generation component for this veri-
fication tool. If necessary, certain Post-GIMR Optimizations can also be added.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this framework, we provided an implemen-
tation of this framework and applied it to verify two real-world human-intensive
processes. In this implementation, we selected Little-JIL as the process definition
language. This is because this language provides rich facilities with well defined
semantics that allow us to model the complex concurrency, coordination, and excep-
tion handling that often arise in human-intensive processes and we had Little-JIL
definitions for some human-intensive processes to evaluate the framework. In addi-
tion, since we had access to the internal representation of the Little-JIL processes,
the process translation would be easier to implement. The GIMR that we chose is
the Bandera Intermediate Representation (BIR) [36] used by Bandera [38]. There
are many existing finite-state verification tools as discussed in the background chap-
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Figure 3.2. Simplified Blood Transfusion Process
ter. Each tool has its own strengths and weaknesses. In our implementation, we
chose to use FLAVERS [43] and SPIN [67] simply because we are familiar with them
(FLAVERS was developed in our laboratory), and they represent distinct modeling
and checking approaches.
Since the High-Level Trace Generation and Trace visualization are also used by the
Fault-Tree Analysis, they are presented later in Trace Generation and Visualization
Chapter. In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on three components Process
Translation, Property Translation, and Optimizations. Figure 3.2 shows the simplified
blood transfusion process presented in the Background and Related Work Chapter.
It will be used as the running example in our discussion. It should be noted that
although the discussions here are based on our implementation of the framework,
most of the issues that we discuss, as well as the approaches used to handle those
issues, are also applicable to other implementations.
3.2 Process Translation
Figure 3.3 shows the details of our implementation of the Process Translation
component for Little-JIL process definition language and two verifiers FLAVERS
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Figure 3.3. Implementation of Process Translation
and SPIN. As mentioned above, Process Translation contains two sub-components:
Process-to-GIMR Translation and GIMR-to-Verifier-Model Translation. The imple-
mentation of Process GIMR Translation sub-component consists of three modules:
Process Well-Formedness Check, Process Unrolling and Little-JIL-to-BIR Transla-
tion. Process Well-Formedness Check checks the well-formedness of the process. Pro-
cess Unrolling turns the process into a finite representation. And Little-JIL-to-BIR
Translation translates the finite representation of the process into the BIR model.
As discussed in Background and Related Work chapter, this implementation is very
similar to Bandera. The main difference is that our implementation targets Little-JIL
processes instead of Java programs.
For GIMR-to-Verifier-Model Translation, a BIR-to-TFG Translation module and
a BIR-to-Promela Translation module are provided for FLAVERS and SPIN respec-
tively (Promela [67] is the input modeling language used by SPIN). Fortunately,
the BIR-to-TFG Translation module for FLAVERS was already provided by the
FLAVERS/Java front-end and the BIR-to-Promela Translation module has been
constructed by the Bandera team [1]. Since BIR is a low-level representation, the
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translation from BIR to the input model of the verification tool should be easy to
implemented. Therefore, in this section we focus on the tree modules in the imple-
mentation of Process-to-GIMR Translation sub-component.
3.2.1 Process Well-Formedness Check
The Little-JIL-to-BIR translator assumes that the Little-JIL process definition
is well-formed. Errors such as a non-leaf step without any sub-step or a parameter
without an associated parameter binding could cause the verification tool to produce
confusing or even incorrect results. Such errors can be detected by checking certain
simple critics. A critic is basically a rule that addresses a specific aspects of the
well-formedness of Little-JIL processes. For example, critics to catch two kinds of
errors mentioned above can be “any non-leaf step must have at least one sub-step”
and “any parameter must have at least one parameter binding” respectively. Instead
of hard-coding the checkers for these critics in the translation component, they are
implemented as separate plug-ins to the Little-JIL process editor. This not only
allows those errors to be caught as early as possible but also greatly simplifies the
implmentation of Little-JIL-to-BIR translation. The implementation of critic checkers
is straight-forward, and hence is not discussed here.
3.2.2 Process Unrolling
Little-JIL is a very expressive language, allowing users to precisely model complex
real-world processes. Such expressiveness, however, also presents a challenge for the
verification: Little-JIL process definitions allow an unbounded number of threads to
be created during the runtime. Unbounded numbers of threads in a Little-JIL process
can be introduced by two sources: unbounded cardinality and recursion. Figure 3.4(a)
shows an example of unbounded cardinality. The cardinality of the step “C ” is +,
indicating that any number of instances of the step “C ” can be created during an
execution. Because the parent step “P” is a parallel step, those instances of “C ” may
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Figure 3.4. Unbounded Threads Examples
be executed in parallel. Figure 3.4(b) is an example of recursion. The parent step
“P” is a parallel step, and the first child step is a step reference that refers to the
parent step. Thus, during an execution, any number of instances of “P” and “C ”
could be created recursively and potentially run in parallel.
A Little-JIL process with an unbounded number of threads cannot be directly
handled by most finite-state verification tools, including the ones that we target
(FLAVERS and SPIN). As a matter of fact, this is a common problem in soft-
ware model checking research. Many important software systems can also create
unbounded numbers of threads, including web severs that might create service threads
for unspecified number of requests or token ring algorithms involving any number of
processes. This common model-checking problem is called the parameterized model-
checking problem. It has been shown that to decide whether a temporal property
holds for systems with unbounded numbers of threads is undecidable in general [12].
Approaches that attempt to tackle this problem fall into two categories [46]. One
focuses on restricted subclasses of the systems and the properties, and applies various
abstraction techniques to obtain finite models of those systems so that they can be
verified [24] [31] [136]. The other kind of approaches simply impose a bound on the
number of threads that can be created [71] [72] [19]. The underlying premise of these
bounded approaches is called the “small scope hypothesis” [72], which suggests that
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most flaws in a system can be revealed by considering instances of the system with
a small bound. Some researches [45] have indeed shown that a sound bound can
be achieved for some particular subclasses of systems. No one, however, is able to
provide the proof to valid this assertion in the general cases. Therefore, the analyst
needs to bear in mind that this kind of bounded analysis may be unsound.
In our work, we take the bounded approach to solve this problem. The analyst is
asked to designate upper bounds for recursive steps as well as steps with unbounded
cardinalities. Given these bounds, a process unrolling preprocessor unrolls the input
Little-JIL process definition into a unrolled version of the process that contains a
finite number of step instances. In addition, a step may be used multiple times in a
Little-JIL process via step references. The process unrolling preprocessor also turns
each step reference into a step instance. As a result, the unrolled process becomes
a tree of step instances. This unrolled process then can be further translated into a
finite model that can be verified by FLAVERS or SPIN. Since the simplified blood
transfusion process does not contain steps with cardinalities, recursive steps or step
references, the unrolled process is the same as the original one.
In the remainder of this chapter, the discussions assume an unrolled Little-JIL
processes. And unless stated otherwise, we use “step” and “step instance” inter-
changeably to refer to a step instance in an unrolled Little-JIL process.
3.2.3 Little-JIL-to-BIR Translation
The Little-JIL-to-BIR Translator translates a given unrolled Little-JIL process
into a BIR program. In this subsection, we first briefly introduce the BIR specification
language. Then we give a high-level overview of the mapping between the Little-JIL
process and the BIR program. Next, we discuss the translation templates. Finally,
we describe our template-based process translation algorithm.
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3.2.3.1 Bandera Intermediate Representation
Bandera Intermediate Representation is a guarded command language used in
the Bandera project, developed at KSU, for model checking concurrent Java pro-
grams [71]. BIR contains constructs close to Java, including threads, monitor locks
and asynchronous communication primitives (e.g., wait, notify, notifyAll). Our
translation is based on the BIR specification version 0.6 [36]. Here, we only briefly
describe features that are enough to understand the translation templates. More
details about BIR can be found in the BIR specification.
A BIR program is called a process. A process consists of a set of threads, and
one of them is designated to be the main thread. The main thread is automatically
executed when the process starts. BIR provides several thread actions that can be
used to update the thread status. Threads other than the main thread need to be
started by explicitly invoking the start action. Invoking the exit action changes the
state of current thread to inactive. The join action cause the current thread to be
blocked until another thread is inactive.
A thread is basically a directed graph represented as a non-empty list of locations.
The first location in the list is the start location. Each location has a unique label
that can be used to refer to the location. A location contains one or more transforma-
tions. Each transformation has a Boolean guard expression, a sequence of actions, and
a goto target. When the execution reaches a location, guard expressions of all trans-
formations in this location are evaluated. The transformation whose guard expression
turns out to be true is enabled. The actions of the enabled transformation are then
performed in the order of which they are defined. When all the actions complete, the
control goes to the location identified by the goto target of the transformation. It is
possible that more than one transformations are enabled. In this case, only one such
transformation is non-deterministically selected to be executed.
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BIR supports seven basic data types and their corresponding operations. Cur-
rently, we only used the boolean type, the integer range type, and the lock type
in our translation. Locks are used to synchronize the threads. Operations similar to
Java are provided on the locks, such as lock, unlock, wait, unwait, notify, and
notifyAll. Threads can communicate with each other via global variables declared
in the definition section of the process. A thread may also declare local variables that
are only visible within the scope of the thread.
BIR allows predicates to be defined on the states of the process. A predicate
consists a unique identifier and a Boolean expression. The Boolean expression is
defined over two kinds of basic predicate expressions: thread location tests and remote
references. A thread location test threadName@locLabel becomes true when the
execution of the thread threadName reaches the location with the label locLabel. A
remote reference threadName:locLabel refers to the local Boolean variable locLabel
in the thread threadName.
3.2.3.2 Translation Overview
Given an unrolled process, the Little-JIL-to-BIR translator produces a BIR pro-
gram that consists of threads, variable declarations and predicates.
3.2.3.2.1 Threads
The root step of the process is translated into the main thread in the BIR program.
In addition, steps that may potentially run in parallel with other steps, including
sub-steps of a parallel step, exception handling steps, and sub-steps of a choice step,
are also translated into BIR threads. As indicated by the name of the sequencing
badge, sub-steps of a parallel step may execute in any (possibly interleaved) order,
and therefore are turned into different threads. At an exception handling point, e.g.
after termination of a sub-step of a sequential step, multiple exceptions may have
been thrown. Different exception handling steps could be invoked to handle these
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exceptions. According to the Little-JIL specification, these exception handling steps
may run in parallel. Therefore, all exception handling steps should also be translated
into threads. Translating sub-steps of choice steps into threads is not so intuitive
because the choice is supposed to choose only one sub-step to execute each time.
The problem is that the choice step does not restrict the order of its sub-steps. In
other words, sub-steps of a choice step may execute in any order although not in
parallel. One straight-forward translation option is to enumerate all possible such
orders in the BIR code. This could easily blow up the BIR code if the choice step
has many sub-steps. Instead, we translate sub-steps of a choice step into BIR thread
and force them to run one after another. This ordering is achieved by adding a
choice variable that indicates which sub-step is selected. In addition, each sub-step is
assigned one done variable that represents whether the sub-step is done or not. The
choice variable is randomly assigned to the index of a single sub-step at the beginning
of each iteration. Then all sub-step threads are started. The thread of a sub-step first
tests if it has been done. If so, the thread ends immediately. Otherwise the thread
proceeds to check the sub-step index against the choice variable. Only the thread
whose index equals the value of the choice variable will continue. And other threads
simply retract their corresponding sub-steps. The major advantage of this approach
is that it produces more compact BIR code, greatly relieving the burden of the model
construction for verification tools. For the simplified blood transfusion process, the
root step is translated to the main thread and two sub-steps of the parallel step “Check
Blood Product” are translated to two threads respectively.
3.2.3.2.2 Variables
Variables in the BIR program are translated from Little-JIL artifacts, which in Little-
JIL include exceptions and channels. In our approach, since the BIR program is
intended to be used to verify the event-based temporal properties and to create the
reversed control flow graph for fault tree derivation, the resulting BIR program needs
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to preserve the control flow of the original Little-JIL process. Details of artifacts that
do not affect the control flow are ignored by the translation. In addition, temporary
variables are introduced to enforce constraints imposed on certain steps, such as the
constraint mentioned above to enforce the ordering of threads translated from sub-
steps of a choice step.
• Exception Variables In Little-JIL, an exception can be defined as any type. In
our translation, however, we only care about whether the exception is thrown
or not, since that is the only way that an exception can affect the control flow
of the process. Thus, each exception is translated into a Boolean type exception
variable. An exception variable is initially set to false. It changes to true if
the corresponding exception is thrown and reset to false after the exception is
successfully handled by the exception handler. If the exception is re-thrown by
the exception handler, the exception variable remains true. In the simplified
blood transfusion process, there are four exceptions: PatientBloodTypeUnavail-
able, WrongPatient, BloodExpired and WrongBlood. Therefore, four exception
variables are created for these exceptions during the translation.
• Channel Variables Channels in Little-JIL are used for passing artifacts as
well as for synchronizing different steps. In our current implementation, a very
simple model is used to translate channels. A channel can hold any number
of artifacts. Similar to how unbounded numbers of threads are handled as
discussed in process unrolling subsection, a bound needs to be imposed on
channels to make the BIR program finite. In our model, the bound is set to 1.
In addition, since the Little-JIL process definition does not define the behavior
of a leaf step, in our translation the behaviors of leaf steps are abstracted using a
conservative model (Please refer to the discussion of Leaf Step Started Template
later for more details). Our implementation is based on Little-JIL 1.4. In this
version, an artifact may only affect the flow of control in a leaf step. Since
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such effects are subsumed by the abstract model of the leaf step, the content
of the artifact can be ignored. With only one artifact whose content can be
ignored, a channel can simply be translated to a Boolean type channel variable
that indicates whether the channel is empty. An channel variable is initially
set to false, indicating the channel is empty. It changes to true when a
Write operation puts an artifact into the channel. It is reset to false after a
Take operation removes the artifact in the channel. This simplified model of
channels captures most synchronization scenarios caused by the channels. This
is enough for the verification of the processes in our case studies. If necessary,
however, one can always replace this model with a more complicated model.
This can be achieved by substituting the default channel translation module
in our implementation with the one that creates a complicated channel model.
Since the simplified blood transfusion process does not use channels, no channel
variable is created during the translation.
• Temporary Variables Temporary variables are used to enforce constraints im-
posed on choice and parallel steps. As mentioned above, one choice variable
is introduced for each choice step, and one done variable is assigned to each
sub-step of a choice step. Similarly, one done variable is also assigned to each
sub-step of a parallel to avoid re-entering the finished sub-step. In the simplified
blood transfusion, step “Check Blood Product” is a parallel step. For each of its
sub-steps, one done variable is created during the translation.
3.2.3.2.3 Predicates
Predicates in the BIR program are translated from Property Event Bindings that
map abstract events in property specifications to concrete events in the Little-JIL
process. Detailed discussion of property event bindings and their translation is given
in Section 3.3.
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3.2.3.3 Translation Templates
An unrolled Little-JIL process is a tree composed of steps. The translation of
the Little-JIL process, therefore, is based on the translation of steps in the process.
Depending on certain attributes (e.g. step kind, step kind of the parent step, etc.),
steps may behave quite differently from each other. For example, a step may go from
the POSTED state to the RETRACTED state if its parent is a parallel step or a
choice step. But this will never happen if the parent step is a sequential step or a try
step. When started, a step will invoke its sub-steps if it is a non-leaf step, but the
order in which sub-steps are executed is decided by the sequencing badge of the step.
Implementing the translation of a step as a monolithic step translator would result in
a large chunk of code that is hard to maintain. Instead, we designed a few types of
translation templates. Each type of template is responsible for translating a specific
part of the behavior of a step. For example, a Started Template translates the behavior
of a step after it is started, and the Exception Handling Template translates the
exception handling actions of a step. One template type may have several templates
that correspond to different values of a specific attribute. For instance, there are five
Started Templates corresponding to five step kinds. A step translator simply consists
of a collection of templates, one for each type. To translate a given step, a specific
step translator can be constructed by selecting appropriate templates according to
attributes of the step.
According to the Little-JIL semantics, we propose twelve templates that belong
to seven template types.
• Posting Template Type This type of template translates the behaviors
before a step is posted, including passing in parameters and obtaining artifacts
from channels. Since such behaviors are the same for all steps, only one template
is defined for this type.
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• Posted Template Type This type of template translates the behaviors after
a step is posted. After being posted, a step may be opted-out or retracted under
some circumstances. If it is not opted-out or retracted, the step is started. This
type has only one template that simply uses the appropriate Retracted Template
and Opted-Out Template to translate behaviors that check whether the step
should be opted-out or retracted respectively.
• Retracted Template Type This type of template translates the behavior
that checks whether a step should be retracted. Two templates are defined:
Choice Sub-Step Retracted Template handles the sub-steps of choice steps and
Parallel Sub-Step Retracted Template handles the sub-steps of parallel steps.
• Opted-Out Template Type This type of template translates the behavior
that checks whether an optional step should be opted-out. Only one template
is defined for this type.
• Started Template Type This type of template translates the behaviors
after a step is started. Corresponding to the five step kinds, five templates
are defined for this type: Sequential Step Started Template, Try Step Started
Template, Parallel Step Started Template, Choice Step Started Template, and
Leaf Step Started Template.
• Completing Template Type This type of template translates the behaviors
right before a step is completed, including passing out parameters, and putting
artifacts in channels, etc. Such behaviors are the same for all steps, so only one
template is defined for this type.
• Exception Handling Template Type This type of template translates the
exception handling behavior for non-leaf steps. If exceptions are thrown from
its sub-steps, a non-leaf step identifies and invokes the appropriate exception
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1 loc Check_Expiration_Date_STARTED:
2 when true do { }
3 goto Check_Expiration_Date_COMPLETED;
4 when true do { b_BloodExpiration := true; }
5 goto Check_Expiration_Date_TERMINATED;
Figure 3.5. BIR Representation for Leaf Step Started Template
handlers to handle these exceptions. Such exception handling behaviors are the
same for all non-leaf steps, so only one template is defined for this type.
We only discuss four representative templates here: Leaf Step Started Template,
Sequential Step Started Template, the Parallel Step Started Template, and the Ex-
ception Handling Template. The description of all the templates can be found in
Appendix A.
3.2.3.3.1 Leaf Step Started Template
In a Little-JIL process, leaf steps are performed by the assigned agents once they are
started. The behaviors of agents, however, are not modeled in the Little-JIL process
definition. The process definition only specifies the interface of a leaf step, which
declares the parameters used by the step as well as exceptions that might be thrown
by the step. Based on the interface, we translate the started behavior of a leaf step
into a BIR model that conservatively captures such behavior.
In the simplified blood transfusion process, leaf step “Check Expiration Date”
might throw exception BloodExpired. Figure A.17 shows the BIR code generated by
Leaf Step Started Template for this step. There are two transformations in this loca-
tion, corresponding to two behaviors that step “Check Expiration Date” might have.
Both transformations have the condition true. This means that when the execution
reaches the location, one transformation will be non-deterministically selected to be
executed. In the first transformation (line 2-3), no exception is thrown and the step
“Check Expiration Date” is completed. In the second transformation (line 4-5), the
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exception Blood Expired is thrown and the step “Check Expiration Date” is termi-
nated. This is a conservative model because the conditions in which two behaviors
may occur are ignored. It turns out that such conservative model for leaf steps is
enough for verifying two processes in our case study.
3.2.3.3.2 Sequential Step Started Template
The Sequential Step Started Template is used to construct the behavior of a sequential
step after it has been started. When a sequential step is started, its sub-steps are
executed one by one from left to right. And the sequential step is only successfully
completed after all of its sub-steps have successfully completed.
Figure A.8 shows the root step as well as its four sub-steps in the simplified blood
transfusion. The corresponding BIR representation is given in the Figure A.9. When
the sequential step “Blood Transfusion Process” is started, the first sub-step “Obtain
Patient’s Blood Type” is posted (line 1-3). When “Obtain Patient’s Blood Type” is
completed, the next sub-step “Pick up Blood from Blood Bank” is posted (line 8-10).
Similarly, “Perform Bedside Check” is posted as soon as “Pick up Blood from Blood
Bank” is completed (line 15-16) and “Infuse Blood” is posted as soon as “Perform
Bedside Check” is completed (line 20-21). The sequential step “Blood Transfusion
Process” is completed when its last sub-step is completed (line 27-29). Note that
step “Perform Bedside Check” may throw exceptions. Therefore, BIR code must
be inserted to check and handle those exceptions (line 22-23). This is achieved by
invoking the Exception Handling Template.
3.2.3.3.3 Parallel Step Started Template
The Parallel Step Started Template is applied to construct the behavior of a parallel
step after it has been started. It is quite different from the Sequential Step Started
Template that we just discussed. When a parallel step is started, all its sub-steps
are posted at the same time. Then the sub-steps can be executed in any (possibly
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Figure 3.6. Sequential Step Example
1 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_STARTED:
2 when true do { }
3 goto Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED;
4 loc Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED:
5 when true do { }
6 goto Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_STARTED;
7 ... // Obtain Patient ’s Blood Type
8 loc Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED:
9 when true do { }
10 goto Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_POSTED;
11 loc Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_POSTED:
12 when true do { }
13 goto Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_STARTED;
14 ... // Pick up Blood from Blood Bank
15 loc Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_COMPLETED:
16 when true do { } goto Perform_Bedside_Check_POSTED;
17 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_POSTED:
18 when true do { } goto Perform_Bedside_Check_STARTED;
19 ... // Perform Bedside Check
20 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_COMPLETED:
21 when true do { } goto Infuse_Blood_POSTED;
22 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_TERMINATED:
23 ... // Exception handling
24 loc Infuse_Blood_POSTED:
25 when true do { } goto Infuse_Blood_STARTED;
26 ... // Infuse Blood
27 loc Infuse_Blood_COMPLETED:
28 when true do { }
29 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_COMPLETED;
Figure 3.7. BIR Representation for the Sequential Started Template
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interleaved) order. And the parallel step is only completed after all of its sub-steps
has successfully completed.
Step “Check Blood Product” in the simplified blood transfusion is a parallel step.
The BIR representation generated by the Parallel Step Started Template for this step
is given in the Figure A.13. Before the Parallel Step Started Template is applied, the
sub-steps of the parallel step have already been translated into different BIR threads.
In this example, threads T Check Expiration Date and T Check Product Info
Match Patient Info are created for sub-step “Check Expiration Date” and “Check
Product Info Match Patient Info” respectively. When the parallel step “Check Blood
Product” is started, two threads of its sub-steps are started by the start action (line
3-7). Then the parallel step waits until these thread to finish (line 8-23). Note that
each join action on a thread is followed by a threadTerminated test for that thread.
This is a constraint imposed by the BIR language specification. Note that the target
of the last location is empty. It will be set to the label of the first location in the
exception handling BIR code generated by the Exception Handling Template.
3.2.3.3.4 Exception Handling Template
The Exception Handling Template is invoked by various Started Templates to generate
the code to handle exceptions thrown by the sub-steps. When a sub-step throws an
exception, the matching exception handler associated with the parent step is invoked
to handle the exception. If the handler is associate with an exception handler step,
the handler step is executed. The exception handler also has a control-flow badge
indicating how the step catching the exception executes after the handler step finishes.
Since this exception handling mechanism is the same for all kinds of steps, only one
Exception Handling Template is defined.
Figure A.20 shows the exception handling code generated by the Exception Han-
dling Template for step “Check Blood Product” to handle two exceptions, BloodExpired
and WrongBlood, thrown by its sub-steps. There are two transformations in the only
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1 loc Check_Blood_Product_STARTED:
2 when true do { } goto Check_Blood_Product_fork_subs;
3 loc Check_Blood_Product_fork_subs:
4 when true do {
5 start(T_Check_Expiration_Date );
6 start(T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info );
7 } goto Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub1;
8 loc Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub1:
9 when true do { join(T_Check_Expiration_Date ); }
10 goto Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub1;
11 loc Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub1:
12 when threadTerminated(T_Check_Expiration_Date) do { }
13 goto Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub2;
14 loc Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub2:
15 when true do {
16 join(T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info );
17 } goto Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub2;
18 loc Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub2:
19 when
20 threadTerminated(
21 T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info
22 )
23 do { } goto unionsq;
24 ... // Exception Handling
Figure 3.8. BIR Representation for the Parallel Started Template
1 loc Check_Blood_Product_control_rethrow:
2 when (b_BloodExpired ==true || b_WrongBlood ==true)
3 do { }
4 goto Check_Blood_Product_TERMINATED;
5 when (b_BloodExpired == false && b_WrongBlood == false)
6 do { }
7 goto Check_Blood_Product_COMPLETED;
Figure 3.9. BIR Representation for the Exception Handling Template
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location in this code. The first transformation (line 2-4) checks whether those two ex-
ceptions are thrown. If any one is thrown, step “Check Blood Product” is terminated
because no exception handlers are provided to handle these exceptions. In addition,
the exception variables for two exceptions are not reset to false because they will be
re-thrown to the parent step of “Check Blood Product”. The second transformation
(line 5-7) handles the case where no exception is thrown. In this case, step “Check
Blood Product” is completed. Note that this simple example does not involve excep-
tion handlers. For more complicated exception handling scenarios, please refer to the
discussion of the Exception Handling Template in Appendix A.
3.2.3.4 Translation Algorithm
The translation algorithm involves three phases. Phase 1 goes over the unrolled
process, creating various BIR variables mentioned earlier. In Phase 2, the algorithm
performs a post-order traverse over the unrolled process, which is basically a tree of
step instances. Upon visiting a step instance, the children of this step instance have
already been translated into the BIR representations. A step translator for this step
instance is constructed by selecting appropriate templates according to attributes of
the step instance. The step translator is then applied to assemble the BIR repre-
sentations of its children and produce the BIR representation for this step instance.
All the BIR threads are completed when the traverse is finished. Phase 3 identifies
all locations in BIR threads where concrete events defined in property event bindings
occur and generates predicates based on these locations. The BIR program translated
from the simplified blood transfusion process is presented in Appendix C.
3.2.4 Summary
In this section, we discussed three issues that we encountered in the implemen-
tation of the process translation. The first issue is the well-formedness checks of the
process definition. Performing the well-formed check on the process definition before
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the translation is very important because it not only catches errors earlier but also
greatly simplifies the implementation of the translation templates. In our approach,
the well-formedness check is achieved by checking the process against a set of pre-
defined critics. The critics that we developed as well as their implementation are
specific to the Little-JIL language and cannot be used for other process definition
languages. Using critics to check the well-formedness, however, is a general idea that
can be applied in the realizations of the framework for other languages.
The second issue is how to handle unbounded numbers of threads in the process.
Currently, we simply impose upper bounds on the number of threads that can be
created. The problem of this approach is that it might be unsound for some properties.
In the future, we may consider implementing some abstraction approaches that are
sound for certain classes of processes.
The last issue is how to actually translate the process. In our approach, we
proposed a template-based translation algorithm that simplifies the implementation
of the process translation. In the original design, only five templates were provided
to translate five kinds of Little-JIL steps. It turned out that this design caused the
implementation of templates to be very complex, containing a lot of duplicated code.
Therefore, we revised the design and divided those five templates into templates with
finer granularity. Each template translates a specific part of the behavior of a step.
Our experience shows that the current design greatly simplifies the implementation of
the templates. It is also very flexible, allowing new templates to be easily added into
the translator to support new features. Although the templates and the translation
algorithm are Little-JIL dependent, the idea of using templates may also be applied
to simplify the translation of other languages.
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3.3 Property Specification and Translation
A property describes a single aspect of the behavior of a process. A process
often has different implementations that share certain common core components.
Therefore, the property should be stated at a high-level and usually is independent of
any specific implementation of the process. Typically, a property can is either event-
based or state-based. An event-based property is defined over events in the process and
a state-based property is defined over states in the process. In our implementation,
we used an event-based model for the property specification because it maps nicely
to Little-JIL process definitions, which tend to focus on events, represented as flow
of control, coordination, or task invocation. To be verified, a property needs to be
precisely specified using a formal notion. In addition, since the events in the property
specification are not tied to any process implementation, they need to be defined
in terms of events in the process implementation to be verified. Then the property
specification together with the property events definitions are translated into the
property representation accepted by the selected verifier.
In this section, we discuss our approach to specify and translate event-based prop-
erties. We first present the tool that we used to precisely specify properties. Then we
discuss property event bindings that are used to define the events in property speci-
fications. Finally, we describe the translation of property specifications and property
event bindings. In the discussion, property “the nurse must identify the patient be-
fore infusing the blood” for the simplified blood transfusion process is used a running
example. It should be noted that although this approach is based on the event-based
model, a similar approach can be applied for the state-based model.
3.3.1 Property Specification
Our experience shows that correctly specifying properties is a surprisingly difficult
task. Even experienced developers may overlook subtle, but important, details. In
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our approach, we use Propel to precisely specify properties. Propel provides users
with a set of property templates, each of which can be viewed as an extended Finite-
State Automaton representation, a Disciplined Natural Language representation, or
a Question Tree. Each representation contains options (or questions) that explicitly
indicate the variations that must be considered, thereby ensuring that users do not
overlook important subtle details. In addition, the Question Tree can be used to guide
the user in selecting the appropriate template. All three representations are views of
a single underlying representation so that a change in any representation is reflected
automatically in the others. More details about Propel can be found in [35].
3.3.2 Property Event Binding Specification
As noted, events in a property specification are not tied to a specific process im-
plementation. To verify a process implementation against the property specification,
the events in the property specification need to be clearly defined in terms of the
events in the process implementation. To distinguish those two kinds of events, “ab-
stract events” refer to the events in the property specification and “concrete events”
refer to the events in the process implementation. In our approach, we propose to
use property event bindings to define the abstract events in terms of concrete events.
A property event binding describes the mapping from an abstract event to one
or more concrete event. The property “the nurse must identify the patient before
infusing the blood” has two abstract events: “IdentifyPatient” and “InfuseBlood”. For
the simplified blood transfusion process example, it is obvious that the abstract event
“IdentifyPatient” and “InfuseBlood” can be defined as the concrete event “Identify
Patient COMPLETED” and “Infuse Blood STARTED” respectively. Therefore, the
property event bindings can be defined as:
IdentifyPatient -> Identify Patient COMPLETED
InfuseBlood -> Infuse Blood STARTED
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Figure 3.10. Process Example for Discussing Step Identifier
In this example, both concrete events only reference one step instance in the
process implementation. Therefore, we can use the step name to identify the cor-
responding step instance. This simple way of identifying step instances, however, is
not enough for complex real-world processes. During an execution of such processes,
multiple instances of a step may be created. A property may be concerned with a
concrete event occur only at some of those step instances. Therefore, one must be
able to distinguish a particular set of step instances from the others. In our approach,
the step instance identifier is introduced to identify a particular set of step instances.
To facilitate the discussion of the step instance identifier, we contrived an example
process, shown in Figure 3.10. There are four instances of step “S” in this unrolled
process, with label 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Figure 3.11 gives the syntax of the step identifier. The basic form of a step
instance identifier is step-name, which represents all instances of the step with the
name step-name. For instance, the step name S represent all four instances of step
“S” in the example process. To achieve finer granularity, however, certain constraints
have to be posed on the step name. There are three kinds of constraints that can
be used in step identifiers: prefix, index, and type. The prefix is used to distinguish
step instances from the others with different parents. The type is used to distinguish
step instances from their siblings according to their relationships with the parent (i.e.
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〈step-instance-identifier〉 ::= 〈prefix〉? 〈step-name〉
(‘[’〈type〉‘]’)? (‘[’〈index〉‘]’)?
〈prefix〉 ::= 〈step-instance-identifier〉 ‘.’
〈step-instance-identifier〉 ‘.’ 〈prefix〉
〈type〉 ::= SUB-STEP|PRE-REQUISITE|POST-REQUISITE|HANDLER
〈index〉 ::= 1|2|3|...
Figure 3.11. Step Instance Identifier Syntax
sub-step, pre-requisite, post-requisite, and exception handler). And the index is used
to distinguish different step instances with the same parent and the same relationship
with the parent.
• Prefix A prefix is a step instance identifier itself that defines a set of step in-
stances. Given a prefix prefix and a step instance identifier step-identifier,
prefix.step-identifier represents the set of step instances in step-
identifier whose parents appear in the set prefix. In the example process,
among all four instances of “S”, the instance labeled 4 is the only one that has
the parent step “P”. Therefore, we can use P.S to distinguish it from the other
instances. On the other hand, P.Q.S can be used to represent the instances
with label 1, 2 and 3. For this particular process, one may just use Q.S to
represent the instances with label 1, 2 and 3 because the instance with label 4
has a different parent “P”.
• Type In terms of the relationship with its parent, a step instance can be
one of four types: SUB-STEP, PRE-REQUISITE step, POST-REQUISITE step, or
(exception) HANDLER step. The type in the identifier is used to distinguish one
type of instances from the others. For example, S[HANDLER] uniquely identifies
the instance of “S” with label 3 because it is the only one that is an exception
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handling step. The other three are all sub-steps and therefore can be identified
by S[SUB-STEP].
• Index In a unrolled process, it is not unusual to see several instances of a
step that are sub-steps of the same parent, like the two instances of “S” labeled
1 and 2 in the example process. This usually results from unrolling steps with
cardinality + or *. In these cases, we may use an index (starting from 1) to
distinguish one instance from the others. For instances of “S” labeled 1 and
2 in the example process, S[SUB-STEP][1] represents the instance labeled 1
and S[SUB-STEP][2] refers to the one labeled 2. It should be noted that the
index does not imply the execution order of those instances. For example,
suppose the step “Q” is a parallel step, S[SUB-STEP][1] might be executed
after S[SUB-STEP][2].
Step identifiers are used to identify the step instances for the concrete events
in property event bindings. The syntax of the property event binding specification
language is shown in Figure 3.12. As mentioned earlier, an property event binding
maps an abstract event to one or more concrete event in the process. This means
that if any concrete event in the property event binding occurs during execution of
the process, the corresponding abstract event is considered to occur. Currently, we
support three kinds of concrete events: step state events, exception throwing events,
and parameter def/use events.
• Step State Event This kind of event occurs when a step instance identi-
fied by 〈step-identifier〉 goes into the particular state 〈step-state〉. The
〈step-state〉 contains all runtime step states defined in the Little-JIL language
specification (e.g. POSTED, STARTED, RETRACTED, OPTED-OUT, COMPLETED, and
TERMINATED).
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〈event-binding〉 ::= 〈abstract-event〉 ‘->’ 〈concrete-events〉+
〈concrete-events〉 ::= 〈concrete-event〉 ‘|’ 〈concrete-events〉
| 〈concrete-event〉
〈concrete-event〉 ::= 〈step-state-event〉
| 〈exception-throwing-event〉
| 〈parameter-def-use-event〉
〈step-state-event〉 ::= 〈step-identifier〉 ‘:’ 〈step-state〉
〈step-state〉 ::= POSTED|STARTED|RETRACTED
| COMPLETED|TERMINATED|OPTOUT
〈exception-throwing-event〉 ::= 〈step-identifier〉? ‘.’ 〈exception-name〉
〈parameter-def-use-event〉 ::= 〈step-identifier〉? ‘.’
〈parameter-name〉 ‘:’ 〈def-use〉
〈def-use〉 ::= DEF|USE
Figure 3.12. Property Event Binding Syntax
• Exception Throwing Event This kind of event occurs when an exception
with the name 〈exception-name〉 is thrown from a step instance identified by
〈step-identifier〉. The step identifier can be omitted if the property does
not care about from which step the exception is thrown.
• Parameter Def/Use Event This kind of event occurs when a parameter with
the name 〈parameter-name〉 is defined or used at a step instance identified by
〈step-identifier〉. Similar to Exception Throwing Events, the step identifier
in a parameter def/use event definition can also be omitted if it does not matter
at which step the parameter is defined or used. In Little-JIL, only leaf steps can
manipulate parameters and the non-leaf steps are used to pass the parameters.
Therefore, the definition or use of a parameter only occurs at a leaf step. There
are two issues with the parameter def/use events. First, since the Little-JIL
process definition does not define the behavior of a leaf step, we have no way of
knowing the exact point where the parameter is defined or used. Therefore, we
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Figure 3.13. Parameter Def/Use Event Example
consider that the parameter is defined when the corresponding leaf step instance
is COMPLETED, and is used when the corresponding leaf step instance is STARTED.
Second, when a property refers to the definition or use of a parameter, it usually
means “each time the artifact held by that parameter is defined/used”. Since
the artifact may be propagated through the process, being held by different
parameters and being defined or used at different leaf step instances, the analyst
has to provide the complete set of bindings, each connecting to one parameter
at one leaf step instance.
Figure 3.13(a) shows an example process. Step “S1” produces an artifact and
passes it out as parameter P1. The artifact is passed to the IN/OUT parameter
P2 at step “S2” and then to the IN parameter P3 at step “S3”. Suppose that
an event e intends to indicate the definition of this artifact. According to the
artifact flow discussed above, one can see that the artifact is created in step
“S1” and may be changed in step “S2”. Therefore, the event can be defined
as e -> S1:P1 DEF | S2:P2 DEF. The artifact flows in a real-world process,
however, could be very complex. In addition, an artifact may be passed to
parameters with different names. Identifying step instances where an artifact
is defined or used manually could be very difficult and prone to errors.
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To reduce the burden of the analyst, we construct an artifact flow graph from
the process definition. The analyst only needs to provide the binding for a
parameter at one step instance. The rest of them then can be automatically
inferred based on the artifact flow graph. The formal definition of the arti-
fact flow graph and how it is constructed are discussed in Fault Tree Analysis
Chapter. For now, it is enough to know that it is a directed graph representing
the artifact flows in a process definition. Figure 3.13(b) shows the artifact flow
graph for the example process. To define the event mentioned above, the ana-
lyst only needs to provide the property event binding e -> S2:P2 DEF, which
only contains the definition of one parameter. All parameters that connect to
this parameter in the artifact graph can be identified. In this example, those
parameters are S1:P1 and S3:P3. S1:P1 may define the artifact because it is
an OUT parameter and S3:P3 may not define the artifact because it is an IN
parameter. Therefore, the given property event binding can be expended to e
-> S1:P1 DEF | S2:P2 DEF. This property event binding can also be inferred
if the analyst provides the property event binding e -> S1:P1 DEF.
3.3.3 Property Specification and Property Event Binding Translation
To be verified, the property specification and the property event bindings need
to be translated to the property representation accepted by the underlying verifier.
A usual way to achieve this is to first translate the property specification into the
property representation accepted by the underlying verifier. Then the events in the
translated model for the verifier are identified for abstract events based on the prop-
erty event bindings. Finally, the abstract events in the verifier’s property representa-
tion are replaced by the corresponding events in the translated model for the verifier.
Implementation of this approach could be difficult because identifying the events in
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the translated model for the abstract events requires the understanding of both the
process-to GIMR-model translation and the GIMR-to-verifier-model translation.
In our implementation, we employ a different approach that takes advantage of
the predicate feature provided by BIR. The property specification is translated into
the property representation accepted by the verifier. Then instead of substituting the
abstract events in the verifier’s property representation, the property event bindings
are translated into predicates in the BIR model. The predicates, when translated
to the constructs in the verifier’s process model, allow the verifier to recognize the
occurrence of abstract events in the verifier’s process model.
Propel provides a translator that translates Propel properties into properties ac-
cepted by FLAVERS. The property translator for SPIN and other verifiers can be eas-
ily implemented. Therefore, we only discuss how to translate property event bindings
into BIR predicates here. This translation is implemented in the Little-JIL-to-BIR
translator. Remember that a BIR predicate consists a unique identifier and a Boolean
expression. The Boolean expression is defined over two kinds of basic expressions:
thread location tests and remote references. In the property event binding translation,
only the thread location tests are used. An property event binding is translated into
one predicate. The abstract event in the property event binding is directly mapped to
the identifier in the predicate. For each concrete event in the property event binding,
the Little-JIL-to-BIR translator first finds out the step instances identified by the
step identifier in the concrete event. Then it identifies the threads in which the BIR
representations of those step instances reside. After that, the exact locations where
the concrete event occurs are determined by the type of the concrete event. With the
threads and locations, a set of thread location tests can be constructed. Eventually,
the conjunction of such thread location tests for all concrete events in the property
event binding forms the Boolean expression in the predicate.
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As an example, let’s look at how to translate property event binding InfuseBlood
-> Infuse Blood STARTED mentioned earlier. The abstract event InfuseBlood is
directly mapped to the identifier InfuseBlood in the predicate. For the concrete
event, the step instance identified by the step identifier is “Infuse Blood ”. The BIR
representation of this step instance is embedded in the main thread T Perform Blood
Transfusion. The location at which this concrete event occurs is the location with
label Infuse Blood STARTED. Therefore the thread location test corresponding to
the concrete event is T Perform Blood Transfusion@Infuse Blood STARTED. As a
result, the predicate translated from the property event binding is:
InfuseBlood: T Perform Blood Transfusion@Infuse Blood STARTED
Similarly, the property event binding IdentifyPatient -> Identify Patient
COMPLETED is translated to:
IdentifyPatient:
T Perform Blood Transfusion@Identify Patient COMPLETED
3.3.4 Summary
In our realization of the process verification framework, we used an event-based
model for the property specification because it maps nicely to process definition. Since
property specifications are usually independent of any particular process definition,
we assume that a property is specified over abstract events and map these events
to the concrete events in the process based on property event binding specifications.
This approach can be easily adapted for verifying processes defined in other languages
if an event-based model for property specification is used. For state-based model, a
similar approach can be applied. One can define properties in terms of abstract states
and map them to concrete states in processes using property state bindings.
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3.4 Optimizations
As noted, a human-intensive process often entails substantial amounts of concur-
rency and communication. It may also incorporate exception handlers to cope with
various exceptional situations during the execution of the process. Handling of ex-
ceptions often leads to diversion of the normal control flow and causes the process
to be more complicated. The state space of the process, therefore, becomes pro-
hibitively large. Despite the fact that verification tools usually have various built-in
optimizations, our preliminary experiments showed that direct translation of a pro-
cess into a verifier’s model representation often results in a model that easily exceeds
the capability of that verifier. For instance, direct translation of a real-world blood
transfusion process (comprised of about 120 steps) results in a BIR model containing
about 20K lines of code, 315 threads and 253 Boolean variables. Neither FLAVERS
nor SPIN is able to verify it. Therefore, it is necessary to use optimizations to reduce
the translated model.
A specific property is usually only concerned with the temporal ordering of a few
events in the process. To decide if the property holds, it is often sufficient to restrict
the model representation to specific aspects of the process. Based on this observation,
we proposed several optimizations that are able to greatly reduce the model, including
Step Abstraction, Step Removal, Thread Inlining, Exception Elimination, and Variable
Reuse. Except for step abstraction, these optimizations are sound, meaning that a
process will not be reported to be consistent with a property unless that is indeed
the case. Step abstraction is sound for safety properties, but is not sound for liveness
properties in general. If the process can always finish, however, step abstraction is
also sound for liveness properties. These optimizations are also precise in that they
will not introduce spurious violations. Spurious violations are property violations in
the optimized process that do not correspond to any real trace through the original
process.
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The optimizations that we have proposed are all Pre-GIMR optimizations. These
optimizations are not new. For instance, step abstraction and step removal are two
special cases of the alphabet refinement used in FLAVERS [43]. Being performed dur-
ing the Little-JIL-to-BIR translation (Pre-GIMR), however, allows them to achieve
more reduction in the model because they are able to take advantage of the scoping
and hierarchical information in the Little-JIL process definition. This high-level in-
formation in the process might be lost or scattered over the model after the process
is translated to the low-level BIR representation. Moreover, since an optimization
might not be provided in all verifiers, implementing it in Little-JIL-to-BIR transla-
tion facilitates using different verifiers.
Before describing the details of each optimization, relevant exceptions and rele-
vant steps, which are steps and exceptions relevant to events in the property, must
be identified. This can be achieved by comparing steps and exceptions to the prop-
erty event bindings for the given property. Specifically, exceptions that match ex-
ception throwing events in the property event bindings are relevant exceptions and
steps that match step state events in the property event bindings are relevant steps.
Steps that throw relevant exceptions are also considered to be relevant steps as are
steps that define or use parameters that match parameter def/use events in property
event bindings. In the simplified blood transfusion process, for property “the nurse
must identify the patient before infusing the blood” and the property event bindings
shown earlier, step “Identify Patient” and “ Infuse Blood” are relevant steps because
they match the step state event Identify Patient COMPLETED and Infuse Blood
STARTED in the property event bindings respectively. Given the relevant steps and
relevant exceptions, the optimizations basically abstract or remove various constructs
(e.g. step instances, threads, variables, etc.), without changing the execution ordering
of relevant step and relevant exceptions and, thus, without changing the ordering of
property events.
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3.4.1 Step Abstraction
An unrolled Little-JIL process is essentially a tree composed of steps. Steps rele-
vant to events in the property are scattered throughout the tree. The step abstraction
converts sub-trees that do not contain relevant steps into leaf steps. For a sub-tree
that does not contain any relevant steps, the only way it can alter the order of events
occurring in other part of the process is to throw exceptions. For instance, an ex-
ception from the sub-tree without an associated exception handlers at any ancestor
could terminate the whole process, preventing the succeeding events from occurring.
To preserve such effect, the leaf step that replaces the sub-tree should have the same
exception declarations as the root step of the sub-tree. Remember that the exception
declarations of a step declare the set of exceptions that may be thrown from the
step. The exceptions that are handled by non-rethrown handlers within the sub-tree
will not appear in the exception declarations of the root step of the sub-tree. Such
exceptions should not be included in the exception declarations of the new leaf step
because they have no impact on the occurrence of the relevant events.
In the simplified blood transfusion process, “Identify Patient” and “Infuse Blood”
are the only relevant steps. Since the sub-tree with the root step “Obtain Patient’s
Blood Type” does not contain any relevant step, it can be abstracted to a leaf step.
In addition, the exception PatientBloodTypeUnavailable is handled within “Obtain
Patient’s Blood Type”. Therefore, the abstracted leaf does not throw any exception.
Similarly, the sub-tree with the root step “Check Blood Product” is also abstracted to
a leaf step. Note that the step “Check Blood Product” does not handle the exception
BloodExpired and WrongBlood thrown by its sub-steps. Therefore, the abstracted leaf
should also throw the exception BloodExpired and WrongBlood. The process after step
abstraction is shown in the Figure 3.14.
Step abstraction is both sound and precise for safety properties. According to the
definition of the safety property, a violation trace of a safety property always contains
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Figure 3.14. Simplified Blood Transfusion Process after Step Abstraction
a finite prefix that leads the property to the violation state [18]. Given one such trace
in the original process, a corresponding trace in the abstracted process can always be
constructed by replacing the part relevant to the execution of the replaced sub-tree
with the execution of the abstracted leaf step. This trace also drives the property to
the violation state because the ordering of the property events is conserved in this
trace and both removed and inserted nodes do not contain any events in the property.
This means that step abstraction is sound in the sense that it will not remove any
violation trace in the original process. On the other hand, given a violation trace in the
abstracted process, a violation trace in the original process can also be constructed by
replacing the execution of abstracted leaf step with a corresponding execution of the
sub-tree. This means that no spurious violations that do not correspond to any real
traces through the original process will be introduced by step abstraction. Therefore,
step abstraction is also precise for safety properties.
Step abstraction, however, is not sound with respect to liveness properties. The
reason is that a violation trace of a liveness property may contain infinite loops.
Since replacing a sub-tree with a leaf step might eliminate loops in the sub-tree, step
abstraction may remove some violation traces through the original process. This is
not a serious problem because many real-world processes, especially for the ones in
the medical domain that interests us, have a hidden assumption that requires the
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processes to be able to finish. Under this assumption, the violation traces are finite
even for liveness properties. Using the same reasoning for the safety property, it
is easy to show that step abstraction becomes both sound and precise for liveness
properties under that assumption.
3.4.2 Step Removal
After step abstraction, the Little-JIL process should only contain the following
steps: (1) relevant steps and all their ancestors, (2) Leaf steps that are children of a
step in (1). Step removal tries to further reduce the size of the process by removing
some leaf steps in (2).
Step removal only considers the steps in (2) that do not throw exceptions and do
not reference any relevant events. For a pre-requisite step or a post-requisite step,
it can never change the execution order of events relevant to the property if it could
not throw any exception. Therefore, it is safe to remove it from the process. For
an exception handler, since the control flow badge decides the flow of control after
the exception handler step is completed, step removal only removes the exception
handler step instead of the whole exception handler. For a sub-step that does not
throw exceptions, whether to remove it or not depends on the kind of the parent step.
• If the parent step is a sequential step or a parallel step, the sub-step can be
removed because it does not have any impact on the execution of the other
steps.
• If the parent step is a try step, however, the sub-step that does not throw
exceptions should not be removed. According to the semantics of the try step,
when a sub-step completes, the try step is completed and the next sub-step will
not be executed. The only way that the next sub-step can be invoked is that the
previous sub-step throws an exception handled by an exception handler with
the continue badge. In other words, sub-steps following a sub-step that does
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Figure 3.15. Simplified Blood Transfusion Process after Step Removal
not throw exception are not reachable. Therefore, in a well-formed process, a
sub-step that does not throw exceptions can only be the last sub-step of a try
step. If this sub-step is removed, a NoMoreAlternative exception will be thrown
when an exception is thrown by the previous sub-step and the corresponding
exception handler with the continue badge tries to invoke the next sub-step.
Such NoMoreAlternative will not be raised if the last sub-step is not removed.
• If the parent step is a choice step, it is safe to keep only one such sub-step and
remove the others. A choice step is similar to a try step in a sense that they
both use the continue exception handler to invoke the next alternative, and
will throw a NoMoreAlternative exception if no alternative can be executed.
The difference is that the choice step randomly picks up a non-finished sub-step
while the try step always selects the next sub-step. Therefore, a choice step
may have multiple sub-steps that do not throw exception. It is easy to see that
keeping one such sub-step is enough to preserve the effect of all of them.
In the simplified blood transfusion process after step abstraction, as shown in
Figure 3.14, there are five leaf steps. Step “Identify Patient” and “Infuse Blood”
cannot be removed because they are relevant steps. Step “Check Blood Product” may
throw exceptions, and thus cannot be removed as well. Since step “Obtain Patient’s
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Blood Type” and “Pick up Blood from Blood Bank” are sub-steps of a sequential step
and do not throw any exception, they will be removed by step removal. This results
in the process shown in Figure 3.15.
It is easy to show that step removal is both sound and precise for safety properties
using the same reasoning for step abstraction. Furthermore, since the steps removed
are leaf steps, no loops in the original process will be removed. Therefore, step removal
is both sound and precise for liveness properties as well.
3.4.3 Thread Inlining
During the translation, steps that may potentially run in parallel with other steps,
including sub-steps of a parallel step, exception handling steps, and sub-steps of a
choice step, are translated into BIR threads. A real-world process often contains many
parallel steps and exception handling steps. Translation of the processes, therefore,
often end up with a BIR model contains many threads and may run into the state ex-
plosion problem. Thread inlining is able to reduce the number of threads by inlining
certain threads into other threads. It is based on an observation that the behaviors
of the parallel step, the choice step, and the parent step of exception handling steps
follow the same pattern: the parent step posts all its child steps (sub-steps or excep-
tion handling steps), and then is blocked until all those child steps finish (completed,
terminated, opt-outed, or retracted). Although those child steps may run in parallel
with each other, the parent step never interleaves with its child steps. Therefore, we
can choose one child step and insert its thread into the thread corresponding to the
parent step. Inlining threads like this is perfectly safe for both the safety property
and the liveness property because it can neither eliminate existing paths from the
original process, nor introduce new infeasible paths into it.
After step abstraction and step removal, the simplified blood transfusion process
shown in Figure 3.15 does not contain any opportunity for thread inlining because
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1 loc Check_Blood_Product_STARTED:
2 when true do { } goto Check_Blood_Product_fork_subs;
3 loc Check_Blood_Product_fork_subs:
4 when true do {
5 start(T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info );
6 } goto Check_Expiration_Date_begin;
7 loc Check_Expiration_Date_begin:
8 ... // Code for Check Expiration Date
9 loc Check_Expiration_Date_exit:
10 when true do {} goto Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub2;
11 loc Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub2:
12 when true do {
13 join(T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info );
14 } goto Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub2;
15 loc Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub2:
16 when
17 threadTerminated(
18 T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info
19 )
20 do { } goto unionsq;
21 ... // Exception Handling
Figure 3.16. BIR Code After Thread Inlining
it only has one thread. For some other properties, however, it is possible that the
parallel step “Check Blood Product” as well as its two sub-steps are not abstracted
or removed. In this case, the thread for one of these two sub-steps can be inlined.
Suppose that the thread for “Check Expiration Date” is selected to be inlined. The
BIR code in Figure 3.16 shows how the thread for “Check Expiration Date” is inserted
into the thread for the parent parallel step. The fork location (line 3-6) only starts
threads for“Check Product Info Match Patient Info”. Then instead of joining this
thread, it goes to the first location in the thread corresponding to “Check Expiration
Date”. When the thread for “Check Expiration Date” exits, it goes to the location
that starts the join of “Check Product Info Match Patient Info” (line 9-10).
The benefit of thread inlining is that it reduces the states that are created during
verification. In finite-state verification, a state typically contains a program counter
for each thread to keep track of the execution at the thread. The space for storing
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the program counter for a thread can be saved if the thread is removed. In addition,
thread inlining can achieve even more savings for some verification tools such as
FLAVERS. In FLAVERS, synchronizations between threads are explicitly captured
using concurrency constraints represented as finite-state automata. The state also
need to keep the states of those constraints. If a thread for a child step is inlined into
the thread for its parent step, the concurrency constraint used to synchronize these
two threads can be eliminated, resulting in further reduction of the state size.
3.4.4 Exception Elimination
A robust real-world process usually needs to consider many exceptional situations.
Therefore, the process definition usually contains a large number of exceptions, which
becomes a major source of the state explosion problem when verifying the process.
For a particular property, however, some exceptions are equivalent in a sense that
they have the same impact on the execution of the relevant steps or exceptions. To
verify such a property, it is enough to keep only one such exception and eliminate the
others.
To identify the sets of equivalent exceptions, we adopt a heuristic that checks
equivalence of exceptions based on some simple rules. Specifically, two exceptions are
considered to be equivalent if:
1. Neither of them is a relevant exception, and
2. They are thrown in the same leaf step. This rule is not as restrictive as it seems
to be because after step abstraction, a sub-tree may be replaced by a leaf step
that has all the exceptions propagated from the root of the sub-tree. And
3. They don’t have exception handlers or they have equivalent exception handlers.
For the second case, it is possible that an exception handler re-throws the excep-
tion that it catches, causing the exception to have multiple exception handlers
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Figure 3.17. Simplified Blood Transfusion Process after Exception Elimination
at different ancestors. In this case, exception handlers at each ancestor step are
equivalent. The equivalence of two exception handlers can be checked against
the following conditions:
(a) Both handlers have the same kind of control flow badge, and
(b) Neither of them has an exception handling step, or both point to the same
exception handling step.
The simplified blood transfusion process after step abstraction and step removal
is shown in Figure 3.15. Step “Check Blood Product ” throws two exceptions: Blood-
Expired and WrongBlood. These two exceptions are equivalent because 1) they are
not relevant exceptions, 2) they are thrown in the same step, and 3) they don’t have
exception handlers. Therefore, any one of them can be removed. Figure 3.17 shows
the process where BloodExpired is removed.
Exception elimination is both sound and precise for all properties. Since it does
not introduce any traces to the optimized process, the exception elimination is sound.
On the other hand, it is possible that certain violation traces may be removed by the
exception elimination. Nevertheless, it is still precise in that for any violation trace in
the original process that is removed, an equivalent trace can be constructed from the
optimized process. There are two kinds of violation traces that can be removed: the
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trace where a single eliminated exception is thrown, and the trace where more than
one equivalent exception is thrown. For a trace of the first kind, we can always find
an equivalent trace in the optimized process by substituting the eliminated exception
with the remaining exception. For a trace of the second kind, we can also find the
equivalent trace as follows: if the remaining exception is not thrown in the trace,
replace one eliminated exception with the remaining exception, and then remove the
nodes relevant to all the eliminated exceptions. In both cases, since all eliminated
exceptions and the remaining exception are not relevant exceptions, no trace nodes
that reference the property events will be removed or introduced. Therefore, the trace
constructed from the optimized process is equivalent to the corresponding removed
trace with respect to the property.
3.4.5 Variable Reuse
The translated BIR model contains a variety of BIR variables, such as exception
variables, parameter variables, variables indicating whether sub-steps of a parallel
or choice step finishes or not, etc. Since these variables might be used in different
threads, they are defined as global variables. By the variable reuse optimization, the
number of variables in the BIR model can be reduced without changing the behavior
of the model.
Variable reuse borrows the idea from the register allocation [23] in compiler opti-
mizations. When a compiler generates a target program, it is often the case that the
number of variables in the target program is much larger than the number of available
CPU registers. In this case, some variables have to be saved to memory, and loaded
back to registers later if needed. If two variables will not interfere with each other,
however, we can use the same register to store both of them without changing the
behavior of the program. A variable may interfere with another variable if both may
live (hold a value that may be needed in the future) at the same time. Based on this
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idea, the register allocation tries to allocate as many variables as possible to registers
to reduce the expensive memory access operations. It first constructs a interference
graph, which is an undirected graph where a node corresponds to a variable in the
target program and an edge connects two nodes whose variables may interfere with
each other. Then an existing graph coloring algorithm can be applied to identify the
minimal number of registers to cover all variables.
In the case of variable reuse, the variables in the original BIR model are analogous
to the variables in the target program of the compiler, and the BIR variables in the
optimized model are similar to the CPU registers. The differences are the definition
of inference relationships and the way to compute them. (To make the following
discussion easier, we refer to variables in the original BIR model as “BIR variables”
and variables in the optimized model as “register variables”.) In variable reuse,
two variables are considered to interfere with each other if any one of the following
condition is satisfied:
1. They have different types Note that even though range types may have different
range, they are treated as the same type because we can always use a register
variable with the highest range to hold values of those range types.
2. Any one is relevant to a property event Some variables may be associated with
certain property events. For instance, an exception variable may correspond to
an exception throwing event. Share the register variable with other variables
could create spurious events in the optimized model.
3. They may live at the same time This is the same as in the register allocation.
The first two conditions are easy to decide. The current implementation employs a
much simpler approach to check the third condition. Instead of applying the liveness
analysis, as in register allocation, this approach takes advantage of scoping informa-
tion provided by the Little-JIL process. Specifically, each variable is associated with
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Figure 3.18. Check Whether Two Steps May in Parallel
one or more step instances in the process that indicate the scope in which the variable
is alive. For example, an exception variable is associated with the step that throws
the corresponding exception and the exception handling step, if one exists. To decide
whether two variables may be live at the same time becomes a simple check to deter-
mine whether their associated steps may execute in parallel. Given two steps s1 and
s2, as shown in Figure 3.18, their least common ancestor s can be identified following
the tree structure of the process. s′1 is an ancestor of s1, and s
′
2 is an ancestor of s2.
Both s′1 and s
′
2 are children of s. We conservatively assume that s1 and s2 may run
in parallel if s′1 and s
′
2 may run in parallel. To decide if s
′
1 and s
′
2 may run in parallel,
we only need to check if s′1 and s
′
2 are sub-steps and s is a parallel step, or s
′
1 and s
′
2
are exception handling steps. Theoretically, this simple approach is not as precise as
liveness analysis. There are two reasons why we prefer to use it however. One is that
to perform the liveness analysis, we need to construct the global control flow graph,
which is not available during the translation. The other reason is that in our experi-
ence, it is quite effective and can lead to great reduction of the number of variables.
Once the interference relationships between variables are decided, the variable reuse
can find the minimal set of register variables using existing graph coloring algorithms.
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For the simplified process shown in Figure 3.17, two exception variables, corre-
sponding to exception WrongPatient and WrongBlood, are created in the BIR model.
Since the parent step is a sequential step, “Identify Patient” and “Check Blood Prod-
uct” will never run in parallel. The two exception variables thus will not live at the
same time. Since both exceptions are not relevant to the property events, variable
reuse only assigns one register variable for them.
After optimizations including step abstraction, step removal, exception elimina-
tion and variable reuse, the simplified blood transfusion process is translated to the
BIR program shown in the following figure. Comparing this program to the one with-
out optimizations (as shown in Appendix C), it is obvious that those optimizations
achieve significant reduction. Three threads (one main thread and two threads cor-
responding two sub-steps of parallel step “Check Blood Product”) are reduced to a
single main thread, six variables (four exception variables and two done variables for
two sub-steps of parallel step “Check Blood Product”) are reduced to one, and total
lines of BIR code is reduced from 217 to 71.
1 process Process_Blood_Transfusion_Process ()
2 b_e1: boolean := false;
3
4 main thread T_Blood_Transfusion_Process
5 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_POSTED:
6 when true do { }
7 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_STARTED;
8 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_STARTED:
9 when true do { }
10 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_POSTED;
11 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_POSTED:
12 when true do { }
13 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_STARTED;
14 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_STARTED:
15 when true do { }
16 goto Identify_Patient_POSTED;
17 loc Identify_Patient_POSTED:
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18 when true do { }
19 goto Identify_Patient_STARTED;
20 loc Identify_Patient_STARTED:
21 when true do { }
22 goto Identify_Patient_COMPLETED;
23 when true do { b_e1 :=true ; }
24 goto Identify_Patient_TERMINATED;
25 loc Identify_Patient_COMPLETED:
26 when true do { }
27 goto Check_Blood_Product_POSTED;
28 loc Identify_Patient_TERMINATED:
29 when ( b_e1==true ) do ()
30 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_TERMINATED;
31 loc Check_Blood_Product_POSTED:
32 when true do { }
33 goto Check_Blood_Product_STARTED;
34 loc Check_Blood_Product_STARTED:
35 when true do { }
36 goto Check_Blood_Product_COMPLETED;
37 when true do { b_e1 :=true ; }
38 goto Check_Blood_Product_TERMINATED;
39 loc Check_Blood_Product_COMPLETED:
40 when true do { }
41 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_COMPLETED;
42 loc Check_Blood_Product_TERMINATED:
43 when ( b_e1==true ) do ()
44 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_TERMINATED;
45 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_COMPLETED:
46 when true do { } goto Infuse_Blood_POSTED;
47 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_TERMINATED:
48 when ( b_e1==true ) do { }
49 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_TERMINATED;
50 loc Infuse_Blood_POSTED:
51 when true do { } goto Infuse_Blood_STARTED;
52 loc Infuse_Blood_STARTED:
53 when true do { } goto Infuse_Blood_COMPLETED;
54 loc Infuse_Blood_COMPLETED:
55 when true do { }
56 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_COMPLETED;
57 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_COMPLETED:
58 when true do { }
59 goto T_Blood_Transfusion_Process_exit;
60 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_TERMINATED:
61 when true do { }
62 goto T_Blood_Transfusion_Process_exit;
63 loc T_Blood_Transfusion_Process_exit:
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64 end T_Blood_Transfusion_Process;
65
66 predicates
67 IdentifyPatient =
68 T_Blood_Transfusion_Process@Identify_Patient_COMPLETED;
69 InfuseBlood =
70 T_Blood_Transfusion_Process@Infuse_Blood_STARTED;
71 end Process_Blood_Transfusion_Process;
3.4.6 Summary
In this section, we presented several optimizations used to reduce the translated
models. Our evaluation, discussed later in this thesis, showed that these optimizations
significantly improved the scalability of our implementation of the process verifica-
tion framework. All properties for two complex real-world processes were verified in a
few seconds. Although these optimizations are described based on the Little-JIL and
BIR, they are pretty general and can be easily used in the translation of other pro-
cess definition languages. As noted earlier, all of these optimizations are Pre-GIMR
optimizations and have the benefit of applying to different verifiers. Unfortunately,
we did not find any opportunity for new Post-GIMR optimizations. As discussed
in future work, we plan to investigate and incorporate more optimizations into the
process verification framework.
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CHAPTER 4
FAULT-TREE ANALYSIS
A human-intensive process consists of tasks that are performed by various agents,
including hardware devices and human agents. The process verification framework
discussed in the previous chapter primarily detects event sequence errors. It assumes
that the tasks are done correctly and is concerned with the ordering of events occurred
at some tasks, as specified by the given temporal properties. Due to hardware failure
or human error, however, faults may be introduced during the execution of a task.
If not detected and corrected, such a fault may propagate to the successors without
violating those temporal properties and eventually lead to hazards. “Hazard” is a
term used in the system safety analysis community. It is defined as “a state or
set of conditions of the system that, together with certain other conditions in the
environment, will lead inevitably to an accident” [80]. The accident usually results in
harm to people or damage to property. For example, a hazard for a blood transfusion
process could be “the blood unit to be transfused to the patient is wrong”. This
hazard could cause transfusion reaction that endangers the patient’s life. Developing
such a safety critical process also requires to prevent or control potential hazards. This
can be achieved by incorporating various mechanisms to prevent or control faults that
could lead to the hazards. For instance, a failure-resistant agent could be assigned
to some tasks where major faults could occur. Additionally, consistency checks could
be added to well-chosen places in the process to stop the propagation of faults. To
add such mechanisms into the process, the process developers need to identify the
potential hazards that could occur in the process, as well as the faults that could
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lead to those hazards. Due to resource limitations or other constraints, the process
developers are usually only able to apply the fault prevention mechanisms to the most
important faults, which requires assessing and prioritizing the faults. This kind of
analysis (i.e. identifying and assessing hazards and faults) is called “hazard analysis”
in the system safety analysis community. So far, many hazard analysis techniques
have been proposed and successfully applied in several industries [80]. We believe
that these techniques can also be adopted to analyze safety critical processes.
In this work, we investigated a selected hazard analysis technique called Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) [131]. Given a potential hazard in a system, FTA deductively
identifies events (faults or conditions) in the system that could lead to the hazard
and produces a fault tree, which provides a graphical depiction of all possible parallel
and sequential combinations of those events. Once a fault tree has been derived,
qualitative and quantitative evaluation can be applied to provide information, such
as specific sequences and sets of events that are sufficient to cause a hazard and overall
system vulnerability. This information can then be used as guidance for improvement
of the design or implementation of the system. To apply FTA on processes, we
developed a process FTA framework that is able to automatically derive and evaluate
fault trees for processes modeled in a process definition language. It also provides
supports that help process developers understand the analysis results.
4.1 Overview of Process Fault-Tree Analysis
Fault-tree analysis involves three steps: (1) defining the system, (2) deriving the
fault tree, and (3) evaluating the fault tree. Since systems in many domains are
defined in informal notations, the fault tree derivation has to be performed manually
by a group of experts and therefore is time-consuming, costly and error-prone. Some
researches, however, have demonstrated that this step can be automated if the system
is completely and precisely defined. As discussed in the background chapter, several
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template-based approaches have been proposed to automatically derive fault trees
from software systems defined in various specification languages. Since processes
definitions are essentially software, such template-based approaches may as well be
applied to automatically construct fault trees from rigorous process definitions. To
show this, we developed an automatic fault tree derivation algorithm for the Little-
JIL process definition language. During our research, we encountered three issues
that, as far as we know, were not well addressed in the previous software fault tree
amalysis approaches.
• Scalability A human-intensive process usually involves complex control and
artifact flows. The fault tree derived from it can easily become too large to
either be understood by humans or be analyzed by fault tree analyzing tools.
To address this issue, two optimizations are proposed to reduce the size of the
process before the fault tree is derived. In addition, an optimization is applied
to remove events from the fault tree after it is derived.
• Looping Constructs Processes often contain steps that are executed repeat-
edly. Fault trees derived from these processes, therefore, may contain loops (i.e.
an input and the output of an event connect to the same event). Since a fault
tree with loops is no longer a tree, existing techniques for analyzing fault trees
cannot be applied to it. To address this issue, we proposed an approach to
remove loops from the derived fault trees. As discussed later in this chapter,
this approach does not degrade the results.
• NOT Gate Traditionally, NOT gates are not used in fault trees because
they may introduce difficulties to the evaluation of fault trees. Without NOT
gates, however, some relationships between events cannot be captured in the
fault tree. This may cause the fault-tree analysis tools to produce inaccurate
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results. To improve the accuracy of analysis results, we introduced to use NOT
gates in our fault tree derivation and evaluation approach.
• Usability Once a fault tree has been derived, various qualitative and quan-
titative evaluation techniques can be applied to evaluate the fault tree. In this
work, we investigated the most commonly used technique – Minimal Cut Set
(MCS) analysis. For complex real-world processes, it is often very difficult to
understand how events in a MCS cause the hazard to occur. To address this us-
ability issue, we proposed two complimentary representations that help process
developers to easily understand the MCSs produced by the MCS analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents our au-
tomatic fault tree derivation algorithm for the Little-JIL process definition language.
Section 4.3 gives a brief introduction to the MCS analysis. Section 4.4 discusses
the approaches that we proposed to handle four issues in process fault tree analysis
mentioned above. Finally, the limitation of our approach is discussed in Section 4.5.
4.2 Automatic Fault Tree Derivation
As discussed in the Background and Related Work chapter, a fault tree shows all
the parallel and sequential combinations of events that could lead to the given hazard.
The basic elements of a fault tree are events and gates. Events are used to represent
faults, such as component failures, human errors, or other pertinent conditions in
the system or environment. Basic events are basic initiating faults or conditions.
Undeveloped events are events that are not developed any further, either because
necessary information for deriving the fault tree leading to these events is unavailable
or because these events are considered to have insignificant consequence. Basic events
and undeveloped events are also called primary events because they require no further
development. As opposed to primary events, intermediate events are events that need
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to be developed. In a fault tree, events are connected using various gates. Each gate
connects one or more input events to a single output event.
To derive a fault tree from a process, the given hazard is represented as an inter-
mediate event called the TOP event. Starting with a fault tree that only cotains the
TOP event, the fault tree derivation procedure proceeds to expand the fault tree by
developing intermediate events in it. An intermediate event is developed by inves-
tigating the process to identify the immediate, necessary, and sufficient events that
cause this event, and then connecting those events to it via a proper gate. The new
events may also be intermediate events that need to be developed. The derivation
procedure terminates when no undeveloped intermediate events is left in the fault
tree. To automate this derivation procedure, the process has to be precisely specified.
In addition, two problems need to be solved:
• How to automatically discover events that could possibly occur in the various
steps of the process. This could be difficult because the tasks performed by
different steps are quite different, and thus so are the events that could occur
in these steps.
• Given an intermediate event, how to automatically identify events that could
cause this event and connect them to this events using appropriate gates.
To address these problems, we propose a template-based automatic fault tree
derivation approach for Little-JIL process definitions. In this approach, the first prob-
lem is solved by classifying events that could possibly occur into several pre-defined
types so that they can be identified based on the simple uniform step interfaces spec-
ified in Little-JIL process definitions. The second problem is solved by defining a set
of templates according to the semantics of the Little-JIL process definition language.
Each template is used to develop a particular type of event. With these event types
and templates, a simple work-list algorithm can be applied to automatically derive
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Figure 4.1. Simplified Blood Process
fault trees from the Little-JIL process definition. Although the events and templates
are specific to the Little-JIL language, the basic idea of this template-based fault tree
derivation approach may be applied to automatically construct fault trees for other
process definition languages.
In the remainder of this section, we first present a simplified version of a blood
transfusion process that will be used as a running example in the discussion. Then we
show the set of pre-defined events types. We also discuss a few templates and show
how to apply them to develop events. After that, we describe the work-list algorithm
that derives the fault trees using the templates. Finally, we discuss three major issues
faced by the derivation algorithm as well as our approaches to address these issues.
Figure 4.1 shows the simplified blood transfusion process presented in the Back-
ground and Related Work chapter. For simplicity, step “Perform Bedside Check” as
well as its two sub-steps are removed. In this figure, arrows with dashed lines are
used to illustrate the parameter bindings, which play an important role in fault tree
derivation. To keep the figure simple, parameters of steps are not displayed. Such pa-
rameters, however, can easily be inferred from the parameter bindings. For example,
there is a parameter binding for Patient’ ID from step “Blood Transfusion Process”
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to “Obtain Patient’s Blood Type”. Therefore, both steps must have a parameter Pa-
tient’s ID. A serious hazard that could occur in a blood transfusion process is that
the blood product to be transfused to the patient is wrong (e.g., does not match the
patient’s blood type). This could cause a transfusion reaction that endangers the
patient’s life. We illustrate how to apply our approach to derive the fault tree for
this hazard and show how the analysis result can help to improve the safety of the
process.
4.2.1 Events
In fault-tree analysis, events usually represent faults of components in the system.
In addition to faults, some conditions in the environment are also considered to be
events if they may affect the propagation of faults. Steps are the basic building
blocks of Little-JIL process definitions. Based on the simple uniform interfaces of
Little-JIL steps, we proposed several pre-defined types of events, such as “All Inputs
are Correct, But S Produces Incorrect Output o”, “Artifact o is Wrong When S is
Posted” and “Exception e is Thrown by S”. In this work, we limit our attention to
the faults related to artifacts in Little-JIL process definitions. We believe that a large
number of interesting faults are artifacts faults or can easily be turned into artifact
faults. For example, in many human-intensive processes, some hazards are caused
by the delay of certain steps. To capture such faults, we can associate an artifact
representing the execution time to each step. Then our approach then can handle
unacceptable delays as an unacceptable output artifact value. For the faults that can
not be easily turned into artifact faults, our framework is designed in such a way that
a new kind of fault can be supported if the type of the event representing that fault is
defined and the appropriate template used to develop this type of event is provided.
The events that we proposed fall into three categories.
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4.2.1.1 Category 1
A fault may be introduced to a process in two ways. It may be caused by the
incorrect execution of a step in the process. It may also be generated outside the pro-
cess and passed to the process as certain wrong artifact. Category 1 events represent
the faults in the first case. The faults in the second case are represented as events of
type Event Type 2: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted defined in Category 2.
Event Type 1: All Inputs are Correct, But S Produces Incorrect Output o
In this type of event, the step S is a leaf step and o is an output artifact of S.
In Little-JIL, only a leaf step is able to manipulate its input artifacts and create
or change its output artifacts. Whereas non-leaf steps are only used to coordinate
their sub-steps and passing artifacts. Without losing generality, we assume that no
faults could occur during artifact passing. Unreliable artifact passing can be explicitly
modeled using additional leaf steps, so a fault that could occur during artifact passing
can be defined as this type of event. Therefore, this type of event can only occur at
leaf steps, representing the possibility that designated agents fail to execute those
steps as required. Since we do not look into the implementation of leaf steps, this
events of this type are always primary events.
4.2.1.2 Category 2
The second category contains events indicating that an artifact is incorrect when
a step is at a particular step state, including:
Event Type 2: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted
Event Type 3: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started
Event Type 4: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Retracted
Event Type 5: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Opted-out
Event Type 6: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed
Event Type 7: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Terminated by Exception e
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These types of events are usually intermediate events that serve as the intermediate
nodes on the propagation paths of faults generated by the events in Category 1. The
only exception is when the step S in Event Type 2 is the root step of the process.
In this case, the artifact is already wrong when it is passed into the process. Since
the error in the artifact is not introduced within this process, such an event cannot
be developed based on this process and therefore is treated as a primary event. It
should also be noted that Event Type 7 has an additional parameter “exception e”.
The reason is that a step might throw more than one exception, which may lead to
different execution paths of the process. If we do not distinguish different exceptions,
the corresponding paths will be mixed together, which may introduce imprecision to
the fault tree.
The last type of event in this category does not correspond to any step state
defined in the Little-JIL specification. It says:
Event Type 8: Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be Completed
An event of this type occurs after S is started and before S is completed. This
event type is introduced to break the large template for Event Type 6: Artifact o is
Wrong When S is Completed into four small templates: Template 6 and Template 7
for Event Type 6: Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed and Template 10 and
Template 11 for Event Type 8: Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be Completed.
These templates are discussed in Appendix B. Introducing this type of event not
only simplifies the code to generate the fault tree, but also makes the templates much
easier to describe and understand.
4.2.1.3 Category 3
Since a fault that leads to the hazard along one path may not cause the hazard to
occur on another path, it is necessary to introduce events to represent conditions that
might change the control flow of the process. In Little-JIL, there are several cases
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where the flow of control may be changed. The first case is the exception. When an
exception is thrown, the control flow is diverted to the exception handler. Therefore,
two types of events are introduced to represent whether an exception is thrown or
not.
Event Type 9: Exception e is Thrown by S
Event Type 10: Exception e is not Thrown by S
Another case is that an optional step may be opted out by the agent assigned to
the step. For instance, suppose a step has a cardinality (2..5), so five instances of
the step may be created during the execution. The first two instances are required
to be executed. The remaining three instances are optional. So the agent has the
choice not to perform those three instances. Therefore, two types of events are used
to represent whether a step is opted out nor not.
Event Type 11: Step S is Opted-out
Event Type 12: Step S is not Opted-out
The third case is that some step may be retracted under certain situations. For
example, a posted sub-step of a parallel step will be retracted if another sub-step
throws an exception. Posted sub-steps of a choice step will be retracted if they are
not chosen to be executed. Similarly, two types of events are introduced to represent
whether a step is retracted nor not.
Event Type 13: Step S is Retracted
Event Type 14: Step S is not Retracted
Given the interface of a step, the events that could occur in that step can be easily
identified. Let’s take step “Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type” in the simplified
blood transfusion process as an example. Its interface specifies that it has an input
parameter Patient ID and an output parameter Blood Type. It may also throw an
exception Patient’s Blood Type Unavailable. Based on this interface, events that could
occur at this step include:
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– All Inputs are Correct, But Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type
Produces Incorrect Blood Type
– Patient ID is Wrong When Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type is Posted
– Patient ID is Wrong When Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type is Started
– Patient ID is Wrong When Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type is
about to be Completed
– Blood Type is Wrong When Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type is Completed
– Blood Type is Wrong When Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type is Terminated
by Exception Patient’s Blood Type Unavailable
– Exception Patient’s Blood Type Unavailable is Thrown by
Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type
– Exception Patient’s Blood Type Unavailable is not Thrown by
Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type
While we can identify all the events in a process in this way, we do not have to do
so because a large number of them may have nothing to do with the given hazard. In
our fault tree derivation approach, events are generated on the fly by applying various
templates and the design of templates ensures that only events that are relevant to
the hazard will be generated.
To derive a fault tree, the hazard needs to be specified as an event, usually called
the TOP event. In our approach, the TOP event is required to be defined as an event
in Category 2. For the simplified blood transfusion process, the hazard of interest is
“the blood product to be transfused to the patient is wrong”, which can be translated
into the event “Blood Product is Wrong When Infuse Blood is Started”.
4.2.2 Templates
The fault tree derivation is an iterative procedure. A single intermediate event is
developed in each iteration. This is done automatically by applying the appropriate
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pre-defined template. Based on the Little-JIL semantics, we develop a collection of
templates, each of which is used to develop a particular type of events.
A template consists of a requirement and a partial fault tree. The requirement
specified the conditions under which the template can be applied. The partial fault
tree demonstrates how to develop an event. The root event of the partial fault tree is
the event to be developed. The leaves of the partial fault tree are the immediate and
necessary events that could lead to the root event. “Immediate” means that those
events should occur at step states immediately preceding the step state associated
with the root event (each event is explicitly or implicitly associated with a specific
step state, as shown in Section 4.2.1.) This partial fault tree has a generic form, which
needs to be instantiated when applied to develop an event. To develop an event, the
appropriate template will be identified according to the type of the event as well as
certain attributes of the step or the artifact in the event, such as whether the step
is a leaf step and whether the artifact is an output parameter of the step. Then the
partial fault tree of the template is instantiated according to the attributes of the
step and the artifact in the event. Finally, the event is replaced by the partial fault
tree instance.
The corresponding templates for different types of events are shown as Table 4.1.
Note that one type of event might have more than one template. Each template is
applicable for a particular situation. The templates are carefully designed so that for
any intermediate event, there is exactly one template that is applicable. Some types
of events are always primary events that do not need to be developed. Therefore, no
templates are associated with them.
Due to space limitation, we only discuss three selected templates in this section.
The detailed description of all the templates is given in Appendix B. In the discussion
of templates, we use “child steps” to refer to sub-steps, pre-requisite steps, post-
requisite steps, and exception handler steps. Child steps of the same parent step are
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considered to be “siblings” of each other. Before discussing templates, it is necessary
to first give the definitions of the Reverse Control Flow Graph and the Artifact Flow
Graph, which are used when instantiating the partial fault tree in a template.
4.2.2.1 Reverse Control Flow Graph and Artifact Flow Graph
The Reverse Control Flow Graph (RCFG) is used to find the previous step states
of a given step state. It is a directed graph Gc =< Nc, Ec >, where Nc is the set
of states of step instances in the process and Ec is the set of edges. There is an
edge from n1 to n2 iff the step state n2 may immediately precedes the step state n1
according to the Little-JIL process definition. In other words, the edge goes in the
opposite direction of the ordinary control flow. Figure 4.2 shows the reverse control
flow graph of the example process.
The Artifact Flow Graph (AFG) is used to decide whether an artifact is data
dependent on another artifact. It is a directed graph Ga =< Na, Ea >, where Na is
Table 4.1. Fault Tree Derivation Templates
Event Type Template(s)
Event Type 1 All Inputs are Correct, But S Produces In-
correct Output o
None
Event Type 2 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted Template 1, 2
Event Type 3 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started Template 3
Event Type 4 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Retracted Template 4
Event Type 5 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Opted-out Template 5
Event Type 6 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed Template 6, 7
Event Type 7 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Terminated
by Exception e
Template 8, 9
Event Type 8 Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be
Completed
Template 10, 11
Event Type 9 Exception e is Thrown by S None
Event Type 10 Exception e is not Thrown by S Template 12
Event Type 11 Step S is Opted-out None
Event Type 12 Step S is not Opted-out Template 13
Event Type 13 Step S is Retracted None
Event Type 14 Step S is not Retracted Template 14
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Figure 4.2. Reverse Control Flow Graph for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process
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Figure 4.3. Artifact Flow Graph for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process
the set of artifact instances in the process and Ec is the set of edges. There is an edge
from n1 to n2 iff the artifact n2 may have an immediate data dependency on n1. For
instances, suppose both n1 and n2 are parameters, n2 may depend on n1 if 1) there is
a parameter binding indicating that n1 is passed to n2, or 2) n1 is an input parameter
and n2 is an output parameter of the same step. In general, if there is a path from
an artifact n1 to the artifact n2 in the graph, we know that the fault in n1 may be
propagated to n2. Figure 4.3 gives the artifact flow graph for the simplified blood
transfusion process. Note that parameters of different steps might have the same
name. For example, “Blood Transfusion Process”, “Pick up Blood from Blood Bank”,
and “Perform Transfusion” all have a parameter called Blood Product. Therefore, we
use “Parameter Name @ Step Name” to distinguish them.
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Figure 4.4. Partial Fault Tree for Template 3
4.2.2.2 Template for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started
The event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started” is developed by Template 3.
Template 3
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started
Partial Fault Tree:
The partial fault tree for this template is shown in Figure 4.4. In Little-JIL,
the only step state that may immediately precedes the state <S, Started> is <S,
Posted>. Since artifacts cannot be changed between these two states, event “Artifact
o is Wrong When S is Started” can occur only if the artifact o is already wrong when
the step S is posted. On the other hand, however, event “Artifact o is Wrong When S
is posted” does not always lead to “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started”. The step
S may be a retractable step, e.g. S is a sub-step of a parallel step. S may go from
the posted state to the retracted state when another sub-step throws an exception.
When this occurs, the faulty o will not be propagated to the state <S, Started>.
The step S may also be an optional step. The agent responsible for S is allowed
to opt out of the posted step S. In this case, event “Artifact o is wrong when S is
posted” will not lead to “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started” as well. Therefore,
to allow the faulty o to be propagated from the posted state to the started state, S
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Figure 4.5. Instantiated Partial Fault Tree for Template 3
should not be retracted or opted-out. Notice that the nodes for event “Step S is not
Opted out” and “Step S is not Retracted” are drawn using dash lines. This means that
these two events may or may not be present, depending on if the step S is optional or
retractable. “Step S is not Opted out” is present iff S is an optional step, and “Step
S is not Retracted” is present iff S is a retractable step.
This template can be used to develop the TOP event “Blood Product is Wrong
When Infuse Blood is Started” for the example process. Since step “Infuse Blood” is
neither optional nor retractable, the TOP event can only be caused by “Blood Product
is Wrong When Infuse Blood is Posted”, as shown in Figure 4.5. This new event is
an intermediate event, which can be further developed using a template that we are
going to discuss next.
4.2.2.3 Template for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted
Since the artifact o is already wrong when S is posted, the fault is not introduced
by the step S. It must be propagated from another step. Depending on whether the
step S is an exception handler or not, the control flows going to S are quite different.
Therefore, two templates are introduced to develop this type of events.
Template 1
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted, and
107
Figure 4.6. Partial Fault Tree for Template 1
• Step S is an exception handler step
Partial Fault Tree:
The partial fault tree for this template is shown in Figure 4.6. If S is an exception
handler step, it can only be posted if the corresponding exception is thrown. There-
fore, event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted” can only be caused by event
“Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Terminated by Exception e”, where
• e is the exception handled by S;
• S ′ may throw exception e;
• o′ is an output parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o (via parameter bindings).
If no such parameter exists, o′ = o.
It is possible that the step S ′ does not have an output parameter o′ that is passed
to o. o′ may be an output of another step S ′′ that is executed before S ′ and be
passed to the exception handler. It is tempting to look several steps back to identify
S ′′, create an event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S” is Completed”, and connect this
event to the OR gate. This, however, violates an important rule in the practice of
fault tree derivation: always look at the immediate causes each time [131]. Violating
this rule could result in overlooking some critical events between event “Artifact o’
is Wrong When S” is Completed” and “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted”. One
might argue that since we derive the fault tree automatically instead of manually, we
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can avoid overlooking such critical events by considering all possible situations and
incorporating them into the templates. The problem is that this will greatly increase
the size of the templates and make the derivation algorithm much more complicated.
Therefore, we choose to apply Template 1 and create the temporary event “Artifact
o is Wrong When S’ is Terminated by Exception e” in this case. This event can be
interpreted as: although the artifact o is not visible to the step S ′, it is already wrong
and still alive at the point when S ′ is terminated by exception e. After the fault tree
is derived, most of the temporary events introduced in this way can be removed by
the fault tree optimization techniques that are discussed later in this chapter.
To apply this template, the step that throws the exception e handled by S needs
to be identified. This can be achieved by looking up the successor nodes of the node
<S, Posted> in the Reversed Control Flow Graph. For any successor node that has
the form <S’, Terminated>, we further check if the step S ′ throws the exception
e. If so, S ′ is what we are looking for. We also need to find out whether there is
an output parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o. Given an output parameter of
S, whether this parameter may be passed to o can be decided by checking if there
is a path from this parameter to o in the Artifact Flow Graph. If there is one such
output parameter o′, we create an event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Terminated
by Exception e” and connect it to the OR gate. Otherwise, the event “Artifact o is
Wrong When S’ is Terminated by Exception e” will be created instead.
Template 2
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted
• S is not an exception handler step
Partial Fault Tree:
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Figure 4.7. Partial Fault Tree for Template 2
The partial fault tree for this template is shown in Figure 4.7. If S is the root
step, the incorrect artifact must be passed in as a parameter to the process. How
the parameter went wrong is out of the scope of the process. Therefore, the event is
treated as a primary event that does not need to be developed further.
If S is neither an exception handler nor the root step, it may be posted in two
cases: it may be posted after its parent step is started or it may be posted after
a sibling step is completed. The first case occurs if S is the first child step to be
executed, e.g. S is a pre-requisite step, or S is the first sub-step of a sequential step
that does not have a pre-requisite step. Suppose S ′ is the parent step of S, S will be
posted as soon as S ′ is started. Since S ′ is a non-leaf step, it is not able to change the
artifact o. The artifact o must already be wrong at the point when the S ′ is started.
In other words, the event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted” could be caused
by the event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Started”, where:
• S ′ is the parent step of S, and S is the first child to be executed, and
• o′ is a parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter exists,
o′ = o.
The second case occurs when S is not the first child step to be executed. In this
case, S can only be executed after one of its siblings is completed. For example, if S is
the second sub-step of a sequential step, it will be posted as soon as the first sub-step is
110
completed. If the first step may throw an exception and the corresponding exception
handler has a continue badge, S can also be posted after the exception handler step
is completed. Note that if this exception handler does have a handler step, S can
actually be posted when the first step is terminated. To simplify the template, a
dummy handler step is added to an exception handler if it is not associated with a
hander step. For steps in the second case, event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is
posted” may be caused by event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Completed”, where:
• S ′ a sibling of S and if S ′ is completed, S will be executed, and
• o′ is an output parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter
exists, o′ = o.
To apply this template, we first need to identify the S ′, which can be done by
checking the conditions given above. This could become fairly complicated, especially
for the second case. With the help of the Reversed Control Flow Graph, however, S ′
can be identified easily. We start with looking up the successor nodes of the node <S,
Posted>. For any node that has the form <S’, Started>, if S ′ is the parent step of
S, S ′ satisfies the condition for the first case. For any node that has the form <S’,
Completed>, if S ′ has the same parent as S, S ′ satisfies the condition for the second
case. We then can further check the parameters using the Artifact Flow Graph and
create an event accordingly.
We now use this template to develop the event “Blood Product is Wrong When
Infuse Blood is Posted” in the fault tree for the example process. In the Reversed
Control Flow Graph shown in Figure 4.2, the node <Infuse Blood, Posted> only
has one successor <Pick up Blood from Blood Bank, Completed>. Since “Pick up
Blood from Blood Bank” and “Perform Transfusion” has the same parent step, “Pick
up Blood from Blood Bank” is eligible for the second case. Next, we need to check
if “Pick up Blood from Blood Bank” has an output parameter that can be passed to
111
Figure 4.8. Instantiated Partial Fault Tree for Template 2
the parameter Blood Product of “Infuse Blood”. “Pick up Blood from Blood Bank”
has one output parameter Blood Product. This parameter will be passed to Blood
Product of “Infuse Blood” because there is a path from the node <Blood Product @
Pick up Blood from Blood Bank> to the node <Blood Product @ Infuse Blood>
in the Artifact Flow Graph shown in Figure 4.3. Therefore, “Blood Product is Wrong
When Infuse Blood is Posted” can only be caused by the event “Blood Product is
Wrong When Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is Completed”, as shown in Figure 4.8.
4.2.3 Derivation algorithm
The fault tree derivation algorithm for Little-JIL process definitions consists of
three phases:
• Perform Process Unrolling The state space of a Little-JIL process definition
might be infinite because of the recursion and unbound cardinality. The fault
tree, on the other hand, is a finite representation. To be able to automatically
derive a fault tree from a Little-JIL process definition, we first make the state
space of the process finite using the same unrolling technique discussed in the
previous chapter. The recursive steps and steps with unbound cardinality are
unrolled to step instances up to bounds given by the analyst.
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• Construct RCFG and AFG To construct the Reversed Control Flow Graph,
we first build a regular control flow graph from the unrolled process, then reverse
all its edges. The Artifact Flow Graph can be easily constructed based on the
parameter bindings in the unrolled process. Both algorithms can be done in
polynomial time.
• Derive Fault Tree With the unrolled process, the RCFG, and the AFG, the
following work-list algorithm applies the templates to develop the fault tree for
the given TOP event.
Input: Unrolled Little-JIL process definition, TOP event, RCFG, AFG
Output: Fault Tree
Initialize the visited event vs set to empty;
Initialize work-list wl set to empty;
Add TOP event into the work-list wl;
while wl is not empty do
Remove an event e from wl;
if vs contains e then
continue;
end
Find the appropriate template t for e;
Instantiate t using the RCFG and AFG;
Replace e with the partial fault tree in the instantiated t;
foreach leaf e’ in the partial fault tree do
if e’ is not a primary event then
Add e′ to the work-list wl;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: The Fault Tree Derivation Algorithm
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This algorithm is a polynomial time algorithm. Suppose there are n step instances
and m artifacts in the unrolled process. There are at most m ∗ n events that will
be created. This algorithm ensures that each event will be developed at most once.
Therefore it can be finished in O(m ∗ n).
Given the TOP event “Blood Product is Wrong When Infuse Blood is Started”, the
fault tree derived by this algorithm from the simplified blood transfusion process is
shown in Figure 4.9. One might immediately notice that it is not exactly a tree. The
event “Patient ID is Wrong When Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type is Started”
serves as an input to two gates. We can certainly expand the graph into a tree by
creating two sub-trees and connect them to those two gates respectively. For fault
trees derived from real-world processes, however, fully expanded versions are usually
much larger than the compact graph representations. While much smaller and easier
to understand, the compact graph representation produces the same MCSs as its
fully expanded counterpart. Therefore, we choose to use this graph representation.
Without causing confusion, we still call these graphs fault trees.
4.3 Evaluating Fault Trees
Once a fault tree is derived, all faults that might cause the hazard to happen
can be obtained from the primary events in the fault tree. The process developer
can then change the process to control or eliminate occurrence of those faults. For
instance, a failure-resistant agent could be assigned to steps where faults could occur.
Additionally, consistency check steps could be added to well-chosen places in the
process to stop the propagation of faults. In practice, due to resource limitations
or other constraints, the process developer usually is only able to apply the fault
prevention mechanisms to a few of the most important faults.
Priorities of the faults can be determined by evaluating the derived fault tree [131].
The most important fault tree evaluation technique is the Minimal Cut Set Analysis.
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Figure 4.9. Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process
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It computes a set of Minimal Cut Sets(MCSs) from the fault tree. A cut set is a set
of primary events whose occurrence ensures that the TOP event occurs. An MCS is
a cut set that cannot be further reduced. In other words, an MCS will not be able to
cause the hazard to occur if any event in it is missing. The importance of a MCS can
be grossly estimated by its size. Smaller MCSs are considered to be more important
than larger ones since fewer faults need to arise to cause the top event to occur. The
process developer, therefore, can start with the faults in MCSs with smallest size. If
probabilities of all the primary events in the fault tree are provided, statistic analysis
can be applied to compute probabilities of MCSs. As the indicator, the probability is
more accurate than the size. The quantitative evaluation can even obtain the numeric
evaluation of overall system vulnerability to a hazard caused by the occurrence of a
particular fault. In this section, we focus on the computation of MCSs.
To compute MCSs from a fault tree, each gate in the fault tree is first translated
into a Boolean equation. Consider the fault tree derived from the simplified blood
transfusion process (Figure 4.9) as an example. The Boolean equations corresponding
to several gates are shown as follows.
Gate 1: E1 = E2
Gate 2: E2 = E3
Gate 3: E3 = E4
Gate 4: E4 = E5 + E6
. . .
Gate 8: E9 = E11E12
. . .
Given these equations, existing Boolean Minimization tools can be applied to get
rid of all the intermediate events, except the TOP event, and obtain an equation that
only contains the TOP event and primary events. In this equation, the left side is the
TOP event and the right side is a formula of primary events in Conjunctive Normal
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Form. Each clause in this formula corresponds to a MCS, which contains all events
in that clause. The final equation computed for the example fault tree is:
E1 = E6 + E17 + E25 + E15¬E14
From this equation, we get four MCSs:
1) {E6}
2) {E17}
3) {E25}
4) {E15,¬E14}
MCS 1, 2, and 3 only contain one event, indicating that the process is exposed
to a single point of failure. The hazard will definitely occur if either wrong blood
product is picked up at the blood bank(E6), wrong blood type is produced by the
blood testing(E17) or the patient ID passed to the process is wrong (E25). Therefore
subsequent changes need to be made to remove these single points of failure.
MCS 4 does not indicate a single point of failure because it contains two events E15
and ¬E14. If we look carefully at these events, however, we can see the problem with
this MCS. E15 says “All Inputs are Correct, But Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type
Produces Wrong Blood Type”. Since the agent for step “Contact Lab for Patient’s
Blood Type” already produces the blood type, although it is wrong, the agent will not
throw the exception Patient’s Blood Type Unavailable. Therefore, E15 implies ¬E14,
which represents that the exception Patient’s Blood Type Unavailable is not thrown
by “Contact Lab for Patient’s Blood Type”. We can see that E15 is a indeed single
point of failure even though the MCS says that it is not. Since our analysis treats leaf
steps as black boxes, it is not able to deduce relationships between primary events
that occur at leaf steps. Therefore it is up to analysts to identify such relationships
and generate more accurate results. Although MCSs computed by our approach may
not be minimal, there is one thing that is guaranteed – if a MCS contains only one
event, the event must be a single point of failure.
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4.4 Process FTA Issues
We encountered four major issues during our study of process fault tree analysis:
scalability, looping contructs, NOT gates, and it Useability. In this section, we discuss
these issues as well as our approaches to address these issues.
4.4.1 Scalability
A real-world human-intensive process usually involves complex control and artifact
flows. The fault tree derived from it can easily become too large either to be easily
understood by humans or be analyzed by fault tree evaluation tools. To address
this issue, two optimizations, Step Abstraction and Step Removal, are applied to
the unrolled process before the fault tree is derived. Similar to step abstraction
and step removal in the process verification framework, Step Abstraction abstracts
sub-processes into leaf steps and Step Removal removes certain steps that do not
have impact on the propagation of faults. In addition to these two optimizations, the
optimization Equivalent Event Removal can be applied to remove certain intermediate
events from the fault tree after it is derived. All three optimizations guarantee that
the optimized fault tree is equivalent to the original one in the sense that both fault
trees generate the same minimal cut sets.
4.4.1.1 Step Abstraction
In the process verification framework, the Step Abstraction first identifies a set of
relevant steps where property events could occur, and then abstracts sub-processes
that do not contains relevant steps into leaf steps. The Step Abstraction for fault
tree derivation is almost the same as the one for verification, except for the way in
which relevant steps are identified. In our approach, the hazard is represented as
an incorrect artifact at a specific point in the process. The faults that could cause
the hazard to occur can only originate from two sources: a leaf step that produces a
wrong output or a wrong input to the root step. The other steps can only change the
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Figure 4.10. Step Abstraction for Fault Tree Derivation
propagation of the faults by throwing exceptions. Therefore, relevant steps for fault
tree derivation are the root step and the steps that have an OUT parameter that may
flow to the artifact in the TOP event. As noted earlier, the TOP event is required to
be defined as an event in Category 2, which always has an artifact. These relevant
steps can be easily identified with the help of the Artifact Flow Graph. Once the
relevant step set is obtained, any sub-process that does not contain relevant steps
can be replaced with a leaf step that throws the same exceptions as the root step
of the sub-process. In this way, intermediate events associated with the steps in the
sub-process will not be created.
Figure 4.10(a) shows an example. The step S1 creates the parameter p1, which is
passed to the parameter p3 of the step S5 via the temporary parameter p2. Suppose
the hazard is “Artifact p3 is Wrong When S5 is Started”. The only step that has
an output parameter that may flow to p3 is step S1. Therefore, the hazard can only
be caused by the fault “All Inputs are Correct, But S Produces Wrong p1”. The
sub-process with the root S2 can never create faults that lead to the hazard. We can
safely replace the sub-process with a leaf step S ′2, as shown in Figure 4.10(b). This
results in a fault tree without intermediate events containing states of step S3 and
S4. The fault tree derived after the step abstraction is equivalent to the fault tree
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Figure 4.11. Step Removal for Fault Tree Derivation
derived without step abstraction. Both have one MCS: {“All Inputs are Correct, But
S Produces Wrong p1”}.
4.4.1.2 Step Removal
Different from the one for process verification, the Step Removal for fault tree
derivation removes a step only if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. It is not a relevant step, and
2. It does not throw any exceptions
The first condition guarantees that the step will never produce a fault that could
lead to the hazard. The second condition ensures that the step cannot change the
propagation of faults that may cause the hazard to occur. For the process shown in
Figure 4.11(a), we can remove S ′2 because it satisfies both conditions. Figure 4.11(b)
is the process after removing S2. It is easy to see that the fault tree derived from this
process is equivalent to the fault tree derived from the original process.
4.4.1.3 Equivalent Event Removal
While the previous two optimizations are performed on the process before the
fault tree is derived, the Equivalent Event Removal optimization is applied to remove
certain intermediate events from the fault tree after it is derived. This optimization
first partitions the events in the fault tree into different equivalent groups. Each
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Figure 4.12. Groups in Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process
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equivalent group has a source event that is a primary event or an event whose input
gate connects to event(s) in another group. Except for the source event, each event
in an equivalent group occurs if and only if the source event occurs. Note that the
idea of equivalent groups is similar to basic blocks of control flow graphs in compiler
optimizations [9]. Figure 4.12 shows the groups identified in the fault tree derived
from the simplified blood transfusion process. Each equivalent group is enclosed in a
box with the dashed line. To make the figure less crowded, the boxes for groups with
a single event are not drawn. Take group 1 as an example. E4 is the source event.
The other three events are included in this group because they may occur if and only
if E4 occurs.
Here, we give an informal description of the algorithm that we use to identify
equivalent groups. The algorithm performs a post-order traverse over the given fault
tree. Upon visiting an event e, a new group is created to include e if e is a primary
event or input gate of e is a NOT gate. Otherwise, e must be an intermediate event
whose input gate g is either an AND gate or an OR gate. In this case, the algorithm
proceeds to check the input events of g. If all these input events belong to the same
group, e is added into this group. Otherwise, a new group is created to include e.
For each equivalent group, the Equivalent Event Removal optimization selects
certain event(s) and removes the other events in the group. Specifically, the TOP
event and primary events are always selected to be kept. If a group does not contain
the TOP event or a primary event, any event in the group can be selected. Based
on the definition of equivalent groups, it is easy to prove that this optimization will
result in a fault tree that is equivalent to the original one. This optimization is able
to greatly reduce the size of the fault tree. The problem, however, is that removing
intermediate events creates “gaps” between events that may cause the fault tree to be
difficult to understand. To solve this problem, events are only temporarily removed
when the MCSs are calculated. When the fault tree is displayed to the user, an
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Figure 4.13. Example of Process Containing Loop
equivalent group with more than one event is collapsed into a node. If necessary, the
user can expand the node to see the events in the group.
4.4.2 Looping Constructs
Processes often contain steps that are executed repeatedly. Fault trees derived
from these processes, therefore, may contain loops (i.e. an input and the output
of an event connect to the same event). Figure 4.13 shows a process example. In
this process, the sub-step S1 may throw exception e. The exception is handled by a
restart handler. Step S has an INOUT parameter o that will be passed and changed
by S1. Exception handler step S2 cannot change o. Since the exception handler is a
restart handler, S1 and S2 might be executed repeatedly. Given the hazard “Artifact
o is Wrong When S is completed”, the fault tree derived by our algorithm is shown
in Figure 4.14. For each intermediate event, the template used to develop this event
is shown next to the event. Note that there is an edge from the input gate of event
e14 to event e7. This edge introduces a loop into the fault tree.
Since a fault tree with loops is no longer a tree, existing techniques for analyzing
fault trees cannot be applied to it. To address this issue, we simply remove loops
from the derived fault tree f in the following way:
• Detecting a loop A depth search is performed on the fault tree f , starting from
the hazard event. If an input event of a gate points to an event in the stack,
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Figure 4.14. Fault Tree Containing Loop
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Figure 4.15. Fault Tree without Loop
a loop is detected. In the fault tree shown in Figure 4.14, the loop is detected
when the edge from the input gate of event e14 to event e7 is visited.
• Removing the loop Before discussing how to remove a loop, we first define an
elimination operation f\e, where f is a fault tree and e is an event in f . This
operation produces another fault tree f ′ as follows. As discussed in Section 4.3,
events in a fault tree can be considered as Boolean variables and gates as Boolean
equations. The event e in the operation is first assigned it to false. This may
cause some other events to be evaluated to false. For example, suppose there
is an AND gate that has two input events, e and e′, and an output event e′′.
The equation for this gate is e′′ = ee′. Since e is assigned to false, e′′ will be
evaluated to false too according to this equation. This may cause more events
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to be evaluated to false. Removing all events evaluated to false from the
fault tree f results in f ′.
To remove a loop, a new event e is created and the back edge in the loop is
connected to this new event. Then the operation f\e is applied to obtain fault
tree f ′. Removing the loop in the fault tree shown in Figure 4.14 results in the
fault tree shown in Figure 4.15.
A loop in a fault tree is caused by certain steps that are executed repeatedly.
Removing a loop in the above way basically results in a fault tree corresponding to
the case where those steps executed once. Compared to this fault tree, a fault tree
corresponding to the case where those steps executed more than once usually produces
larger MCSs. Since process developers usually focus on small MCSs, we believe that
it should be enough to only consider the fault tree corresponding to the case where
those steps executed once. If necessary, however, a fault tree corresponding to the
case where those steps executed more than once can be easily created from the fault
tree with the loop.
4.4.3 NOT Gate
Traditionally, NOT gates are not used in fault trees because they may introduce
difficulties to the evaluation of fault trees. The use of NOT gates will result in a
non-coherent fault tree, meaning that the fault tree is no longer a monotone Boolean
function [10]. For non-coherent fault trees, the original concept of minimal cut sets
does not apply and should be replaced by prime implicants. Usually, computing prime
implicants for non-coherent fault trees is much more difficult than computing minimal
cut sets for coherent fault trees. Without NOT gates, however, the fault-tree analysis
may produce inaccurate results because relationships between many events cannot be
captured in the fault tree. Therefore whether to use NOT gates is a trade off between
efficiency and accuracy. In the early stage of fault-tree analysis (1960s–1980s), due to
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Figure 4.16. Simple Process for Discussing NOT gates
the limitation of computing power and algorithms, fault trees were derived without
using NOT gates so that they could be evaluated. Since then, the computing power
has been increased significantly. More importantly, recent research has showed that
prime implicants for large non-coherent fault trees can be computed using symbolic
or heuristic approaches [112] [39] [3]. Because of this progress, many FTA approaches
now choose to use NOT gates in order to achieve more accurate results.
In our research, we decided to use NOT gates to capture relationships between
certain conditional events. For example, in Template 12, event “Exception e is not
Thrown by S” is connected to event “Exception e is Thrown by S” via a NOT gate.
Here, we use a simple example to show why FTA of processes may produce inaccurate
results without NOT gates. In the process shown in Figure 4.16, the root step “P”
is a sequential step with two sub-steps. The first sub-step “S1” may throw exception
e, which will be handle by a continue handler. The root step has an input parameter
o that cannot be changed by its sub-steps. For the hazard “o is Wrong When S2
is Started”, the fault tree derived without NOT gates is shown in Figure 4.17. The
MCSs computed from this fault tree are {o is Wrong When P is Posted (E10), e
is Thrown by S1 (E5)} and {o is Wrong When P is Posted (E10), e is not Thrown
by S1 (E7)}. These two MCSs fail to indicate the single point of failure – event “o
is Wrong When P is Posted”, which always causes the hazard to occur no matter
whether S1 throws exception e or not. The reason is that the relationship between
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Figure 4.17. Fault Tree without NOT Gates
event “e is not Thrown by S1” and “e is Thrown by S1” is not captured in the fault
tree. To get the expected MCS {“o is Wrong When P is Posted”}, a NOT gate needs
to be introduced to connect these two events.
4.4.4 Usability
To control or eliminate a fault in a MCS, the process developer needs to understand
how this fault together with the other events in the MCS could cause to hazard to
occur. Usually, this can be done by first identifying events from the MCS in the fault
tree and then following the fault tree up to the TOP event. The problem is that fault
trees derived from real-world processes could be very large. To solve this problem,
we generate two representations, Partial Fault Trees and a Process Trace, which are
designed to help process developers to better understand MCSs.
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Figure 4.18. Partial Fault Tree for MCS {E6}
4.4.4.1 Partial Fault Tree
The fault tree derived from a process shows combinations of all events that could
lead to the hazard. Large parts of the fault tree actually have nothing to do with the
events in a MCS. Therefore, we generate a partial fault tree for the MCS by removing
events irrelevant to the MCS from the fault tree. Given a MCS m and the fault tree
f from which m is computed, an event e is an irrelevant event if f\e is still able to
produce MCS m. f\e is the elimination operation discussed in Section 4.4.2. Since
the partial fault tree does not contain irrelevant events, it is much smaller and is
easier to follow. Figure 4.18 shows the partial fault tree for the minimal cut set {E6}
generated from the fault tree for the simplified blood transfusion process.
4.4.4.2 Process Trace
In many cases, events in a MCS could lead to the hazard along different executions
of the process. In a large partial fault tree, it is often difficult to distinguish events
occur along one execution from events along another execution. To address this issue,
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we generate process traces that show how events in a MCS cause the hazard to occur.
Details about this trace generation algorithm are given in Chapter Trace Generation
and Visualization.
4.5 Limitations of Our Approach
To use our process FTA approach, process developers need to be aware of several
limitations that may cause the analysis results to be imprecise or even incorrect.
• The completeness a fault tree derived from a Little-JIL process definition by our
automatic algorithm depends on the completeness of the process. Thus, in cases
where the Little-JIL process definition fails to completely represent steps in a
real-world process that have an effect upon critical artifact flows, our algorithm
will, accordingly, produce an incomplete fault tree.
• Since the fault tree derivation algorithm only looks at step interfaces, which
do not specify how a leaf step produces its outputs from its inputs, it has to
assume that any output of a leaf step depends on all its inputs. Thus, leaf steps
that do not satisfy this assumption may cause the derived fault tree to contain
superfluous sub-trees.
• As shown in the example discussed in Section 4.3, computed MCSs may not be
minimal because our analysis is not able to identify the relationships between
different primary events.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present our template-based automatic fault tree derivation
algorithm for the Little-JIL process definition language. Although the events and
templates are specific to the Little-JIL language, the basic idea of this template-based
fault tree derivation approach may be applied to automatically construct fault trees
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for other process definition languages. When applying FTA to real-world, human-
intensive processes, we encountered three issues. To address the scaling issue, we
proposed three optimizations that are able to significantly reduce the size of fault
trees so that they can be understood and evaluated more easily. To address the
loop issue, we applied a simple approach to remove loops in fault trees so that they
can be analyzed using existing fault tree evaluation techniques. To obtain more
accurate results, we chose to use NOT gate to capture relationships between certain
conditional events. We believe that these issues may also be found when applying
FTA to processes defined in other languages and believe our approaches provide
suggestions for addressing such issues. In addition to support for automatic fault tree
derivation, we proposed two representations that make MCSs more easily understood,
no matter how the fault trees were derived.
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CHAPTER 5
TRACE GENERATION AND VISUALIZATION
In software engineering, an execution of a software system is a sequence of system
states from initialization to termination. A state is a configuration of the system where
every variable in the system is assigned to a specific value. Here we define a trace to be
a partial view of an execution. Specifically, a trace is a sequence of states, where the
set of states in the trace is a sub-set of the states in the corresponding execution and
the order of states in the trace is the same as the order in which those states appear in
the execution. Traces have been widely used in many software engineering techniques.
For instance, to debug a software system, the developer may follow a particular trace
generated by the debugger to diagnose the bugs in the system. System logs, which can
be considered as a particular kind of traces, are used to recorded information about
certain executions of the system. The system logs help the system administrator to
detect abnormal behavior of the system. In system simulation, the analyst needs to
study the traces of the simulator to make sure that the simulator correctly captures
the behaviors of the real system. The trace also plays an important role in two
analysis techniques that we study in this thesis. As mentioned earlier, during process
verification, if the property is violated by the process, a counter-example trace will
be generated by the verifier to demonstrate how a property is violated. The counter
example trace represents one possible execution of the translated model along which
the property is violated. For the Fault-Tree Analysis, we generate traces for a MCS
to aid the analyst in understanding how events in a MCS may eventually cause the
hazard to occur.
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In this section, we focus on an important yet often neglected issue: how to make
traces more accessible to the analyst. We proposed an approach to generate a high-
level Little-JIL trace from a low-level violation trace of the underlying verification
tools used by our verification framework. This Little-JIL trace generation approach is
designed in a generic way so that it is also able to produce a Little-JIL trace based on a
Minimal Cut Set (MCS) computed by the fault tree analysis. In addition, we proposed
two visual representations that allow the user to navigate and understand the Little-
JIL trace more easily. We believe these approaches are able to greatly enhance the
user-friendliness of both process verification and process fault tree analysis. Although
the discussion in the remainder of this chapter is based on the Little-JIL process
definition language, the underlying ideas of our approaches can be adopted to generate
and represent traces in other languages.
5.1 High-Level Trace Generation
In our process verification framework, we translate the Little-JIL process defini-
tion into the model used by the underlying verification tool. The counter-example
trace produced by the verification tool, therefore, is a trace through this model in-
stead of through the Little-JIL process definition. During the translation, high-level
constructs, such as exceptions and channels, are mapped to low-level representations
in the model. In addition, steps or artifacts might be removed or abstracted by the
optimizations. Therefore, the model often becomes considerably different from the
original Little-JIL process definition. As a consequence, the counter-example traces
become extremely difficult to understand, even for an expert with deep understanding
of the translation and optimization techniques.
To solve this problem, we implemented a tool that is able to generate a correspond-
ing trace through the Little-JIL process definition based on the counter-example trace
through the model used by the verification tool. Since the Little-JIL process defini-
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tion is mapped into the model via a sequence of transformations including translation
and various optimizations, the most straight-forward approach is to map the counter-
example trace backward, phase by phase, along those transformations. The problem
with this approach is that it requires the mapping information for each transforma-
tion to be stored. Furthermore, any change in the optimizations or the translation
might lead to change in the implementation of the tool. Instead, we chose to per-
form an A* search [114] on the Little-JIL process definition, where the search goal
is the sequence of property events as they appear in the counter-example. Since the
Little-JIL trace generated by the A* search contains the same sequence of property
events, it will drive the property into the violation state in the same way as the low-
level counter-example trace. For this A* search approach, no extra transformation
information needs to be stored, and changes in transformations usually will not affect
the implementation of tool. Another major advantage of this approach is that we
are able to reuse it to generate the Little-JIL traces from a MCS, with a few minor
changes as described below.
Since A* search could effectively generate high-level violation traces, one might
wonder why we do not use the A* search to verify a property in the first place. The
main reason is that A* search is not effective for proving the property is not violated.
In this case, the A* search would need to explore the whole state space of the process
and can easily run into the state explosion problem.
5.1.1 Introduction to A* Algorithm
Before discussing the high-level trace generation tool, it is necessary to give a
brief introduction to the A* search algorithm. The A* search algorithm is a best-first
graph search algorithm. Starting from an initial node, it is able to find the least-cost
path that satisfies the given goal. The algorithm maintains a work-list that contains
the nodes to be examined. During each iteration of the search, one node is taken
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from the work-list. This node is then examined to see if it meets the goal. If so,
the algorithm reconstructs and returns a path from the initial node to this node.
Otherwise, the successors of the node are added into the work-list. This is similar
to the many search algorithms such as depth-first and breath-first algorithms. What
sets A* algorithm apart from these algorithms is the order in which the nodes in the
work-list are visited. In the A* algorithm, the order of a node n to be examined
is determined by a heuristic function f(n). The node with the smaller f(n) has the
higher priority. Therefore, the algorithm always picks a node with the smallest f(n) to
examine during each iteration. The heuristic function f(n) for a node n is the sum of
two functions: g(n), which is the shortest distance from the initial node to node n, and
h(n), which is the estimate of the distance from node n to the goal. An important
property of A* search is that it will find the optimal path if the function h(n) is
admissible. h(n) is admissible if it is guaranteed to never overestimate the actual
minimal distance from node n to the goal. Formally, suppose h′(n) is the function
that gives the actual minimal cost from node n to the goal, h(n) is admissible if and
only if h(n) ≤ h′(n) for all node n. The proof of this property can be found in [114].
It should be noted that for a search problem, one may come up with different h(n)
functions. The A* algorithm is able to find an optimal path with all these functions
as long as they are admissible. The only difference is the performance. Compared to
the depth-first algorithm, A* search is usually able to find a shorter path. Compared
to the breath-first algorithm, A* algorithm is faster because it often explores fewer
states. Therefore, A* search is widely used to solve many practical search problem.
5.1.2 High-Level Trace Generation Tool Architecture
Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of the high-level Little-JIL trace generation tool.
There are four major components: a search engine, a goal constructor, a goal manager,
and an Little-JIL event manager.
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Figure 5.1. Little-JIL Trace Generation Tool Architecture
• The search engine applies the A* search algorithm to explore the state space
of the given Little-JIL process definition. Each time a process state is visited,
the search engine consults the goal manager to decide what to do next. There
are three possible results that may be returned by the goal manager. The goal
manager may indicate that the current process state meets the goal. If so, the
search engine will reconstruct the Little-JIL trace from the initial process state
to the current process state and stops the search. The goal manager may also
indicate that the goal can never be achieved after the current process state. In
this case, the search engine simply discards this state and picks up another state
from the work-list to visit. The last possible result is that the goal is not yet
met by the given process state but may possibly be achieved by its successors.
If this is the case, the search engine computes the successors of the current
process state and adds them onto the work-list.
• The goal constructor creates the goal that needs to be achieved by the search.
The goal constructor for FSV extracts the goal from a counter-example trace,
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while the goal constructor for FTA constructs the goal from a MCS. In our
approach, the goal is encoded as a finite-state automaton (FSA) for both FSV
and FTA. The labels in this FSA are events: either property events for FSV, or
fault tree events for FTA. Since both kinds of events are designed to share the
same interface, the goal can be implemented as a generic FSA, independent of
the underlying difference between these two kinds of events.
• The goal manager makes the decision of what the search engine should do
about a process state based on the goal. The process state passed from the
search engine contains a goal state that represents the state of the goal right
before this process state. The goal manager first forwards the process state to
the Little-JIL event manager to see whether any event may occur when the
process goes into that state. Based on the goal FSA, it then computes the next
goal state according to the events returned by the Little-JIL event manager.
If the next state is the accepting state, it will tell the search engine that the
goal is achieved by the process state. If the next state is the violation state, it
will tell the search engine to discard this process state because no successors of
this process state can achieve the goal. When the next goal state is neither the
accepting state nor the violation state, the goal manager will notify the search
engine to keep searching the successors of the process state. In this case, some
other information will also be return to the search engine, including the next
goal state and the value of h(x) for the process state. The next goal state will
be stored in the successors of the process state. The value of h(x) will be used
to compute f(x) for the successors of the process state. Given a process state
x, h(x) is defined as the distance between the next goal state corresponding to
x and the accepting state in the goal FSA. For an arbitrary FSA, the distances
between two states may differ on different paths connecting these states. The
goal FSA in our approach, however, guarantees that the distances between a
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goal state and the accepting state are always the same. We provide a more
detailed discussion of h(x) in Section 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.2.
• The Little-JIL event manager is used to generate event(s) for a given process
state. The search engine adopts an interleaved model of the Little-JIL process
definition. Therefore, only one step state in the process state is changed from
the previous process state. We call such a step state in a process state the active
step state. The Little-JIL event manager checks whether any event may occur
when the active step goes into the specific active step state. Although sharing
the same interface, the Little-JIL event manager for FSV and the one for FTA
use different methods to generate the events.
The major part of this framework, including the search engine and the goal man-
ager, can be shared for both FSV and FTA. The only two components that need to
be customized are the goal constructor and the Little-JIL event manager.
5.1.2.1 Customization for FSV
In this section, we describe the goal constructor that extracts a goal FSA from a
given counter-example trace. We also discuss the way in which events are generated
by the Little-JIL event manager for FSV. These two customized components allow
the search engine to find a Little-JIL trace that violates the property in the same way
as the low-level counter-example trace.
5.1.2.1.1 Goal Constructor
Our process verification framework allows the analyst to use various underlying ver-
ification tools such as FLAVERS and SPIN. Counter-example traces produced by
different verification tools may have different forms. Ignoring the syntax differences,
however, a counter-example trace can usually be represented as a sequence of nodes:
n1, n2, . . . , ni(e1), . . . nj(e2), . . . , nk(em), . . . , nk
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Figure 5.2. Goal FSA from Counter-Example Trace
Each node corresponds to one state of the model fed to the verification tool. Some
nodes (i.e. ni, nj, and nk) may be associated with an event in the alphabet of the
property. This means that the event associated with a node occurs when the model
goes into the state represented by that node. Given a counter-example trace, we can
extract a sequence of events:
e1, e2, . . . , em
The order of events in this sequence must remain the same as that in the counter-
example trace. This event sequence will drive the property into the violation state.
Since the model translated from the Little-JIL process definition is equivalent to the
Little-JIL process definition with respect to the property, there must exist a Little-JIL
trace that will produce the same event sequence. What we need to do, therefore, is to
construct a goal from the event sequence so that the A* search engine can find such
a Little-JIL trace. Given the event sequence e1, e2, . . . , en, the finite state automaton
for the goal is shown in Figure 5.2.
States s1, s2, . . . , sn correspond to events e1, e2, . . . , en respectively. sn+1 is the
accepting state, and sv is the violation state. At the state si(1 ≤ i ≤ n), only the
event ei can cause the state to move to state si+1. All the other events in the alphabet
will lead to the violation state. Once the goal state goes into the accepting state sn+1,
we know that the current Little-JIL trace can produce the given event sequence that
violates the property. So the search can stop and return the current Little-JIL trace.
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In this goal FSA, there is only one path from any state si(1 ≤ i ≤ n) to the
accepting state. Therefore we define h(si) as n−i+1. For a process state n associated
with si, any path from n to the process state nf that satisfies the goal must contain
process states associated with si+1, . . . , sn+1. The actual distance between n and nf
should be at least n − i + 1. So this h(si) is admissible function that can never
overestimate the actual distance.
5.1.2.1.2 Little-JIL Event Manager
The events for FSV are property events. They are generated according to the property
event bindings discussed in Chapter 3. An event binding maps a property event to
one or more concrete events in the process. There are three kinds of concrete events:
step state events, exception throwing events, and parameter def/use events. The step
state events can directly map to step states. For example, if there is a property event
binding saying “event e occurs if step s goes into the started state”, the Little-JIL
event manager will generate the event e if the active step state indicates that step s
is started. The exception throwing events correspond to TERMINATED step states with
specific exceptions. For instance, if there is a property event binding saying “event e
occurs if step s throws exception ex”, the Little-JIL event manager will generate the
event e only if the active step state indicates that step s is terminated with exception
ex. As discussed in Chapter 3, parameter def/use events can be treated as step
COMPLETED and STARTED states respectively.
5.1.2.2 Customization for FTA
In this section, we discuss how to customize the goal constructor and the Little-
JIL event manager for a MCS to allow the search engine to find a Little-JIL trace
that shows how events in the MCS cause the hazard to occur.
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5.1.2.2.1 Goal Constructor
Unlike the counter-example trace, the MCS contains a set of events that do not have
a specific order. Therefore the goal should accept sequences of those events occurring
in any order.
The MCS is a minimal set of primary events (or negation of primary events) that
could lead to the given hazard. As discussed in Chapter 4, only the following types
of basic events may appear in a MCS:
• Event Type 1: All inputs are correct, but S produces incorrect output o
• Event Type 2: Artifact o is wrong when S is posted (S is the root step)
• Event Type 9: Exception e is thrown by S
• Event Type 11: Step S is opted-out
• Event Type 13: Step S is retracted
Note that event of Event Type 2 can be a basic event only if the step S is the
root step. Otherwise, the event must be caused by another event within the process,
and thus cannot be a basic event. To match against the step state events generated
by the event manager, we need to do a simple event translation for the events in the
MCS. Notice that each basic event shown above is explicitly or implicitly associated
with a step state of the process. An event is translated to its corresponding step state
event using the following map:
All inputs are correct, but S produces incorrect output o → Step S is completed
Artifact o is wrong when S is posted → Step S is posted
Exception e is thrown by S → Step S is terminated by exception e
Step S is opted-out → Step S is opted-out
Step S is retracted → Step S is retracted
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The translation ignores the artifact information in the first two types of events.
This information is not necessary for generating the Little-JIL trace because whether
an artifact is wrong or not does not affect the control flow of the process. Suppose
there is a trace containing a step state event “S is completed”, we can interpret this
event as “All inputs are correct, but S produces incorrect output o” (o is an output of
S). This interpretation does not invalidate the trace.
After the event translation, a MCS becomes a set of step state events {e1, e2, . . . ,
en}. This is an unordered set of events as opposed to the ordered event sequence
extracted from the counter-example trace in FSV. Since we want to find a Little-JIL
trace along which events in the MCS cause the top event to occur, we should also take
the top event into consideration. The top event also needs to be translated into a
step state event h. Given the set {e1, e2, . . . , en} and h, the goal finite state automata
satisfies the following conditions:
1. Each state in the goal is a sub-set of {e1, e2, . . . , en}, except the accepting state
sa and the violation state sv. The initial state s0 is the set {e1, e2, . . . , en}.
2. Given a state s that is neither sa nor sv,
(a) If s is not an empty set, for each event e in s, there is a transition with the
label e from the state s to the state s′ = s− e. There is also a transition
with the label !e from s to the violation state sv. !e is the negation of event
e;
(b) For the state s that is the empty set, there are a transition labeled h from s
to the accepting state sa and a transition labeled !h from s to the violation
state sv. h here is the hazard event.
3. Given a state s, if an event e does not appear on a transition defined in 2, the
event e will not change the state.
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Figure 5.3. Goal FSA from MCS
Figure 5.3 shows the goal for a MCS that contains event e1 and !e2 after the event
translation.
Although there may exist multiple paths from a state to the accepting state, the
lengths of those paths are the same. For a state si that contains n events, it cannot get
to the accepting state unless all n events as well as the hazard event h are encountered.
Therefore, h(si) = n + 1. It is obvious that this h(si) is admissible and can never
overestimate the actual distance.
5.1.2.2.2 Little-JIL Event Manager
The Little-JIL event manager for FTA is trivial. As shown above, the FSA generated
by the goal constructor is defined over step state events. Therefore, the Little-JIL
event manager simply returns the event that corresponds to the active step state.
For example, Little-JIL event manager will generate the event Step S is started if the
active step state indicates that step S is started.
5.1.3 Scaling Problem
Although this approach avoids the difficulties faced by the reverse-mapping ap-
proach, it might not work if the counter-example trace contains too few events and the
process is very large. In this case, the A* search has to search almost all executions of
the Little-JIL process definition and may run out of memory. One possible solution
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is to automatically select some steps that change the control flow of the process and
annotate them with additional events during the translation. This will result in a
counter-example trace that contains more events, but should alleviate the problem.
In fact, the more events that are added, the faster the high-level trace can be found.
However, adding events to the model usually slows down the verification because it
increases the model size. For future work, it would be interesting to explore the
strategies to minimize total time and perform an experimental evaluation of those
strategies.
5.2 Trace Visualization
The Little-JIL trace produced by the high-level trace generation tool, as well
as other techniques such as simulation, is usually represented as a sequence of step
executions annotated with necessary information, such as events, time, and artifact
usage. Since the processes to be analyzed tend to be complex, the traces are often
lengthy and verbose. This prevents them from being easily comprehended by the
analyst.
To solve this problem, we implemented a generic Little-JIL trace visualization
tool that is able to display traces produced by different analysis tools using different
graphic representations. Since the traces often carry a lot of information, we suspect
that one single representation might not be that helpful. Instead, several comple-
mentary representations that display different aspects of the traces might sometimes
be a better choice. After investigating various existing techniques for representing
the phases and activities of work flows or project executions, such as the Gantt
Chart [57], we support two trace visual representations: the Structured Textual View
and the Timeline View. We believe that they are able to help analysts to navigate
and understand the Little-JIL traces more easily.
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Figure 5.4. Simple Trace Example
To present these two representations, we use the simple example showed in Fig-
ure 5.4. The trace on the right is a Little-JIL trace that violates a property of the
process on the left. The trace is a sequence of step states, some of which are associated
with property events. For example, state Leaf1 STARTED in the trace is associated
with event event1. Note that trace produced by other analyses may be annotated
with data other than the events. In the two representations that we discuss, this data
is treated in the same way as events.
5.2.1 Structured Textual View
An important feature of Little-JIL is that a process is organized as the hierarchical
decomposition of steps. The user can often understand the high-level logic of the
process by looking at the first few levels of steps. If necessary, the user can also
quickly pinpoint the step of interest by following the hierarchical structure of the
process. This hierarchical structure information, however, is buried in the Little-JIL
trace. The structured textual representation tries to retrieve the hierarchical structure
information as much as possible from the plain trace and present the trace to the user
using this information.
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Figure 5.5. Structured Textual View
Figure 5.5 shows the structured view of the example trace. The first column is a
tree. The leaf nodes are trace nodes from the Little-JIL trace. The non-leaf nodes
are called scope nodes that are intended to match the steps in the process. The
trace nodes under a scope node constitute a sub-trace. Because of the interleaving,
some steps in the process may not have corresponding scope nodes. In the example
trace, the trace nodes of step Leaf1 and Leaf2 interleave with each other because
the parent step Sub1 is a parallel step. Therefore, we are not able to put them under
different scope nodes without changing their order. The second column shows the
index for each trace nodes and the third column shows the events corresponding to
the trace nodes.
The structured textual view allows the user to collapse or expand scope nodes.
When a scope node is collapsed, the index range of the sub-trace corresponding to
the scope node will appear in the index column, and the sequence of events in the
sub-trace will appear in the event column. The view also allows the user to filter
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Figure 5.6. Timeline View
certain types of trace nodes. The user, therefore, is able to look into the slice of the
trace by filtering out all POSTED traces nodes.
5.2.2 Timeline View
The Timeline View consists of two panels. The left panel is the process tree view.
The right panel shows the trace nodes in the two dimensional way. The x-axis is
the time. Since there is no time information in the trace generated by the process
verification, we use the indexes of trace nodes to represent the time. The y-axis is
the steps in the left panel. The trace nodes of a step lay on the same horizontal
line corresponding to the step on the left panel. Different types of trace nodes are
distinguished using different letter and color. For instance, a node with letter P and
grey color represents a POSTED trace node. If a node is associated with an event, the
event will be shown above or below the node depending on the position of the node.
Moreover, there is a vertical red line crossing every node with event.
The Timeline View also allows the user to collapse non-leaf steps. When a step is
collapsed, the trace nodes between the first and the last node of the step become a
dash line, as shown in Figure 5.7. The events in-between, however, are still visible.
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Figure 5.7. Timeline View - Collapsed
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed our high-level trace generation approach that is able
to generate high-level process traces based on counter-example traces through the
model used by the verification tool. Instead of mapping the counter-example trace
backward along the translation and optimizations, this approach performs an A*
search on the process definition with the search goal being the sequence of property
events as they appear in the counter-example. One advantage of this approach is
that it will not be affected by changes in the translation and optimizations. Another
major advantage of this approach is that, with a few minor changes, it can be reused
to generate the process traces from MCSs produced by FTA. Due to the complexity in
real-world processes, process traces produced by the high-level trace generation tool
as well as other techniques could be lengthy and verbose, preventing them from being
easily comprehended by analysts. To make process traces more accessible to analysts,
we provided support for visualizing process traces using two graphic representations:
the Structured Textual View and the Timeline View. Although the discussion is based
on the Little-JIL process definition language, the underlying ideas of our approaches
can be adopted to generate and represent traces in other languages.
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION
In this work, we designed and implemented an analysis framework that is capable
of performing Finite-State Verification(FSV) and Fault Tree Analysis(FTA) on Little-
JIL process definitions. It is intended to be used to effectively detect defects and
weakness in processes. To evaluate this analysis framework, we applied it to the
analysis of two non-trivial real-world, human-intensive medical processes: a In-Patient
Blood Transfusion process and a Chemotherapy process. The emphasis of these two
case studies has been on demonstrating errors and weaknesses found by the analysis
framework. In the remainder of this chapter, we first give a brief introduction to the
two selected medical processes. Then we present the two kinds of analysis techniques
that we applied. For each kind of analysis, we first describe the methodology employed
in applying the analysis, then present the analysis results and discuss the lesson
learned from the analysis.
6.1 Introduction to Selected Cases
Medical errors are a major cause of death in our society. A 1999 report from the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) [79] estimated that approximately 100,000 people die
each year in US hospitals from preventable medical errors. There is ample anecdotal
evidence that the complexity of the processes used to administer healthcare is a sig-
nificant source of the problem. The healthcare literature is replete with documented
evidence of such errors as administration of blood of the wrong type, misidentification
of patients, and incorrect dosages of potentially lethal medications.
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The medical community is aware of these problems and has approached them in a
number of ways. One principal approach has been to devise mandated procedures for
carrying out many healthcare activities, especially those identified as being particu-
larly high-risk. Mandated procedures are generally described in considerable detail,
sometimes in documents that are dozens of pages long. These documents consist
largely of natural language text, often supplemented by diagrams. These documents
are the basis for both the training of medical professionals and the actual processes
performed in hospitals. Despite the care that went into the creation of such docu-
ments, as well as other safety measures, a subsequent IOM study [110] revealed that
error rates in hospitals had not declined significantly in the five-year period following
the initial IOM report.
Examination of documents used to describe medical processes suggests several rea-
sons why such documents have proven to be inadequate. Documents describing such
processes as blood transfusion (e.g., [134], [135]) provide good examples of the prob-
lem. Despite attempts to be complete, they contain terms that are poorly defined
and inconsistently used, and important details are often missing, especially details
for handling special cases that might arise. Recognizing such limitations, the medical
community has tried to employ a number of modeling representations, but these are
usually based upon such formalisms as data flow graphs that make it relatively cum-
bersome to represent the handling of exceptional cases or complicated concurrency
and synchronization. As a result, these representations generally fail to represent the
full complexity of these processes.
Indeed, the many diverse circumstances under which activities like blood trans-
fusions must take place require processes of considerable complexity. Moreover, a
medical process often requires coordinating the efforts of many different parties, of-
ten performing their activities in parallel. The complexity of a process increases the
risk of defects. This suggests that the finite-state verification and fault-tree analysis
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used to analyze complex, distributed systems might be effective in analyzing medical
processes. Therefore, in our case study we chose two medical processes: an In-Patient
Blood Transfusion process and a Chemotherapy process. More specifically, the two
selected processes are real-world processes actually being performed in the hospital,
instead of processes defined in a textbook or medical reference. This is because we
hope that our analysis can directly help the medical professionals to identify errors
and weakness in the processes that they perform.
It should be noted that although both cases are medical processes, this work also
suggests the applicability of our approach to human-intensive, safety-critical processes
in other problem domains.
6.1.1 In-Patient Blood Transfusion Process
The blood transfusion process is used to administrate blood or blood product to a
patient’s bloodstream. It is a common, high-risk, human-intensive medical interven-
tion. Despite strict regulation by the US Food and Drug Administration as well as
healthcare accreditation agencies, the error rate in blood transfusion is significant and
believed to be underreported [64]. The blood transfusion process that we are going
to analyze is an In-Patient Blood Transfusion process, which is a blood transfusion
process specific for patients who are hospitalized overnight. Although usually follow-
ing the similar high-level steps, the in-patient blood transfusion processes practiced
in different hospitals or medical institutes may vary in details. In our case study, we
choose to model and analyze the one employed in the Baystate Medical Center in
Massachusetts.
Figure 6.1 shows the top-level diagram of this process defined in Little-JIL. The
full process is provided in Appendix D. The simplified blood transfusion process
used as the running example in the discussion of our process analysis framework is
a highly simplified version of this in-patient blood transfusion process, where several
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Figure 6.1. In-Patient Blood Transfusion Process
sub-processes are abstracted into leaf steps and most of the checks and exception
handlers are removed.
An in-patient blood transfusion process cannot start unless there is a blood trans-
fusion order from a physician. Therefore, the root step “perform in-patient blood
transfusion has a pre-requisite step “confirm physician order for blood transfusion.
This step checks whether a blood transfusion order is presented. If no order is pre-
sented, an exception “NoPhysicianOrder will be thrown and the whole process is
terminated.
One blood transfusion order may require blood products to be transfused to the
patient several times. The step “carry out physician order for transfusion” models the
process that needs to be followed each time the blood products are transfused. There
is a cardinality + adjacent to the edge between step “perform in-patient blood transfu-
sion” and step “carry out physician order for transfusion”, which means that “carry
out physician order for transfusion” will be done one or more times, as prescribed in
the physician order. Since “perform in-patient blood transfusion” is a sequential step
(note the right arrow in the left hand side of the step bar), instances of “carry out
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physician order for transfusion” must be executed sequentially. The step “carry out
physician order for transfusion” has five sub-steps. Since it is a sequential step, once
it is started, five sub-steps will be executed one by one, from left to right. The first
sub-step “check for existence of type and screen” obtains the blood type and screen
for the patient. Then the step “prepare documentation for blood pick-up” creates the
blood pick up document based on the blood type and screen. Given the pick up doc-
ument, blood products can be obtain from the blood bank following the step “pick
up blood from blood bank”. In the step “perform transfusion”, the blood products are
transfused to the patient. The step “perform follow through check” performs the nec-
essary last check on the patient. Note that all four sub-steps except “perform follow
through check” do not have triangles attached to their step bars, which means that
they are references. Each of them refers to a sub-process defined in another diagram.
6.1.2 Chemotherapy Process
Chemotherapy is the use of chemical substances to treat disease. In its modern-
day use, it refers primarily to the administration of cytotoxic drugs to treat cancer.
Chemotherapy medications are typically highly toxic, and thus it is of overriding
importance to be sure that the right patient receives the right medications in the
right dosages at the right times. To assure this, elaborate processes are carried
out that integrate the efforts of such diverse medical personnel as doctors, nurses,
pharmacists, and clerical workers. Chemotherapy processes aim to speed the flow
of treatment, while assuring that errors do not occur. Checks are in place to guard
against committing such errors. Similar to the in-patient blood transfusion process,
we also selected a chemotherapy process employed in the Baystate Medical Center.
Figure 6.2 is the top-level diagram of chemotherapy process defined in Little-JIL.
The entire Little-JIL process definition has more than 250 steps and is provided in
Appendix H. The root step “chemotherapy process” has two sub-steps. The first
153
Figure 6.2. Chemotherapy Process
sub-step, “prepare for and administer first cycle of chemotherapy”, is further decom-
posed into six sub-steps to be executed in sequence. These six sub-steps capture the
major stages of the chemotherapy process. Although the agent assignments are not
given in this diagram, “perform consultation and assessment” is done by a Medi-
cal Doctor(MD); “perform initial review of patient records” by a Practice Registered
Nurse(RN) and a Triage Medical Assistant; “perform pharmacy task” by a Pharma-
cist; “perform patient teaching” by a Nurse Practitioner; “perform final tasks (day
before chemo)” by a Pharmacist and a Clinic RN; and “first day of chemo” is done
again by a Pharmacist and a Clinic RN. In the step “perform consultation and as-
sessment”, the doctor may determine that the patient’s pathology report does not
indicate cancer. In this case, the Pathology Report Does Not Indicate Cancer excep-
tion is thrown (the decomposition of the “perform consultation and assessment” step
is not shown due to space limitations). The exception propagates up the tree until it
reaches the root step that has a matching handler “consider alternative treatment”.
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Thus, control is transferred to “consider alternative treatment” and appropriate ac-
tion is taken.
The second sub-step of the root step is “create and process consult note”. It
is further decomposed into two sub-steps: “dictate consult note” performed by a
Medical Doctor(MD) and “transcribe and place consult note in patient’s record” by a
Medical Records Clerk. Since the consult note is primarily used for billing and legal
purposes and does not directly affect the patient’s treatment, the doctor may choose
to dictate the consult note right after evaluating the patient or later, while the tasks
in “prepare for and administer first cycle of chemotherapy” are already underway.
Therefore the root is modeled as a parallel step so that the “dictate consult note”
step can potentially execute in parallel with the step “prepare for and administer
first cycle of chemotherapy”. At the same time, the channel “consultation channel”
imposes the additional restriction that the doctor cannot dictate the consult note
before evaluating the patient’s condition — the step “dictate consult note” takes
a parameter from the “consultation channel” and thus cannot start until “perform
patient consultation” (not shown for lack of space), which is a sub-step of “perform
consultation and assessment”, completes and writes a parameter to the “consultation
channel”.
6.2 Methodology
Each case study involves four phases. We first rigorously specify the process in
Little-JIL language. Then the properties collected during the process specification
are defined using Propel. Given the Little-JIL process definition and the Propel
property specifications, the FSV tool is used to verify the process definition against the
property specifications. During the verification, the process definition and property
specification may need to be changed to eliminate the violations found by the FSV
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tool. Once there are no more violations, we finally apply the FTA to look for the
weakness in the process.
6.2.1 Process Specification
As mentioned above, we intend to analyze the process that is actually being fol-
lowed in the hospital, instead of the process defined in a textbook or medical reference.
To elicit such process, we met regularly with a group of medical professionals who
perform the real process. The medical professionals are responsible for describing
the processes and reviewing the material created by us. And we are responsible for
defining the process in Little-JIL. The process is first described by the medical pro-
fessionals in natural language, sometimes complemented by flow graphs. We then try
to capture the description using Little-JIL language. Due to misunderstandings, the
Little-JIL process definition may not correctly capture the real process. Therefore,
we need to explain the process that we specified to the medical professionals. To
do this, we employ a Little-JIL process description generation tool to automatically
create the detailed description of the process definition. The description explains
every details of the process definition in a disciplined natural language that can be
easily understood by the medical professionals. The medical professionals then study
this description to check for any inconsistency. With their feedbacks, we modify the
process definition accordingly and generate a new description. This iteration ends
when both sides agree that there is no inconsistency between the process definition
and the real process.
6.2.2 Property Specification
The FSV can only identify errors that violate the given properties. To detect
more errors, we need to come up with as many properties as possible. The initial set
of properties are collected from the requirements given in regulations and references.
While the process is being defined, it is also not unusual for goals or high-level re-
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quirements to be mentioned. These requirements are recorded into the requirement
set. After the process definition has begun to stabilize, meetings are then held to
elicit the set of requirements into properties that can be verified by the verification
framework. The requirements are usually initially stated informally in natural lan-
guage. We first work with the medical professionals to agree on a glossary of terms
that are used to more systematically describe the requirements, but still in natural
language. After agreement is reached on these statements, we work closely with the
medical professionals to develop the detailed property specifications using Propel.
Similar to the process definition, property specification is also an iterative process,
which ends when the property specifications are believed to correctly formulate the
requirements.
6.2.3 Finite-State Verification
As mentioned earlier, the formal properties are defined in terms of abstract events.
Before verifying such properties, we work together with the medical professionals to
specify event bindings that map abstract events in the properties to the concrete
events. After the process definition, property specifications, and property event bind-
ings are ready, we apply the FSV tools to evaluate whether the process definition is
consistent with the formal properties. It is often the case that the FSV tools find
problems in the process definition and in the property specifications as well as in the
process. We carefully record these problems during the verification, and consult the
medical professionals before making changes to the process definition, the property
specifications, or to the actual process to eliminate those problems. To make sure
that no error is introduced by the changes, we re-run the verification on the modified
process definition and property specifications. This iterative procedure completes
when no more problems are detected.
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6.2.4 Fault-Tree Analysis
After the verification is completed, the fault-tree analysis is applied on the process
definition. The hazards that we are interested are straight-forward for both processes
that we investigate. For the in-patient blood transfusion process, the hazard is that
the blood products to be transfused to the patient are wrong. For the chemotherapy
process, the hazard is that the chemo drugs to be administered are incorrect. For a
process, we first define the hazard as the top event. With the top event, our FTA tool
automatically derives the fault tree from the process definition. It also computes the
MCSs for the fault tree. We carefully investigate the MCSs to identify the weaknesses
of the process. The results are presented to the medical professionals as guidance for
them to further improve the process.
6.3 Results and Discussion
Each of the four phases may detect various problems and errors. Since this thesis
focuses on the process analysis, we only present and discuss the results of the finite-
state verification and fault-tree analysis here.
6.3.1 Finite-State Verification
The complete verification reports for the two processes can be found in Appendix E
and Appendix I. In this section, we first summarize the verification results of the two
processes. Then we discuss various kinds of problems and errors identified during the
verification in details.
For the in-patient blood transfusion process, 60 properties were specified. 5 of
these cannot be verified because they are timing properties. Another 6 cannot be
verified because we could not find appropriate bindings for them. Among the remain-
ing 49 properties that were verified, 41 properties were violated. For the chemotherapy
process, 57 properties were specified. 13 of these cannot be verified because we could
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not find appropriate bindings for them. Among the remaining 44 properties that were
verified, 11 properties were violated.
The errors found during the verification fall into three categories: errors in the
process definitions, errors in the property specifications, and errors in the real pro-
cesses.
6.3.1.1 Errors in the process definitions
The majority of errors fall into this category. Some of these were exposed when
we were trying to define the event bindings for certain properties. There simply
were no steps in the process definition that could be bound to the abstract events
used to specify those properties. In some cases, this was because the part of the
process intended to address the issue being captured by a property was simply missing
and had to be added. For instance, in the in-patient blood transfusion process,
there was no step that can be bound to the event “review patient history” in the
property “Must review patient history before infusing each unit of blood product”. This
pointed out that an important step “review patient history” as well as the exception
handler “handle previously unrecognized patient problem” to handle the exception
ProblemFoundInPatientHistory thrown by this step were missing. In other cases, the
problem was that certain steps needed to be further decomposed to identify the sub-
steps that should be bound to the property events. For example, there is an event
“review patient history” in the property “Must review patient history before infusing
each unit of blood product”. However, we were not able to identify a step in the
in-patient blood transfusion process that related to this event. This problem showed
that the leaf step “assess patient” needed to be decomposed to add a sub-step “review
patient history”.
The actual verification helped us to find errors in the process definitions. Some
of these were so subtle that they remained undiscovered despite careful inspection by
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both medical professionals and us. For example, the in-patient blood transfusion pro-
cess definition specified that if discrepancies occur during the “verify blood product”
step, then “verify blood product” is to be terminated and a FailedBloodProductCheck
exception is to be thrown. The handler “handle failed blood product check” requires
the nurse to send the blood product back to the blood bank and obtain a replace-
ment blood product. The exception continuation badge of this handler was specified
to be continue, which implied that, after this exception has been handled in this way,
the process continues with the nurse signing the blood bank form after obtaining
the replacement product. This process thus violated the property “Must verify the
blood product before it is transfused to the patient”, where the event “verify the blood
product” is bound to completion of the step “verify blood product”. It is clear that
this would introduce the potential for serious medical error, and in the actual process
the nurse verifies the patient identification and the product identification again after
obtaining the replacement product. Thus, attempting to verify this property indi-
cated that the exception’s continuation badge was wrong and needed to be changed
to restart.
6.3.1.2 Errors in the property specification
The verification also helped us to discover several errors in the property speci-
fication. Some properties were specified incorrectly because we overlooked certain
exceptional situations under which the properties are not required to hold. For in-
stance, a violation was initially found when we verified the in-patient blood transfu-
sion process against the property “Obtain Patient’s stated name and birth date before
infusing each unit of blood product”. The violation showed that when the patient
is unable to communicate to the nurse (i.e. the patient is in coma), an exception
PatientUnableToCommunicate will be thrown. The exception handler then directs
the nurse to obtain the patient’s name and birth date in another way. In this case,
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the event “obtain patient’s stated name and birth date” will not occur. It is obvious
that this property is not required for this exceptional situation. So we changed the
property specification to require the property to hold only if the exception Patien-
tUnableToCommunicate is not thrown. And verification showed no violation for the
modified property.
In addition, a few properties turned out to be unnecessary. In the in-patient blood
transfusion process, the step “verify blood product information” has four sub-steps
that check the different aspects of the blood product: “verify product tag matches
patient ID bracelet”, “verify product tag matches product label”, “check product ex-
piration date & time”, and “confirm product type on product tag matches that on
patient record”. There were several properties that required these sub-steps to be
executed in a specific order. The process definition, however, defines the parent step
“verify blood product information” to be a parallel step. This means that four sub-
steps may be executed in any order, which violates those properties. As we consulted
the medical professionals, they confirmed that in the real-world process, it does not
matter in which order those checks are performed, as long as they are completed
before the blood product is infused to the patient. Those properties only reflect the
choice of the person who suggested such properties, and should not be applied to
other practitioners.
6.3.1.3 Errors in the real processes
The most interesting error that we found is an error in the real-world chemother-
apy process. In attempting to verify the property “Consult note must be present
in patient’s record before chemotherapy can be administered”, we bound the event
“consult note is present in patient’s record” to the COMPLETED state of step “file
consult note in patient’s record”, and the event “administer chemotherapy” to the
STARTED state of step “administer chemo drug”. The verifier reported that the
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chemotherapy process may violate this property, and it produced a trace of a valid
execution of the process where “administer chemo drug is started before “file consult
note in patient’s record” is completed. To better understand the violation trace, let’s
look at Figure 6.2. Step “file consult note in patient’s record” is a sub-step of step
“transcribe and place consult note in patient’s record”, and step “administer chemo
drug” appears in the sub-process with the root step “first day of chemo”. Since the
root step “chemotherapy process” is a parallel step, step “administer chemo drug”
may indeed be executed prior to step “file consult note in patient’s record”. After
talking to the medical professionals, we found out that the medical records clerk who
files the consult note into the patient’s record assumes the clinic RNs check whether
the consult note is present in the patient’s record on the first day of chemotherapy.
The clinic RNs, however, said that they do not perform that check. Therefore, it is
possible that this error occurs in the real process. Although it probably will not lead
to an accident, it may cause serious legal issues if an accident happens. Such errors
exist because the process is very complicated, involving different people who have
conflicting assumptions about others’ responsibilities. Without formally specifying
and verifying the process. Such conflicts may remain undiscovered despite careful
inspection by the medical professionals.
The verification process involves defining the event bindings, running the verifier,
examining violation traces to identify the cause of errors, and consulting medical
professionals to eliminate errors. All these steps make the verification process very
lengthy. As we have seen, except the one in the real chemotherapy process, all errors
that we identified are in the formal process definitions and property specifications.
This is often the case when verifying software systems — much of the early effort of
verification is devoted to finding errors in the model and the properties. For human-
intensive processes, like two medical processes we investigated, this may be more
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significant since the initial artifacts from which process definition and properties are
derived are less concrete and precise than, say, source code.
Nevertheless, the effort invested on the verification, even for the blood transfusion
process where no errors in real process were found, still provided great benefits. The
direct benefit is that the verification greatly improves the accuracy of formal process
definitions, which are also intended to be used for other types of analysis (i.e. FTA),
simulation, and possibly even guidance in the clinical setting. With process definitions
that do not accurately reflect the real processes, these approaches may produce invalid
results or cause dangerous consequences. Another benefit is that verification provides
a solid foundation for process improvement in the future. As noted earlier, real-world
processes usually undergo continuous changes to cope with changed requirements,
discovered defects, inefficiencies, or the need to reduce costs, etc. The modifications
to the processes are usually made incrementally, with changes introduced to address
specific goal. To ensure that no errors are introduced by the change, one needs to
incorporate the change in the formal process definition and verify it against previously
verified properties. Often, the property event bindings can be reused, perhaps with
some changes to small parts of the process. The number of violations detected, if
any, should be much smaller than those detected for the original process definition.
Therefore, the verification process will usually be easier than that of the first round.
As mentioned earlier, the emphasis of verifying the two processes has been on
demonstrating that finite-state verification can be automated and applied to analyze
human-intensive processes. Although we did not perform a careful evaluation of how
optimizations improve the performance, verification of the two processes showed that
the optimizations can greatly scale up the verification framework. In our evaluation,
we used FLAVERS as the underlying verification tool in our process verification
framework. The verification was performed on a Dell Inspiron E1505 laptop with
Intel Core Duo CPU. Without applying the optimizations, the translated models for
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both processes caused FLAVERS running out memory with the maximum heap size
set to 1GB (FLAVERS is a Java program). When all the optimizations were enabled,
every property for both processes was verified in 1 minute.
6.3.2 Fault-Tree Analysis
For the In-Patient Transfusion process, we performed the FTA for the hazard
“the blood unit to be transfused to the patient are wrong”. On a Dell Inspiron E1505
laptop with Intel Core Duo CPU, it took our fault tree derivation tool 238 seconds
to derive the fault tree for this hazard. The fault tree contains 344 gates and 405
events (including 61 primary events and 344 intermediate events). Among the pri-
mary events, there are 25 fault events that could cause the hazard to occur and 36
conditional events that decide the propagation of those fault events. The Equivalent
Event Removal optimization removed 263 intermediate events and 263 gates, result-
ing in a fault tree with 142 events and 81 gates, as shown in Appendix F. To see
whether there is single point of failure in the process, MCSs need to be computed
from the fault tree. It took another 106 seconds to compute 37 MCSs, which are
listed in Appendix G. One might notice that there are more MCSs than primary
fault events. The reason is that one fault event may appear in more than one MCS,
representing different scenarios in which the fault event could cause the hazard to
occur. As discussed in Chapter 4, an MCS may contain spurious conditional events
that need to be removed. After manually removing those spurious events, all MCSs
still contain at least 6 events. Therefore, this process is not exposed to any single
point of failures with respect the given hazard.
For the Chemotherapy process, the hazard that we analyzed is “the chemo drug
to be administered to the patient is wrong”. It took 369 seconds to derive the fault
tree for this hazard. The fault tree contains 1345 gates and 1425 events (includ-
ing 80 primary events and 1345 intermediate events). Among the primary events,
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there are 52 fault events and 28 conditional events. The Equivalent Event Removal
optimization removed 1174 intermediate events and 1174 gates, resulting in a fault
tree with 251 events and 171 gates, as shown in Appendix J. 52 MCSs were com-
puted in 810 seconds. There is an MCS that contains only one event “Step handle
LabelAndOrderDontMatch(call pharmacy) produces wrong ChemoDrug”. Step “han-
dle LabelAndOrderDontMatch(call pharmacy)” is an exception handling step that is
invoked if any discrepancy between the chemo drug label and the chemo order is
detected. This step, therefore, needs to identify the error, in the chemo drug or in
the chemo order, that cause the discrepancy. If it turns out that the chemo drug is
wrong, the step needs to make a change to the chemo drug to fix the error. Since
this step is performed by a human agent, errors may be introduced into the chemo
drug during the execution of this step, as indicated by the fault event in the MCS.
The high-level process trace generated from this MCS shows that once step “han-
dle LabelAndOrderDontMatch(call pharmacy)” is completed, the process will proceed
to the next step and eventually execute step “administer chemo drug” because this
exception handling step is associated with a continue badge. Moreover, there is no
other step to check the chemo drug between this step and step “administer chemo
drug”. In other words, event “Step handle LabelAndOrderDontMatch(call pharmacy)
produces wrong ChemoDrug” will always cause the hazard to occur. This exposes a
single point of failure in the process definition.
6.4 Summary
We evaluated the proposed process analysis framework by applying our imple-
mentation of the process analysis framework to two real-world medical processes:
an In-Patient Blood Transfusion process and a Chemotherapy Process. The results
showed that the framework can be used to effectively detect the defects in such real-
world human-intensive processes. The FSV detected a large number of errors in the
165
process definitions and the property specifications. More interestingly, it identified a
subtle error in the chemotherapy process itself. Through FTA, we discovered a single
point of failure in the chemotherapy process.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Processes are used in almost every domain in our society. For example, products
are produced by various manufacturing processes; software is developed following
software development processes; government or business services are provided via es-
tablished processes; healthcare is delivered through different medical processes. Such
real-world processes are often undergoing improvements in order to achieve various
goals, such as dealing with changed requirements, eliminating defects, increasing the
quality of the products, and reducing costs. Analysis should play a critical role in
process improvement. Identifying and evaluating the root causes of the problem (i.e.
failing to meet changed requirements, discovered defects and low quality) require care-
ful analysis of the process. In addition, since errors may be introduced by changes to
the process, re-analysis should be carried out to detect such errors before the modified
process is deployed. To date, the analysis support for such processes is very limited.
If done at all, it is usually performed manually and can be time-consuming, costly and
error-prone. Analysis of human-intensive processes, where the human contributions
require considerable domain expertise and have a significant impact on the success or
failure of the overall mission, are of particular concern because they can be extremely
complex and prone to errors.
In this thesis, we investigate how two selected safety analysis techniques — Finite-
State Verification (FSV) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) — can be automated and
applied to analyze human-intensive processes. We developed an analysis framework
that is capable of performing both FSV and FTA on processes specified in a process
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definition language with precisely defined semantics. For FSV, we proposed a general
process FSV framework that is intended to address three practical issues: flexibil-
ity, scalability and usability. To address the flexibility issue, a two-phase translation
approach was proposed to facilitate using different existing verification tools. To ad-
dress the scalability issue, several optimizations are proposed to reduce the size of the
translated models. To address the usability issue, automatic support is provided to
translate properties and violation traces. For FTA, we implemented a template-based
approach to automatically derive fault trees from Little-JIL process definitions. When
applying this approach to derive fault trees from real-world processes, we encountered
three issues: scalability, looping construct and NOT gate. To address the scalability
issue, we proposed three optimizations that are able to significantly reduce the size of
fault trees so that they can be understood and evaluated more easily. To address the
looping issue, we applied a simple approach to remove loops in fault trees so that they
can be analyzed using existing fault tree evaluation tools. To obtain more accurate
results, we chose to use NOT gates to capture relationships between certain condi-
tional events. In addition to the support for automatic fault tree derivation, we also
proposed two representations — partial fault tree and process trace — to make MCSs
more easily understood. This process analysis framework has been implemented for
the selected Little-JIL process definition language and been applied to analyze two
real-world human-intensive processes: an In-Patient Blood Transfusion process and a
Chemotherapy process. The results showed that the process analysis framework can
be used to effectively detect the defects in real-world human-intensive processes.
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss several directions for future research.
7.1 Finite-State Verification
To verify real-world processes, scalability is always one of the most important
issues that need to be addressed. In our process verification framework, we proposed
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several optimizations that are able to take advantage of aspects of the structure of
the process definitions to reduce the size of the models. Our evaluation showed that
the optimizations were able to greatly improve the performance of the verification
of two selected medical processes. But those two processes are relatively simple.
As we extend our work to consider processes involving many medical professionals
carrying out many activities in parallel, we expect that the time and memory resources
required will limit the applicability of our analysis frameworks. Therefore, we need
to look for more optimizations to further scale up our analysis frameworks. We plan
to investigate existing optimizations used in software verification to see whether we
can incorporate them into our process verification framework. We will also look for
domain-specific optimizations that take advantage of special features of processes in
specific domains.
7.2 Fault Tree Analysis
The fault tree derivation algorithm that we implemented may produce inaccurate
results. Since a Little-JIL process definition only defines the interface of a leaf step,
which does not specify how the leaf step produces its outputs from its inputs. There-
fore, the fault tree derivation algorithm has to assume that any output of a leaf step
depends on all its inputs. Thus, leaf steps that do not satisfy this assumption may
cause the derived fault tree to contain superfluous sub-trees. Evaluation of such fault
trees may result in inaccurate results. In addition, as shown in the example discussed
in Section 4.3, computed MCSs may not be minimal because our fault tree derivation
algorithm is not able to identify the relationships between different primary events.
To improve the precision of FTA, we plan to extend the fault tree derivation algo-
rithm to allow analysts to precisely specify the dependencies between outputs and
inputs for certain leaf steps as well as relationships between different primary events.
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The fault tree derivation algorithm is a polynomial algorithm that is able to derive
fault trees from complex real-world processes. The bottleneck is in the understanding
and evaluation of derived fault trees. In our approach, we proposed three optimiza-
tions to reduce the size of fault trees so that they can be understood and evaluated
more easily. To further reduce the size of fault trees, we intend to consider a partition
approach that decomposes a large fault tree into several smaller sub-trees that are
easier to understand. To evaluate the fault tree, one should be able to evaluate the
sub-trees individually and then combine or summarize the results.
7.3 Trace Generation and Visualization
In our approach, we use an A* search algorithm to generate a high-level process
traces from a low-level counter-example traces produced by verification tools or a
MCS created by FTA. Although this approach avoids the difficulties faced by the
reverse-mapping approach, it might not work if the counter-example trace or the
MCS contains too few events and the process is very large. In this case, the A*
search has to search almost all executions of the Little-JIL process definition and
may run out of memory. One possible solution is to automatically select some steps
that change the control flow of the process and annotate them with additional events
during the translation. This will result in a counter-example trace that contains more
events, but should alleviate the problem. In fact, the more events that are added, the
faster the high level trace can be found. However, adding events to the model usually
slows down the verification because it increases the model size. For future work, it
would be interesting to explore the strategies to minimize total time and perform an
experimental evaluation of those strategies.
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7.4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
In this work, we adapted two analysis techniques to analyze processes. The
next technique that we start to investigate is the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), also referred to as Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
[120]. It is a hazard analysis technique that can be used to evaluate the impact
of an individual failure mode of a component on the overall system. FMEA was
originally developed by the US military in 1949, described in Military procedure
MIL-P-1629 [130], to evaluate the effect of system and equipment failures. It was
then used by NASA in the early sixties for the Apollo Project. In the early 1980s,
FMEA was introduced to automotive industry in the U.S. The application led to an
industry-wide FMEA standard SAE J-1739 [29] developed by Chrysler Corporation,
Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation. Since then, the generic na-
ture of the method assisted the rapid spreading of FMEA to various other industries,
such as aerospace industry and chemical industry. Besides manufacturing industries,
many service providers, such as heath care providers [42], also apply FMEA to as-
sess and improve their service delivery processes. Introduced by Reifer in 1979 [111],
FMEA began to be used to analyze software based systems. Details about various
software FMEA approaches can be found in [101].
In FMEA, A failure mode at a component basically refers to a fault that could
occur at the component. FMEA usually involves five steps:
1. Modeling the system. The system model is usually specified using a flow chart.
It is also used to prescribe the boundary and granularity of the analysis.
2. Identifying failure modes. For each component in the system model, all possible
ways the component may go wrong need to be considered and represented as
failure modes.
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3. Determining failure effects. An inductive procedure is used to determine all pos-
sible hazards that could eventually be caused by each component failure mode.
Given a failure mode, the procedure identifies its immediate effects based on
the underlying dependency and interactions between components. Those failure
effects are represented as failure modes at successor or next higher level com-
ponents, which in turn need to be further developed. This iteration continues
until the hazards are reached.
4. Prioritizing failure modes Failure modes then can be prioritized by their risks.
There are a number of different methods that can be used to evaluate the risk
of a failure mode based on the severities of the hazards caused by it as well as
other data such as probability and detectability of a failure mode.
5. Identifying potential causes and proposing actions. For failure modes with high
priorities, potential causes are identified and actions that can be applied to
eliminate or reduce those causes are proposed.
The information produced during the FMEA, such as failure modes, hazards
caused by those failure modes, risks of failure modes, causes, and actions, are recorded
in a worksheet. This worksheet can then be used as guidance for improving the design
or implementation of the system.
Similar to the FTA, the traditional FMEA is also conducted manually by a team
with comprehensive knowledge of the system being analyzed. It is obvious that step
(1), (4), and (5) cannot be automated. Thus, we focus on developing an approach
that is able to automatically identify failure modes and determine failure effects. As
a matter of fact, the failure modes in FMEA and the events in FTA both refer to
the faults in components. Therefore, we can use the set of predefined events in the
automatic fault tree derivation to represent the failure modes. Templates used in
automatic fault tree derivation can also be used to determine failure effects of a given
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failure mode. As mentioned above, in each iteration of the procedure to determine
failure effects, the analyst need to identify other failure modes that could be caused
by a given failure mode. This can be automated by finding all templates whose leafs
contain the given failure modes. Since a template is a tree where the leaf cause
the root to occur, the roots of identified templates are the failure modes that could
be caused by the given failure mode. We have demonstrated the feasibililty of this
idea by implementing it in a prototype. This prototype was able to automatically
produce the FMEA worksheet from a simplified blood transfusion process defined in
the Little-JIL process definition language [132]. As future work, we plan to improve
this prototype and apply it on complex real-world, human-intensive processes.
7.5 Interplay of Different Analysis Techniques
All three analysis techniques (FSV, FTA, FMEA) have their own limits. They
seem to complement each other. We expect that more comprehensive results can be
produced by integrating these analysis techniques. In FSV, the kinds of errors can
be detected depend on the properties verified. In other words, errors could not be
found unless the corresponding property is verified. Therefore, the analyst needs to
think of as many properties as possible. This usually is a very difficult task. During
our preliminary experiments, we observed that a large part of the properties address
the checks for the faults occurring in steps. Therefore, the faults produced by FTA
or FMEA may help the analyst to think of more properties. On the other hand, by
detecting errors in the process definitions, FSV can help to increase the credibility of
the results produced by FTA and FMEA. Since both FTA and FMEA are performed
on the process definitions, such errors may cause FTA and FMEA to produce invalid
results. FTA and FMEA can also complement each other. For FTA, it is often
difficult to come up with all important hazards. On the contrary, a problem for
FMEA is that it might be a challenge to identify all possible failure modes in the
173
system. Therefore, approaches such as [83] try to solve this problem by combining
FTA and FMEA. In these approaches, the primary events identified by FTA serve as
the inputs for FMEA. And hazards produced by FMEA may in turn be used to find
more primary events by FTA. Similar to these approaches, we also plan to investigate
how to combine FTA and FMEA to achieve more complete results.
Ultimately we envisage the development of a process environment in which a
spectrum of process analysis techniques are smoothly integrated with the process
definition tool. Such a support environment would hopefully lead to a systematic
and well-reasoned approach to process improvement.
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APPENDIX A
LITTLE-JIL PROCESS TRANSLATION TEMPLATES
Posting Template
This type of template translates the behaviors after a step is POSTING and before
it is POSTED. Since such behaviors are the same for all steps, only one template is
defined for this type.
After a step is POSTING and before it is POSTED, the step may pass in param-
eters and obtain artifacts from channels. Since the Little-JIL process definition does
not define the behavior of a leaf step, in our translation the behaviors of leaf steps
are abstracted using a conservative model (see A). Our implementation is based on
Little-JIL 1.4. In this version, a parameter may only affect the flow of control in
a leaf step. Since such effect is subsumed by the abstract model of the leaf step,
parameters and parameter passing can be ignored. Therefore, the posting template
only translates the behavior to obtain artifacts from channels.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a channel is simply translated into a Boolean variable
that indicates whether the channel is empty. Little-JIL provides four operators to
obtain an artifact from a channel: Blocking Take, Non-Blocking Take, Blocking Read
and Non-Blocking Read. Here we use a simple example to explain how these operators
are translated by the posting template. Suppose that there is a step S that has an
input parameters p and p gets an artifact from a channel channel.
Suppose that operator Blocking Take is used to obtain an artifact from channel
to p. If the channel is not empty, an artifact is removed from the channel and is
put into the parameter. Otherwise, the step is not posted until an artifact becomes
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1 loc S_POSTING:
2 when true do { } goto S_channel_take;
3 loc S_channel_take:
4 when ( channel == false ) do { }
5 goto S_channel_take;
6 when ( channel != false )
7 do { channel := false; }
8 goto S_POSTED;
Figure A.1. BIR for Posting Template - Channel Blocking Take
1 loc S_POSTING:
2 when true do { } goto S_channel_nbtake;
3 loc S_channel_nbtake:
4 when true
5 do { channel := false; }
6 goto S_POSTED;
Figure A.2. BIR for Posting Template - Channel Non-Blocking Take
1 loc S_POSTING:
2 when true do { } goto S_channel_read;
3 loc S_channel_read:
4 when ( channel == false ) do { }
5 goto S_channel_read;
6 when ( channel != false ) do { }
7 goto S_POSTED;
Figure A.3. BIR for Posting Template - Channel Blocking Read
1 loc S_POSTING:
2 when true do { } goto S_channel_nbread;
3 loc S_channel_nbread:
4 when true do { } goto S_POSTED;
Figure A.4. BIR for Posting Template - Channel Non-Blocking Read
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available in the channel. The BIR code generated by the posting template for step
S is shown in Figure A.1. Once in the POSTING state, the step proceeds to obtain
an artifact from the channel channel (line 3-8). It first checks whether the channel
is empty (channel == false). If so, it keeps going back to check again until the
channel is not empty. If the channel is not empty, the channel is set to be empty
(channel := false) and the step S goes into the POSTED state.
Figure A.2 shows the case where operator Non-Blocking Take is used. If the
channel is not empty, an artifact is removed from the channel and is put into the
parameter. Unlike Blocking Take, Non-Blocking Take does not block the step even if
the channel is empty. Therefore, the BIR code does not check whether the channel
is empty. It simpy sets the channel to be empty and posts the step.
Figure A.3 shows the case where operator Blocking Read is used. Blocking Read
is similar to Blocking Take except that the artifact is copy to the parameter and is
not removed from the channel. Therefore, if the channel is not empty, the BIR code
simply posts the step without setting the channel to be empty.
Figure A.4 shows the case where operator Blocking Read is used. In this case, no
matter whether the channel is empty or not, the BIR code posts the step without
setting the channel to be empty.
Posted Template
This type of template translates the behaviors after a step is POSTED. After
posted, a step may be opted-out or retracted under some circumstances. If it is not
opted-out or retracted, the step is started. The only template of this type simply
uses appropriate Opted-Out Template and Retracted Template to translate behaviors
that check whether the step should be opted-out or retracted.
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1 // For Sub1:
2 loc Sub1_test_retract:
3 when (S_choice != 0) do { } goto Sub1_RETRACTED;
4 when (S_choice == 0) do { } goto Sub1_test_optout;
5 loc Sub1_RETRACTED:
6 when true do { } goto T_Sub1_end;
7
8 // For Sub2:
9 loc Sub2_test_retract:
10 when (S_choice != 1) do { } goto Sub2_RETRACTED;
11 when (S_choice == 1) do { } goto Sub2_test_optout;
12 loc Sub2_RETRACTED:
13 when true do { } goto T_Sub2_end;
Figure A.5. BIR Representation for Choice Sub-Step Retracted Template
Retracted Template
This type of template translates the behavior that checks whether a step should be
retracted. In Little-JIL, only sub-steps if a choice step or sub-steps of a parallel step
may be retracted. Thereofre, two templates are defined: Choice Sub-Step Retracted
Template handles the sub-steps of choice steps; Parallel Sub-Step Retracted Template
handles the sub-steps of parallel steps.
Choice Sub-Step Retracted Template
A choice step allows agents to select one of several sub-steps to perform. A sub-
step of a choice step will be retracted if it is not the one chosen to be executed.
Suppose that there is a choice step S has two sub-step Sub1 and Sub2.
Figure A.5 shows the BIR code generated by Choice Sub-Step Retracted Template
for Sub1 and Sub2. This piece of code checks whether Sub1 should be retracted. The
first location (line 2-4) compares the variable S choice against constant 0. S choice
keeps the index of the sub-step that is chosen to be executed. The constant 0 is the
index of the sub-step Sub1. If S choice is not 0, Sub1 is not chosen to be executed.
Therefore it goes directly into the Retracted state, which ends the thread T Sub1.
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1 // For Sub1:
2 loc Sub1_test_retract:
3 when (e1 || e2) do { } goto Sub1_RETRACTED;
4 when !(e1 || e2) do { } goto Sub1_test_optout;
5 loc Sub1_RETRACTED:
6 when true do { } goto T_Sub1_end;
7
8 // For Sub2:
9 loc Sub2_test_retract:
10 when true do { } goto Sub2_test_optout;
Figure A.6. BIR Representation for Parallel Sub-Step Retracted Template
Otherwise, Sub1 continues to execute the code created by Opted-Out Template that
checks whether this sub-step is opted-out.
Parallel Sub-Step Retracted Template
For a posted sub-step of a parallel step, it should be retracted if any exception
is thrown by other sub-steps. Suppose that there is a choice step S has two sub-
step Sub1 and Sub2. Sub2 may thrown exception e1 and e2. Figure A.5 shows the
BIR code generated by Parallel Sub-Step Retracted Template for Sub1 and Sub2. In
this code, Boolean variable e1 or e2 becomes true if the corresponding exception
is thrown. Line 3-4 checks whether exception e1 or e2 is thrown. If so, Sub1 is
retracted. Otherwise, Sub1 continues to check if it is opted-out. Since Sub1 does not
throw any exception, Sub2 will never be retracted. Therefore, Sub2 goes directly to
check if it is opted-out.
Opted-Out Template
This type of template translates the behavior that checks whether a step should be
opted-out. Only one template is defined for this type. Suppose step S is an optional
step. It is up to the agent assigned to S to decide whether to opt out this step. Since
such decision making logic is not defined in the Little-JIL process, we conservatively
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1 loc S_test_optout:
2 when true do { } goto S_STARTED;
3 when true do { } goto S_OPTED_OUT;
Figure A.7. BIR Representation for Opted-Out Template
Figure A.8. Sequential Step Example
translate it into a non-deterministic choice. The BIR code generated by Opted-Out
Template is shown in Figure A.7.
Started Template
This type of template translates the behaviors after a step is started. Correspond-
ing to five step kinds, five templates are defined for this type: Sequential Step Started
Template, Try Step Started Template, Parallel Step Started Template, Choice Step
Started Template, and Leaf Step Started Template.
Sequential Step Started Template
The Sequential Step Started Template is used to construct the behavior of a se-
quential step after it has been started. When a sequential step is started, its sub-steps
will be executed one by one from left to right. And the sequential step is only suc-
cessfully completed after all of its sub-steps are successfully completed.
Figure A.8 shows a sequential step S that has three sub-steps: Sub1, Sub2, Sub3.
The BIR code produced by Sequential Step Started Template is given in the Fig-
ure A.9. When the sequential step S is started, the first sub-step Sub1 goes into
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1 loc S_STARTED:
2 when true do { } goto Sub1_POSTING;
3 ... // Sub1
4 loc Sub1_COMPLETED:
5 when true do { } goto Sub2_POSTING;
6 ... // Sub2
7 loc Sub2_COMPLETED:
8 when true do { } goto Sub3_POSTING;
9 ... // Sub3
10 loc Sub3_COMPLETED:
11 when true do { } goto S_COMPLETING;
Figure A.9. BIR Representation for Sequential Started Template
Figure A.10. Try Step Example
the Posting state (line 1-2). When Sub1 is completed, the next sub-step is posting
(line 4-5). Similarly, Sub3 is posting as soon as Sub2 is completed (line 7-8). And
the sequential step S goes into the Completing state when its last sub-step Sub3 is
completed (line 10-11). In this example, those sub-steps do not throw any exceptions.
If a sub-step may throw exceptions, BIR code must be inserted to check and handle
those exceptions. This is achieved by invoking the exception handling template.
Try Step Started Template
The Try Step Started Template is used to construct the behavior of a try step
after it has been started. When a try step is started, it tries to execute its sub-steps
one by one from left to right. The try step is successfully completed if any of its
sub-steps is successfully completed.
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1 loc S_STARTED:
2 when true do { } goto Sub1_POSTING;
3 ... // Sub1
4 loc Sub1_COMPLETED:
5 when true do { } goto S_COMPLETING;
6 ... // Sub1 cont.
7 loc Sub1_TERMINATED:
8 when true do { } goto S_handle_exceptions1;
9 loc S_handle_exceptions1:
10 when b_e do { b_e:= false; } goto Sub2_POSTING;
11 loc Sub2_POSTING:
12 ... // Sub2
13 loc Sub2_COMPLETED:
14 when true do { } goto S_COMPLETING;
Figure A.11. BIR Representation for Try Started Template
Figure A.10 shows a try step S that has two sub-steps Sub1 and Sub2. Sub1 may
throw exception e that is handled by an exception handler with the continue badge.
The BIR code produced by applying Try Step Started Template is given in the Fig-
ure A.11. When the try step S is started, the first sub-step Sub1 goes into the Posting
state (line 1-2). When Sub1 is completed, the parent step S is completing (line 4-5).
If Sub1 throws exception e, it is terminated and the corresponding exception handler
is executed. The exception handling code from line 9-10 is created by the Exception
Handling Template. Try Step Started Template sets the target for the transition at
line 10 to Sub2 POSTING. This means that after the exception e is handled, the next
sub-step Sub2 is posting because the exception handler has a continue badge. The
try step S goes into the Completing state when its last sub-step Sub2 is completed
(line 14-15).
Parallel Step Started Template
The Parallel Step Started Template is applied to construct the behavior of a paral-
lel step after it has been started. It is quite different from the Sequential Step Started
Template that we just discussed. When a parallel step is started, all its sub-steps will
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Figure A.12. Parallel Step Example
be posted at the same time. Then the sub-steps can be executed in any (possibly
interleaved) order. And the parallel step is only completed after all of its sub-steps
has successfully completed.
Figure A.12 shows a parallel step S that has three sub-steps: Sub1, Sub2, Sub3.
The corresponding BIR representation is given in the Figure A.13. Before the Started
Parallel Step Template is applied, the sub-steps of the parallel step have already been
translated into different BIR threads. In this example, thread T Sub1, T Sub2 and
T Sub3 are created for sub-step Sub1, Sub2, and Sub3 respectively. When the parallel
step S is started, three threads of its sub-steps are started by the start action (line
3-8). Then the parallel step waits until these thread to finish (line 9-20). Note that
each join action on a thread is followed by a threadTerminated test for that thread.
This is a constraint imposed by the BIR language specification.
Choice Step Started Template
The Choice Step Started Template is applied to construct the behavior of a choice
step after it has been started. Once started, a choice step allows the agent to select a
sub-step to execute among its sub-steps. A choice step is considered completed only
after one of its sub-steps have completed. Once a sub-step is selected to be executed,
the other sub-steps are retracted. Handlers with continue badge are used to execute
another sub-step if the selected sub-step fails. More specifically, when a handler with
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1 loc S_STARTED:
2 when true do { } goto S_fork_subs;
3 loc S_fork_subs:
4 when true do {
5 start(T_Sub1 );
6 start(T_Sub2 );
7 start(T_Sub3 );
8 } goto S_join_Sub1;
9 loc S_join_Sub1:
10 when true do { join(T_Sub1 ); } goto S_test_Sub1;
11 loc S_terminate_test_Sub1:
12 when threadTerminated(T_Sub1) do { } goto S_join_Sub2;
13 loc S_join_Sub2:
14 when true do { join(T_Sub2 ); } goto S_test_Sub2;
15 loc S_terminate_test_Sub2:
16 when threadTerminated(T_Sub2) do { } goto S_join_Sub3;
17 loc S_join_Sub3:
18 when true do { join(T_Sub3 ); } goto S_test_Sub3;
19 loc S_terminate_test_Sub3:
20 when threadTerminated(T_Sub3) do { } goto S_COMPLETED;
21 ...
Figure A.13. BIR Representation for the Parallel Started Template
184
continue badge is executed, all the retracted sub-steps will be posted again and one
of them is selected to be performed.
In our approach, sub-steps of choice steps are translated into threads. This is not
so intuitive because the choice is supposed to choose only one sub-step to execute each
time. The problem is that the choice step does not restrict the order of its sub-steps.
In another word, sub-steps of a choice step may execute in any order though not in
parallel. One straight-forward translation option is to enumerate all possible such
orders in the BIR code. This could easily blow up the BIR code if the choice step
has many sub-steps. Instead, we decide to translate sub-steps of a choice step into
BIR thread and force them to run one after another. This is achieved by adding a
choice variable that indicates which sub-step is selected. In addition, each sub-step is
assigned one done variable that represents whether the sub-step is done or not. The
choice variable is randomly assigned to the index of a single sub-step at the beginning
of each iteration. Then all sub-step threads are started. The thread of a sub-step
first tests if it has been done. If so, the thread ends immediately. Otherwise the
thread proceeds to check the sub-step index against the choice variable. Only the
one whose index equals to the value of the choice variable will continue. And other
threads simply retract their corresponding sub-steps. The major advantage of this
approach is that it produces more compact BIR code, greatly relieving the burden of
the model construction for verification tools.
Figure A.14 shows a choice step S that has two sub-steps Sub1 and Sub2. Both
sub-steps could throw exception e which is handled by a hander with continue badge.
This allows the one sub-step to be executed if the other one fails. The BIR produced
by applying Choice Step Started Template is presented in Figure A.15. When the
choice step S is started, the done variables for both sub-steps are initialized to be
false (line 3-7). Then the choice variable of S is non-deterministically assigned to be
0 or 1 (line 8-10). If S choice is 0, Sub1 is selected to be executed. And if it is 1, Sub2
185
Figure A.14. Choice Step Example
is selected. The next location (line 11-17) checks whether Sub1 is selected. If Sub1 is
not selected (S choice!=0), Sub2 should be checked. If Sub1 is selected and it is not
done yet ((S choice==0)&&!Sub1 done), the sub-step threads will be forked. In the
case when Sub1 is selected but it has already done ((S choice==0)&&Sub1 done),
it should not be executed again. Therefore, control flow goes back to choose the
choice variable of S. Line 18-24 checks Sub2 in a similar way. One may readily notice
that in line 25-38, both sub-step threads are forked. According to the semantic of
choice steps, however, only one sub-step that has not finished should be executed in
each iteration. This constraint is actually enforced in the individual sub-step thread.
Figure A.16 presents the sub-step thread for Sub1. Line 2-4 shows that Sub1 can be
posted only if it is not done yet. Otherwise, the whole sub-step thread ends. The code
that makes sure that Sub1 should be retracted if it is not selected is not shown here.
This piece of code is generated by Choice Sub-Step Retracted Template as discussed
above. In line 6-9, the done variable Sub1 done is set to true if Sub1 is completed
or terminated, indicating that Sub1 is done. If Sub1 is retracted, however, the done
variable is not set to true because it could be posted again by the exception handler
with continue badge. Although not shown in this example, the done variable should
also be set to true if the sub-step is opted-out.
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1 loc S_STARTED:
2 when true do { } goto S_init;
3 loc S_init:
4 when true do {
5 Sub1_done := false;
6 Sub2_done := false;
7 } goto S_choose;
8 loc S_choose:
9 when true do { S_choice := 0; } goto S_check_Sub1;
10 when true do { S_choice := 1; } goto S_check_Sub1;
11 loc S_check_Sub1:
12 when ( S_choice != 0 )
13 do { } goto S_check_Sub2;
14 when ( (S_choice == 0) && !Sub1_done)
15 do { } goto S_fork_subs;
16 when ( (S_choice == 0) && Sub1_done )
17 do { } goto S_choose;
18 loc S_check_Sub2:
19 when ( S_choice != 1 )
20 do { } goto S_fork_subs;
21 when ( (S_choice == 1) && !Sub2_done)
22 do { } goto S_fork_subs;
23 when ( (S_choice == 1) && Sub2_done )
24 do { } goto S_choose;
25 loc S_fork_subs:
26 when true do {
27 start(T_Sub1 );
28 start(T_Sub2 );
29 } goto S_join_Sub1;
30 loc S_join_Sub1:
31 when true do { join(T_Sub1 ); } goto S_test_Sub1;
32 loc S_terminate_test_Sub1:
33 when threadTerminated(T_Sub1) do { } goto S_join_Sub2;
34 loc S_join_Sub2:
35 when true do { join(T_Sub2 ); } goto S_test_Sub2;
36 loc S_terminate_test_Sub2:
37 when threadTerminated(T_Sub2)
38 do { } goto S_handle_exceptions;
Figure A.15. BIR Representation for the Choice Started Template
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1 thread T_Sub1
2 loc Sub1_begin:
3 when !( Sub1_done) do { } goto Sub1_POSTING;
4 when Sub1_done do { } goto Sub1_end;
5 ... // Sub1
6 loc Sub1_COMPLETED:
7 when true do { Sub1_done := true; } goto Sub1_end;
8 loc Sub1_TERMINATED:
9 when true do { Sub1_done := true; } goto Sub1_end;
10 loc Sub1_RETRACTED:
11 when true do { } goto Sub1_end;
12 loc Sub1_end:
13 when true do { exit(T_Sub1 ); } goto Sub1_exit;
14 loc Sub1_exit:
15 end T_Sub1;
Figure A.16. BIR Representation for Sub-step of Choice Step
Leaf Step Started Template
In a Little-JIL process, leaf steps are performed by the assigned agents once they
are started. The behaviors of agents, however, are not modeled in the Little-JIL
process definition. The process definition only specifies the interfaces of a leaf step,
which declares the parameters used by the step as well as exceptions that might be
thrown by the step. Based on the interface, we translate the started behavior of a
leaf step into a BIR model that conservatively captures such behavior.
Supposed that there is a leaf step S that might throw exception e1 and e2. Fig-
ure A.17 shows the BIR code generated by Leaf Step Started Template for this step.
There are three transitions in this location. All of them have the condition true.
This means that when the execution reaches the location, one transition will be non-
deterministically selected to be executed. In the first transition (line 2), no exception
is thrown and the step S is completing. In the second transition (line 3), the excep-
tion e1 is thrown and the step S is terminated. In the third transition (line 4), the
exception e2 is thrown that also terminates S.
188
1 loc S_STARTED:
2 when true do { } goto S_COMPLETING;
3 when true do { e1 := true; } goto S_TERMINATED;
4 when true do { e2 := true; } goto S_TERMINATED;
Figure A.17. BIR Representation for Leaf Step Started Template
To handle the rare situations where the precise model of the started behavior
of a leaf step is necessary, we support customized started behavior models. The
analyst provides the BIR model for a leaf step that defines how this step goes from
the STARTED state into the COMPLETING and TERMINATED states. When
applying Leaf Step Started Template for such a step, the customized model is returned.
For a leaf step without a customized model, the default model shown above will be
created.
Completing Template
This type of template translates the behaviors after a step is COMPLETING and
before it is COMPLETED. Such behaviors are the same for all steps, so only one
template is defined for this type.
After a step is COMPLETING and before it is COMPLETED, the step may pass
out parameters and put artifacts to channels. Similar to the posting template, the
completing template only translates the channel operations.
Operator Write is the only operator that can be used to put an artifact to a
channel. Suppose that there is a step S that puts an artifact to a channel channel
using the Write operator. The BIR code after applying the template is shown in
Figure A.18. Once in the COMPLETING state, the step proceeds to write an artifact
to the channel channel. Since the Operator never blocks the execution of a step, the
channel is simply set to be non-empty (channel := true).
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1 loc S_COMPLETING:
2 when true do { } goto S_channel_write;
3 loc S_channel_write:
4 when true do {
5 channel := true;
6 } goto S_COMPLETED;
Figure A.18. BIR Representation for Completing Template Example
Figure A.19. Exception Handling Example
Exception Handling Template
The Exception Handling Template is invoked by various Started Templates to
generate the code to handle exceptions thrown by the sub-steps. When a sub-step
throws an exception, the matching exception handler associated with the parent step
will be invoked to handle the exception. If the handler is associated with an exception
handler step, the handler step will be executed. The exception handler also has a
control-flow badge indicating how the step catching the exception executes after the
handler step finishes. Since this exception handling mechanism is the same for all
kinds of steps, only one Exception Handling Template is defined.
Figure A.19 shows an exception handling example. The sub-step Sub may throw
two exceptions: e1 and e2. The handler used to handle exception e1 has a handler
step Handler1 and a continue control flow badge. And the handler used to handle ex-
ception e2 has a handler step Handler2 and a rethrow control flow badge. Figure A.20
shows the BIR code that will be executed once Sub1 is terminated. In this code, b e1
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1 loc Parent_fork_T_Handler1:
2 when (b_e1==true) do {
3 start(T_Handler1 );
4 } goto Parent_fork_T_Handler2;
5 when (b_e1== false) do {
6 } goto Parent_fork_T_Handler2;
7 loc Parent_fork_T_Handler2:
8 when (b_e2==true) do {
9 start(T_Handler2 );
10 } goto Parent_fork_T_Handler2;
11 when (b_e2== false) do {
12 } goto Parent_join_T_Handler1;
13 loc Parent_join_T_Handler1:
14 when (b_e1==true) do {
15 join(T_Handler1 );
16 } goto Parent_terminate_test_T_Handler1;
17 when (b_e1== false) do {
18 } goto Parent_join_T_Handler2;
19 loc Parent_terminate_test_T_Handler1:
20 when threadTerminated(T_Handler1) do {
21 } goto Parent_control_rethrow;
22 loc Parent_join_T_Handler2:
23 when (b_e2==true) do {
24 join(T_Handler2 );
25 } goto Parent_terminate_test_T_Handler2;
26 when (b_e2== false) do {
27 } goto Parent_control_rethrow;
28 loc Parent_control_rethrow:
29 when (b_e2==true) do { } goto Parent_TERMINATED;
30 when (b_e2== false) do { } goto Parent_control_continue;
31 loc Parent_control_continue:
32 when (b_e1==true) do { b_e1:=false; } goto unionsq;
33 when (b_e1== false) do { } goto unionsq;
Figure A.20. BIR Representation for the Exception Handling Template
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and b e2 are Boolean variables used to encode exception e1 and e2 respectively. Since
exception handlers may be executed in parallel, the handler steps are translated into
BIR threads. T Handler1 and T Handler2 are BIR threads corresponding to handler
step Handler1 and Handler2. The first part of the code (line 1-12) tests whether
exceptions are thrown or not one by one. If an exception is thrown, the thread trans-
lated from the corresponding exception handler step is started. Otherwise, the next
exception is checked. The next part (13-27) joins the threads of exception handling
steps if they have been started. The last part (line 28-33) directs the flow of control
according to the control-flow badges of the exception handlers. In this example, ex-
ception e2 is tested first because its handler Handler2 has a rethrow badge, which
has a higher priority than the continue badge of Handler1. One might notice that
while exception variable b e1 is set to false (line 32), exception variable b e1 re-
mains to be true (line 29). This is because exception e2 is rethrown by its handler.
The exception variable should remain true until it is handled by a non-rethrown
handler associated with any ancestor of the parent step. Another thing needed to be
mentioned is that two targets of the last location are empty. The reason is that they
may go to different locations for different kinds of parent step. For instance, if the
parent step is a try step, the first transformation should go to the posted location
of the next sub-step, and the second one should go to the completed location of the
parent step. But if the parent step is a sequential step, both should go to the posted
location of the next sub-step. These targets, therefore, are left empty and will be
filled up by the Started Template that invokes the Exception Handling Template.
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APPENDIX B
FAULT TREE DERIVATION TEMPLATES
Table B.1. Fault Tree Derivation Templates
Event Type Template(s)
Event Type 1 All Inputs are Correct, But S Produces In-
correct Output o
None
Event Type 2 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted Template 1, 2
Event Type 3 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started Template 3
Event Type 4 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Retracted Template 4
Event Type 5 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Opted-out Template 5
Event Type 6 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed Template 6, 7
Event Type 7 Artifact o is Wrong When S is Terminated
by Exception e
Template 8, 9
Event Type 8 Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be
Completed
Template 10, 11
Event Type 9 Exception e is Thrown by S None
Event Type 10 Exception e is not Thrown by S Tempate 12
Event Type 11 Step S is Opted-out None
Event Type 12 Step S is not Opted-out Template 13
Event Type 13 Step S is Retracted None
Event Type 14 Step S is not Retracted Template 14
Templates for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted
Since the artifact o is already wrong when S is posted, the fault is not introduced
by step S. It must be propagated from the previous step. Depending on whether
step S is an exception handler or not, the flow of control goes to S is quite different.
To make the templates simpler, we use two separate templates to develop this type
of events.
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Figure B.1. Template 1
Template 1
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted, and
• Step S is an exception handler step
Partial Fault Tree:
The partial fault tree for this template is shown in Figure B.1. If S is an exception
handler step, it can only be posted if the corresponding exception is thrown. There-
fore, the event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted” can only be caused by the
event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Terminated by Exception e”, where
• e is the exception handled by S;
• S ′ may throw exception e;
• o′ is an output parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o (via parameter bindings).
If no such parameter exists, o′ = o.
It is possible that the step S ′ does not have an output parameter o′ that is passed
to o. o′ may be an output of another step S ′′ that is executed before S ′ and be
passed to the exception handler. It is tempting to look several steps back to identify
S ′′, create an event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S” is Completed”, and connect this
event to the OR gate. This, however, violates an important rule in the practice of
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fault tree derivation: always look at the immediate causes each time [131]. Violating
this rule could result in overlooking some critical events between event “Artifact o’
is Wrong When S” is Completed” and “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted”. One
might argue that since we derive the fault tree automatically instead of manually, we
can avoid overlooking such critical events by considering all possible situations and
incorporating them into the templates. The problem is that this will greatly increase
the size of the templates and make the derivation algorithm much more complicated.
Therefore, we choose to apply Template 1 and create the temporary event “Artifact
o is Wrong When S’ is Terminated by Exception e” in this case. This event can be
interpreted as: although the artifact o is not visible to the step S ′, it is already wrong
and still alive at the point when S ′ is terminated by exception e. After the fault tree
is derived, most of the temporary events introduced in this way can be removed by
the fault tree optimization techniques discussed in Chapter 4.
Template 2
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted
• S is not an exception handler step
Partial Fault Tree:
The partial fault tree for this template is shown in Figure B.2. If S is the root
step, the incorrect artifact must be passed in as a parameter to the process. How
the parameter went wrong is out of the scope of the process. Therefore, the event is
treated as a basic event and does not need to be developed further.
If S is neither an exception handler nor the root step, it may be posted in two
cases: it may be posted after its parent step is started or it may be posted after
a sibling step is completed. The first case occurs if S is the first child step to be
executed, e.g. S is a pre-requisite step, or S is the first sub-step of a sequential step
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Figure B.2. Template 2
that does not have a pre-requisite step. Suppose S ′ is the parent step of S, S will be
posted as soon as S ′ is started. Since S ′ is a non-leaf step, it is not able to change the
artifact o. The artifact o must already be wrong at the point when the S ′ is started.
In other words, event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Posted” could be caused by
event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Started”, where:
• S ′ is the parent step of S, and S is the first child to be executed, and
• o′ is a parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter exists,
o′ = o.
The second case occurs when S is not the first child step to be executed. In this
case, S can only be executed after one of its siblings is completed. For example, if S is
the second sub-step of a sequential step, it will be posted as soon as the first sub-step is
completed. If the first step may throw an exception and the corresponding exception
handler has a continue badge, S can also be posted after the exception handler step
is completed. Note that if this exception handler does have a handler step, S can
actually be posted when the first step is terminated. To simplify the template, a
dummy handler step is added to an exception handler if it is not associated with a
hander step. For steps in the second case, event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is
posted” may be caused by event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Completed”, where:
• S ′ a sibling of S and if S ′ is completed, S will be executed, and
196
Figure B.3. Template 3
• o′ is an output parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter
exists, o′ = o.
Template for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started
Template 3
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started
Partial Fault Tree:
The partial fault tree for this template is shown in Figure B.3. In Little-JIL,
the only step state that may immediately precedes the state <S, Started> is <S,
Posted>. Since artifacts cannot be changed between these two states, event “Artifact
o is Wrong When S is Started” can occur only if the artifact o is already wrong when
the step S is posted. On the other hand, however, event “Artifact o is Wrong When S
is posted” does not always lead to “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started”. The step
S may be a retractable step, e.g. S is a sub-step of a parallel step. S may go from
the posted state to the retracted state when another sub-step throws an exception.
When this occurs, the faulty o will not be propagated to the state <S, Started>.
The step S may also be an optional step. The agent responsible for S is allowed
to opt out of the posted step S. In this case, event “Artifact o is wrong when S is
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Figure B.4. Template 4
posted” will not lead to “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started” as well. Therefore,
to allow the faulty o to be propagated from the posted state to the started state, S
should not be retracted or opted-out. Notice that the nodes for event “Step S is not
Opted out” and “Step S is not Retracted” are drawn using dash lines. This means that
these two events may or may not be present, depending on if the step S is optional or
retractable. “Step S is not Opted out” is present iff S is an optional step, and “Step
S is not Retracted” is present iff S is a retractable step.
Templates for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Retracted
Template 4
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Retracted
Partial Fault Tree:
The immediate predecessor of the step state <S, Retracted> is <S, Posted>.
Since retracted step can never make changes to its parameters, the artifact o must
have already been wrong when S is posted. Moreover, the control flow only goes from
<S, Posted> to <S, Retracted> if step S is retracted. This results in the template
shown in Figure B.4.
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Figure B.5. Template 5
Templates for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Opted-out
Template 5
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Opted-out
Partial Fault Tree:
The immediate predecessor of the step state <S, Opted-out> is also <S, Posted>.
Similar to the retracted step, opted-out step does not make changes to its parameters.
Therefore, the artifact o must already be wrong when S is posted. Moreover, the
control flow only goes from <S, Posted> to <S, Opted-out> if step S is retracted.
This results in the template shown in Figure B.5.
Templates for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed
Template 6
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed, and
• S is not a leaf step
Partial Fault Tree:
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Figure B.6. Template 6
If S is not a leaf step, S may be completed immediately after certain child step
is completed. For example, a sequential step is completed as soon as its last sub-step
is completed. Suppose this step has an exception handler with a complete badge, it
may also be completed when the exception handler step is completed. In this case,
event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed” is caused by event “Artifact o’ is
Wrong When S’ is Completed”, where:
• S ′ is a child step of S and if it is completed, S will be completed, and
• o′ is a parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter exists,
o′ = o.
There may be more than one child steps that are qualified. For each such child
step, an event “Artifact o’ is Wrong When S’ is Completed” needs to be created and
connected to the OR gate.
If step S has optional sub-steps, it could be completed after one of its optional
sub-step is opted-out. In this case, event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed
is caused by event “Artifact o” is Wrong When S” is Opted-out”, where:
• S ′′ is an optional sub-step of S and if it is completed, S will be completed, and
• o′′ is a parameter of S ′′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter exists,
o′′ = o.
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Figure B.7. Template 7
Figure B.6 shows the template that considers both cases.
Template 7
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Completed, and
• S is a leaf step
Partial Fault Tree:
If S is a leaf step, event “Artifact o is wrong when S is completed” occurs if the
artifact o is already wrong when step S is about to be completed, and no exception is
thrown by S. If any exception is thrown, the faulty artifact o will not be propagated
to the state <S, Completed>. Figure B.7 shows the template.
S may throw more than one exception. For each exception e that could be thrown
by S, a new event “Exception e is not thrown by S” is created. If S does not throw
any exception, event “Exception e is not thrown by S” will not be created.
Templates for Artifact o is Wrong When S is Terminated by
Exception e
Template 8
Requirement:
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Figure B.8. Template 8
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Terminated by
Exception e, and
• S is a leaf step
Partial Fault Tree:
Figure B.8 shows the partial fault tree for this template. According to the copy-
in-copy-out semantics of parameter passing in Little-JIL, if a leaf step is terminated,
the parameter that it changes will not be passed out. For the case that o is an OUT
parameter of S, o can be wrong only if S changes o incorrectly. This error, however,
well not be propagated out of S if S is terminated. Therefore “Artifact o is wrong
when S is terminated by exception e” should never occur. To handle this, we mark
the event as infeasible. The infeasible events will be pruned from the fault tree after
the whole fault tree is derived.
For the other cases (o is an IN/INOUT parameter of S, or o is not a parameter of
S), Event “Artifact o is wrong when S is terminated by exception e” can occur only
when the artifact o is already wrong when S is started and the exception e is thrown
by S.
Template 9
Requirement:
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Figure B.9. Template 9
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is Terminated by
Exception e, and
• S is a not leaf step
Partial Fault Tree:
Figure B.9 shows the partial fault tree for this template. If S is not a leaf step,
it is usually terminated by exception e when the exception s is propagated from a
child step. For example, a handler step throws exception e, or a sub-step throws e
that does not have a corresponding exception hander. For this case, event “Artifact
o is wrong when S is terminated by exception e” may be caused by event “Artifact o
is wrong when S’ is terminated by exception e” is created, where:
• S ′ is a child step of S and when it throws exception e, S is terminated;
• o′ is a parameter of S ′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter exists,
o′ = o.
Suppose S has an exception handler with rethrow badge to handle e, S could be
terminated immediately after the exception handler step is completed. For this case,
event “Artifact o is wrong when S is terminated by exception e” may be caused by
event “Artifact o′′ is wrong when S′′ completed” is created, where:
• S ′′ is an exception handler step associated with rethrow exception handler that
handles exception e, and
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Figure B.10. Template 10
• o′′ is a parameter of S ′′ that will be passed to o. If no such parameter exists,
o′′ = o.
Templates for Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be
Completed
Template 10
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be
Completed, and
• o is an output parameter of S
Partial Fault Tree:
Note that step S in event “Artifact o is wrong when S is about to be Completed”
should always be a leaf step because this event can only be introduced by Template
7, which requires step S to be a leaf step.
If o is an output parameter of S, S may change o. We conservatively assume that
o depends on all inputs of S. Therefore, incorrect o may be caused by incorrect input,
or incorrect execution of S, as shown in Figure B.10. In event “Artifact i is Wrong
When S is Started”, S is the same step as the one in “Artifact o is Wrong When S
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Figure B.11. Template 11
is about to be Completed”, and i is an input of S. For each input i of S, one such
event needs to be created. In event “All Inputs are Correct, but S Produces Wrong
o”, artifact o and step S are the same step as the ones in “Artifact o is Wrong When
S is about to be Completed”.
Template 11
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be
Completed, and
• o is not an output parameter of S
Partial Fault Tree:
Since o is not an output parameter of S, S cannot change o. Therefore, o is wrong
simply because it is already wrong before S is started, as shown in Figure B.11. The
artifact o and step S in the new event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is Started” are
the same as the ones in event “Artifact o is Wrong When S is about to be Completed”.
Templates for Exception e is not Thrown by S
Template 12
Requirement:
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Figure B.12. Template 12
Figure B.13. Template 13
• The event e to be developed is Exception e is not Thrown by S
Partial Fault Tree:
As shown in Figure B.12, this template is straight-forward. “Exception e is not
Thrown by S” simply means NOT “Exception e is Thrown by S”.
Templates for Step S is not Opted-out
Template 13
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Step S is not Opted-out
Partial Fault Tree:
As shown in Figure B.13, “Step S is not Opted-out” simply means NOT “Step S is
Opted-out”.
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Figure B.14. Template 14
Templates for Step S is not retracted
Template 14
Requirement:
• The event e to be developed is Step S is not Opted-out
Partial Fault Tree:
As shown in Figure B.14, “Step S is not retracted” simply means NOT “Step S is
retracted”.
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APPENDIX C
UNOPTIMIZED BIR PROGRAM FOR SIMPLIFIED
BLOOD TRANSFUSION PROCESS
1 process Process_Blood_Transfusion_Process ()
2 // Exception variable for PatientBloodTypeUnavailable
3 b_PatientBloodTypeUnavailable := false;
4 // Exception variable for WrongPatient
5 b_WrongPatient := false;
6 // Exception variable for BloodExpired
7 b_BloodExpired := false;
8 // Exception variable for WrongBlood
9 b_WrongBlood := false;
10
11 // Done variable for ’Check Expiration Date ’
12 b_CheckExpirationDateDone := false;
13 // Done variable for Check ’Product Info Match Patient Info ’
14 b_CheckProductInfoMatchPatientInfo := false;
15
16 main thread T_Blood_Transfusion_Process
17 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_POSTED:
18 when true do { }
19 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_STARTED;
20 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_STARTED:
21 when true do { }
22 goto Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED;
23 loc Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED:
24 when true do { }
25 goto Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_STARTED;
26 loc Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_STARTED:
27 when true do { }
28 goto Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED;
29 loc Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED:
30 when true do { }
31 goto Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_STARTED;
32 loc Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_STARTED:
33 when true do { }
34 goto Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED;
35 when true do { b_PatientBloodTypeUnavailable := true; }
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36 goto Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_TERMINATED;
37 loc Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED:
38 when true do { }
39 goto Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED;
40 loc Check_Lab_for_Patients_Blood_Type_TERMINATED:
41 when true do { }
42 goto Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_control_continue:
43 loc Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_control_continue:
44 when ( b_PatientBloodTypeUnavailable == true )
45 do { b_PatientBloodTypeUnavailable := false; }
46 goto Test_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED;
47 loc Test_Patients_Blood_Type_POSTED:
48 when true do { }
49 goto Test_Patients_Blood_Type_STARTED;
50 loc Test_Patients_Blood_Type_STARTED:
51 when true do { }
52 goto Test_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED;
53 loc Test_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED:
54 when true do { }
55 goto Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED;
56 loc Obtain_Patients_Blood_Type_COMPLETED:
57 when true do { }
58 goto Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_POSTED;
59 loc Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_POSTED:
60 when true do { }
61 goto Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_STARTED;
62 loc Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_STARTED:
63 when true do { }
64 goto Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_COMPLETED;
65 loc Pick_up_Blood_from_Blood_Bank_COMPLETED:
66 when true do { }
67 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_POSTED;
68 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_POSTED:
69 when true do { }
70 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_STARTED;
71 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_STARTED:
72 when true do { }
73 goto Identify_Patient_POSTED;
74 loc Identify_Patient_POSTED:
75 when true do { }
76 goto Identify_Patient_STARTED:
77 loc Identify_Patient_STARTED:
78 when true do { }
79 goto Identify_Patient_COMPLETED;
80 when true do { b_WrongPatient := true; }
81 goto Identify_Patien_TERMINATED;
209
82 loc Identify_Patient_COMPLETED:
83 when true do { }
84 goto Check_Blood_Product_POSTED;
85 loc Identify_Patien_TERMINATED:
86 when true do { }
87 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_control_rethrow:
88 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_control_rethrow:
89 when ( b_WrongPatient == true ) do ()
90 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_TERMINATED;
91 loc Check_Blood_Product_POSTED:
92 when true do { }
93 goto Check_Blood_Product_STARTED;
94 loc Check_Blood_Product_STARTED:
95 when true do { }
96 goto Check_Blood_Product_fork_subs:
97 loc Check_Blood_Product_fork_subs:
98 when true do {
99 start(T_Check_Expiration_Date );
100 start(T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info );
101 } goto Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub1;
102 loc Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub1:
103 when true do { join(T_Check_Expiration_Date ); }
104 goto Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub1;
105 loc Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub1:
106 when threadTerminated(T_Check_Expiration_Date) do { }
107 goto Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub2;
108 loc Check_Blood_Product_join_Sub2:
109 when true do {
110 join(T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info );
111 } goto Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub2;
112 loc Check_Blood_Product_terminate_test_Sub2:
113 when
114 threadTerminated(
115 T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info
116 )
117 do { } goto Check_Blood_Product_coontrol_rethrow;
118 loc Check_Blood_Product_coontrol_rethrow:
119 when ( b_BloodExpired != true &&
120 b_WrongBlood != true )
121 do { }
122 goto Check_Blood_Product_COMPLETED;
123 when ( b_BloodExpired == true ||
124 b_WrongBlood == true)
125 do { }
126 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_control_rethrow2;
127 loc Check_Blood_Product_COMPLETED:
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128 when true do { }
129 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_COMPLETED;
130 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_COMPLETED:
131 when true do { }
132 goto Infuse_Blood_POSTED;
133 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_control_rethrow2:
134 when ( b_BloodExpired == true ||
135 b_WrongBlood == true )
136 do { }
137 goto Perform_Bedside_Check_TERMINATED;
138 loc Perform_Bedside_Check_TERMINATED:
139 when true do { }
140 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_control_rethrow:
141 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_control_rethrow:
142 when ( b_WrongPatient == true ||
143 b_BloodExpired == true ||
144 b_WrongBlood == true )
145 do { }
146 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_TERMINATED
147 loc Infuse_Blood_POSTED:
148 when true do { } goto Infuse_Blood_STARTED;
149 loc Infuse_Blood_STARTED:
150 when true do { } goto Infuse_Blood_COMPLETED;
151 loc Infuse_Blood_COMPLETED:
152 when true do { }
153 goto Blood_Transfusion_Process_COMPLETED;
154 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_COMPLETED:
155 when true do { }
156 goto T_Blood_Transfusion_Process_exit;
157 loc Blood_Transfusion_Process_TERMINATED:
158 when true do { }
159 goto T_Blood_Transfusion_Process_exit;
160 loc T_Blood_Transfusion_Process_exit:
161 end T_Blood_Transfusion_Process;
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163 thread T_Check_Expiration_Date
164 loc Check_Expiration_Date_test_retract:
165 when ( b_WrongBlood == true ) do { }
166 goto Check_Expiration_Date_RETRACTED;
167 when ( b_WrongBlood != true ) do { }
168 goto Check_Expiration_Date_POSTED:
169 loc Check_Expiration_Date_POSTED:
170 when true do { }
171 goto Check_Expiration_Date_STARTED;
172 loc Check_Expiration_Date_STARTED:
173 when true do { }
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174 goto Check_Expiration_Date_COMPLETED;
175 when true do { b_BloodExpired := true; }
176 goto Check_Expiration_Date_TERMINATED;
177 loc Check_Expiration_Date_COMPLETED:
178 when true do { } goto T_Check_Expiration_exit;
179 loc Check_Expiration_Date_TERMINATED:
180 when true do { } goto T_Check_Expiration_exit;
181 loc Check_Expiration_Date_RETRACTED:
182 when true do { } goto T_Check_Expiration_exit;
183 loc T_Check_Expiration_exit:
184 end T_Check_Expiration_Date;
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186 thread T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info
187 loc Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_test_retract:
188 when ( b_BloodExpired == true ) do { }
189 goto Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_RETRACTED;
190 when ( b_BloodExpired != true ) do { }
191 goto Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_POSTED:
192 loc Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_POSTED:
193 when true do { }
194 goto Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_STARTED;
195 loc Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_STARTED:
196 when true do { }
197 goto Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_COMPLETED;
198 when true do { b_WrongBlood := true; }
199 goto Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_TERMINATED;
200 loc Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_COMPLETED:
201 when true do { }
202 goto T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info_exit;
203 loc Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_TERMINATED:
204 when true do { }
205 goto T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info_exit;
206 loc Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_RETRACTED:
207 when true do { }
208 goto T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info_exit;
209 loc T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info_exit:
210 end T_Check_Product_Info_Match_Patient_Info;
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212 predicates
213 IdentifyPatient =
214 T_Blood_Transfusion_Process@Identify_Patient_COMPLETED;
215 InfuseBlood =
216 T_Blood_Transfusion_Process@Infuse_Blood_STARTED;
217 end Process_Blood_Transfusion_Process;
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APPENDIX D
IN-PATIENT BLOOD TRANSFUSION PROCESS
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Figure D.1. Diagram “perform in-patient blood transfusion”
Figure D.2. Diagram “check for existence of type and screen”
Figure D.3. Diagram “pick up blood from blood bank”
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Figure D.4. Diagram “perform pre-release checks”
Figure D.5. Diagram “perform transfusion”
Figure D.6. Diagram “administer a single unit of blood product”
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Figure D.7. Diagram “perform pre-infusion work”
Figure D.8. Diagram “assess patient”
Figure D.9. Diagram “perform bedside checks”
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Figure D.10. Diagram “verify blood product information”
Figure D.11. Diagram “confirm product tag matches patient ID band”
Figure D.12. Diagram “confirm product label matches product tag”
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Figure D.13. Diagram “handle failed product verification by replacement”
Figure D.14. Diagram “handle previously unrecognized patient problem”
Figure D.15. Diagram “handle suspected transfusion reaction”
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Figure D.16. Diagram “infuse unit of blood product”
Figure D.17. Diagram “perform post-infusion work”
Figure D.18. Diagram “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process”
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Figure D.19. Diagram “order test(s)”
Figure D.20. Diagram “order test(s) on computer”
Figure D.21. Diagram “order test(s) on patient chart”
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Figure D.22. Diagram “collect labels”
Figure D.23. Diagram “walk to patient”
Figure D.24. Diagram “obtain and label specimen”
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Figure D.25. Diagram “apply label”
Figure D.26. Diagram “obtain blood specimen”
Figure D.27. Diagram “send blood specimen to lab”
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Figure D.28. Diagram “log specimen transport action”
Figure D.29. Diagram “verify the correct patient to get specimen”
Figure D.30. Diagram “verify patient ID to ID band”
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Figure D.31. Diagram “verify patient first and last names”
Figure D.32. Diagram “verify patient-DOB”
Figure D.33. Diagram “verify patient ID on artifact to artifact”
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APPENDIX E
BLOOD TRANSFUSION PROCESS VERIFICATION
REPORT
A Checks Done Before Obtaining Unit of Blood Product
A.1 If the blood bank doesn’t have a type & screen for the patient, obtain
a blood specimen
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
receive physician order for blood transfusion →
confirm physician order for blood transfusion COMPLETED
obtain blood specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
discover blood bank doesn’t have type and screen →
contact lab for availability of type and screen
throws exception LabUnknown
• Result: violation found. The property requires that the scope event “receive
physician order for blood transfusion” must happen. However, if there is no phy-
cisian order, the exception NoPhycisianOrder will terminate “confirm physician
order for blood transfusion as well as the whole process. In this case, the event
“receive physician order for blood transfusion” will never occur. In fact, the prop-
erty is only required to hold as long as the event “receive physician order for blood
transfusion” occurs. The scope event “receive physician order for blood transfu-
sion” itself is not required to occur. The property specification is too strong.
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• Change: in the property specification, the answer to the question “is receive
physician order for blood transfusion required?” is changed to “No”. 1
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding: after Iteration 1, the step “obtain blood specimen” has been
replaced by a sub-process “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process”. So the
event bindings are changed accordingly.
receive physician order for blood transfusion →
confirm physician order for blood transfusion COMPLETED
obtain blood specimen →
perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process STARTED
discover blood bank doesn’t have type and screen →
contact lab for availability of type and screen
throws exception “LabUnknown”
• Result: no violation found.
A.2 Assess the patient for appropriate I.V. access before picking up units
of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
pick up blood product →
pick up blood from blood bank STARTED
assess patient for appropriate I.V. access →
check IV access COMPLETED
provide IV access COMPLETED
1The Propel has changed the scope question tree after the verification. The question “is receive
physician order for blood transfusion required?” is no longer exist.
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• Result: no violation found.
B Administration of a Unit of Blood Product
B.1 Must locate the patient”s consent document before performing a
blood transfusion
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
perform transfusion →
perform transfusion STARTED
confirm presence of informed consent →
confirm patient consent COMPLETED
• Result: violation found. The property requires that the event “confirm presence
of informed consent” must happen at least once. However, if there is no patient
consent form, the exception NoPatientConsent will terminate the step “confirm pa-
tient consent” as well as whole process. So the event “confirm presence of informed
consent” will never occur. This violation indicates that an important exception
handling step to handle the exception NoPatientConsent is missing.
• Change: an exception handler “obtain patient consent” that handles the NoPa-
tientConsent exception is added.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
perform transfusion →
perform transfusion STARTED
confirm presence of informed consent →
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confirm patient consent COMPLETED
obtain patient consent COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
B.2 Must review patient history before infusing each unit of blood prod-
uct
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find the binding for the event “review patient history”.
• Change: redefine the step “assess patient” by adding new substep “review
patient history” which occurs before “evaluate patient clinically”. Also, add ex-
ception handler “handle previously unrecognized patient problem” to handle the
exception ProblemFoundInPatientHistory thrown by the new substep.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
Infuse a single unit of blood →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
review patient history →
review patient history COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
B.3 If previously unrecognized patient problem found in history, ask
physician for instructions before infusing each unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not identify the binding for the event “previously unrec-
ognized patient problem found in history”.
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• Change: see change in B.2.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
infuse a single unit of blood →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
ask physician for instructions →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
find previously unrecognized patient problem →
review patient history throws exception ProblemFoundInPatientHistory
• Result: no violation found.
B.4.1 Confirm presence of ID band before infusing each unit of blood
product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: in the process, the step “check patient’s ID bracelet” could
throw two exceptions: MissingArmband and NameMismatch, which mean that
this step actually consists of two tasks: “confirm the presence of an ID band”
and “verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match”. Properties
in C section refer to two different events, which correspond to those two tasks
respectively. Therefore, the analyst suggested to add more details into “check
patient’s ID bracelet”.
• Change: the step “check patient’s ID bracelet” is replaced by a detailed patient
identification verification sub-process.
Iteration 2:
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• Event Binding:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm presence of exactly one ID band on patient COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
B.4.2 Obtain patient’s stated name and birth date before infusing each
unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
obtain patient name and birth date COMPLETED
• Result: violation found. In the process definition, the nurse only need to obtain
both the patient name and the birthday when the patient armband is missing or
does not match the stated name. The violation trace shows that if the patient’s
armband is present, the nurse only obtains the patient’s name. This indicates an
error in the process definition.
• Change: the step “check patient’s ID bracelet” is replaced by a detailed patient
identification verification sub-process that has steps that obtain the patient name
and birthday.
Iteration 2:
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Note: in the modified process, obtain patient’s stated name and birthday is done
by two different steps: “ask patient to spell first and last names” and “ask patient to
state DOB”. Therefore, two separate sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB COMPLETED
• Result: violations found for both sets of bindings. The traces show that the
step “confirm patient is able to communicate” throws an exception PatientUnable-
ToCommunicate. The associated exception hander simply completes the parent
step “verify patient ID to ID band”. Therefore, “ask patient to spell first and last
names and “verify patient-DOB”, which follow step “confirm patient is able to
communicate”, are skipped and eventually the step “infuse unit of blood product”
is started. The violations indicate that property specification was not correctly
defined. It should only be require if the patient is able to communicate.
• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
Again, two separate sets of binding are verified.
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• Event Binding a:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found for both sets of bindings.
B.4.3 Verify ID band matches patient’s stated name and birth date before
infusing each unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step that can be bound to the event “verify ID
band matches patient’s stated name and birth date”.
• Changes: the step “check patient’s ID bracelet” is replaced by a detailed patient
identification verification sub-process that has steps that obtain the patient name
and birthday.
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Iteration 2:
Note: in the new process, verify ID band matches patient’s stated name and
birth date is done by three different steps: “confirm patient-stated-first-name matches
patient-first-name on ID band”, “confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-
last-name on ID band” and “confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB on
ID band”. Therefore, three separate sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding c:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band COMPLETED
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• Result: Violation found. Similar to B.4.2.
• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
Again, three separate sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding c:
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patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band COMPLETED
• Result: No violation found for all three sets of bindings.
B.4.4 Verify ID band matches physician order for blood transfusion be-
fore infusing each unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step that can be bound to the event “verify ID
band matches physician order”. There is a step “verify physician order”. However,
it seems to only check the completeness of the physician order because it could
only throw the exception IncompletePhysicianOrder and the handler says “obtain
complete physician order”.
• Change: after consulting the professional, “verify physician order” is renamed
to “confirm complete physician order” because “verify physician order” here only
checks the completeness of the order. And in the Baystate Medical Center, the
physician order is printed onto the tag affixed to blood product. Therefore, the
step “confirm product tag matches patient ID band” can be considered to verify ID
band matches physician order as well.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
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verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Result: No violation found.
B.4.5a (B.4.1 → B.4.2) Confirm presence of ID before obtaining pa-
tient’s stated name and birth date (Before infusing each unit of blood
product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm the presence of an ID bracelet COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
request patient name COMPLETED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
• Result: No violation found.
Iteration 2:
Note: the property needs to be re-verified because the related steps have been
changed. In the modified process, “obtain patient’s stated name and birth date”
correspond to two steps: “ask patient to state first and last names” and “ask patient
to state DOB”. Therefore, two sets of binding are verified.
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• Event Binding a:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm presence of exactly one ID band on patient COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm presence of exactly one ID band on patient COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB COMPLETED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
• Result: No violation found for both sets of bindings.
B.4.5b (B.4.2 → B.4.3) Obtain patient’s stated name and birth date be-
fore verifying ID band matches patient’s stated name and birth date
(before infusing each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
obtain patient name and birth date COMPLETED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
check patient’s ID bracelet STARTED
• Result: Violation found. The violation trace shows that if the patient is uncon-
scious, step “obtain patient name and birth date” will throw an exception Patien-
tUnconsious. The handler for this exception is a simple continue handler, which
means that the next step “check patient’s ID bracelet” will be executed even with-
out obtaining patient’s name and birthday. More details should be added to the
handler.
• Change: Major revision of patient id verification sub-process.
Iteration 2:
Note: “verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match” correspond
to three steps: “confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name on ID
band”, “confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name on ID band”,
“confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB on ID band”. Therefore, three
sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
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ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band STARTED
• Event Binding b:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band STARTED
• Event Binding c:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band STARTED
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• Result: no violation found for all three sets of bindings.
B.4.5c (B.4.3 → B.4.4) Verify ID band matches patient’s stated name
and birth date before verifying physician order for blood transfusion (Be-
fore infusing each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step that can be bound to the event “verify
ID band matches physician order”. There is a step “verify physician order. This
step, however, seems to only check the completeness of the physician order because
it could only throw the exception IncompletePhysicianOrder and the handler says
“obtain complete physician order”.
• Change: after consulting the professional, “verify physician order” is renamed
to “confirm complete physician order” because “verify physician order” here only
checks the completeness of the order. And in the Baystate Medical Center, the
physician order is printed onto the tag affixed to blood product. Therefore, the
step “confirm product tag matches patient ID band” can be considered to verify ID
band matches physician order as well.
Iteration 2:
Note: “verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match” correspond
to three steps: “confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name on ID
band”, “confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name on ID band”,
“confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB on ID band”. Therefore, three
sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
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unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band STARTED
verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band STARTED
verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding c:
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band STARTED
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verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band COMPLETED
• Result: violations found for all three sets of bindings. Similar to B.4.2.
• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding a:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band STARTED
verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
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infuse unit of blood product STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band STARTED
verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding c:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band STARTED
verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found for all three sets of bindings.
B.5.1 Verify ID band matches tag affixed to the unit of blood product
(Before infusing each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
verify ID band and tag affixed to unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Result: violation found. The following figure shows the simplified version of
the process. The step “verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet” is a sub-
step of the parallel step “verify blood product information”. When another sub-step
“check product expiration date & time” is started before “verify product tag matches
patient ID bracelet” and throws an exception ProductExpired, “verify product tag
matches patient ID bracelet” will be retracted, and the handler “handle unit of blood
product expiration” will be executed. In “handle unit of blood product expiration”,
the expired blood unit is discarded, a replacement blood unit is obtained and
infused. The problem is that this handler has a continue badge. Therefore, the
next step “infuse unit of blood product” will be executed and “verify product tag
matches patient ID bracelet” is still retracted.
• Change: “verify blood product” is replaced by a detailed product verification
sub-process. In the sub-process, both Product Expired and Failed Product Check
exceptions are now the same, they’re handled identically, and handled inside “verify
blood product”, so when there’s an exception, new blood will be obtained from blood
bank, and all the verification process should be restarted.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding: the same as iteration 1.
• Result: no violation found.
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B.5.2 Verify tag affixed to the unit of blood product (Before infusing
each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
confirm product label matches product tag COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
B.5.3 Verify that unit of blood product has not expired (Before infusing
each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
B.5.4a (B.5.1 → B.5.2) Verify ID band matches tag affixed to unit of
blood product before verifying tag matches unit of blood product (Before
infusing each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
verify ID band and tag affixed to unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet COMPLETED
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches product label STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Result: violation found. Since “verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet”
and “verify product tag matches product label” are sub-steps of the parallel step
“verify blood product information”, they could occur in any order. This property
is too strong.
• Change: this property is removed.
B.5.4b (B.5.2 → B.5.3) Verify tag matches unit of blood product before
verifying that unit of blood product has not expired (Before infusing each
unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches product label COMPLETED
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
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check product expiration date & time STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Result: violation found. Similar to B.5.4a, Since “verify product tag matches
patient ID bracelet” and “verify product tag matches product label” are sub-steps of
the parallel step “verify blood product information”, they could occur in any order.
This property is too strong.
• Change: this property is removed.
B.6 Assess patient’s baseline single-unit status (Before infusing each
unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
assess patient’s baseline single unit status →
assess patient STARTED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
B.7a (B.4.4 → B.5.1) Verify ID band matches physician order for blood
transfusion before verifying ID band matches tag affixed to the unit of
blood product (Before infusing each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
verify ID band and physician order for blood transfusion match →
verify physician order COMPLETED
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches product label STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Results: violation found. This property has a scope between “unit of blood
product arrives” and “infuse a unit of blood product”. “verify physician order” is
done before “unit of blood product arrives”. But between “unit of blood product
arrives” and “infuse a unit of blood product”, only “verify ID band and physician
order for blood transfusion match” could occur.
• Change: major revision of patient and product verification sub-process.
Iteration 2:
Note: at Baystate, physician order is printed on product tag. Therefore, “verify ID
band matches physician order for blood transfusion” and “verifying ID band matches
tag affixed to the unit of blood product” are the same. Therefore, this property does
not need to be verified for this blood transfusion process.
B.7b (B.5.3 → B.6) Verify unit of blood product has not expired before
assessing patient’s baseline single-unit status (Before infusing each unit
of blood product)
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time COMPLETED
assess patient’s baseline single unit status →
assess patient STARTED
unit of blood product arrives →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Results: violation found. During “perform pre-infusion work, “access patient” is
done before “verify blood product information”, which is the parent step of “check
product expiration date & time”.
• Change: this property is removed because it is not necessary to require “verify
unit of blood product has not expired” must happen before “assessing patient’s
baseline single-unit status”.
B.8 If patient’s baseline single-unit assessment is problematic, ask physi-
cian for instructions before infusing unit of blood product (Before infus-
ing each unit of blood product)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
find problematic patient assessment →
assess patient TERMINATED
ask physician for instructions →
confirm physician order to continue transfusion COMPLETED |
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confirm physician order to discontinue transfusion COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Results: no violation found.
B.9 Infusion of blood product must begin within 30 minutes after being
picked up from blood bank
• Discussion: this is a timing property that cannot be verified by our process
verification framework.
B.10 If a unit of blood product expires, it cannot be infused into a patient
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
expiration date on a unit of blood product is exceeded →
check product expiration date & time TERMINATED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Results: violation found. Note that the events in this property have certain
relationship among them: they are all related to the same unit of blood. However,
the current verifier cannot distinguish events related to different blood unit. The
violation trace shows that when one unit of blood is found to be expired, the nurse
go to pick up a new unit of blood and transfuse the new unit of blood. This is
obvious a false negative result. To eliminated this false violation, one can manually
do an artifact flow analysis. For this property, “infuse a unit of blood product” does
not have a binding because, according to the artifact flow analysis, after a unit of
blood is expired, it will be discarded.
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• Change: the professional suggested to change the property to “if a unit of blood
product expires, must pick up (new blood product) from blood bank”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
expiration date on a unit of blood product is exceeded →
check product expiration date & time TERMINATED
pick up a unit of blood product from blood bank →
pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Results: violation found. In the process, the step “check product expiration date
& time” appears in two places: one during “perform bedside checks” and the other
“handle suspected transfusion reaction”. The exception FailProductCheck from the
first one is handled by “handle failed product verification by replacement”, which
has a sub-step “pick up blood from blood bank”. For the second one, however, the
exception is handled by a continue handler without handling step.
• Change: attach the handler “handle failed product verification by replacement”
to the handler that handles the exception from the second one.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding: the same as Iteration 2.
expiration date on a unit of blood product is exceeded →
check product expiration date & time TERMINATED
pick up a unit of blood product from blood bank →
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pick up blood from blood bank COMPLETED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Results: no violation found.
B.11 Must assess patient’s 15-minute single-unit status after 15 minutes
of the infusion has passed
• Discussion: this is a timing property that cannot be verified by our process
verification framework.
B.12 Must assess patient’s post-single-unit status after the infusion is
completed
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
record infusion information →
record infusion info COMPLETED
discard transfusion materials →
discard infusion materials COMPLETED
assess patient’s post single unit status →
perform post-infusion work.assess patient STARTED
infuse a unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product COMPLETED
• Results: no violation found. Note that the event is bound to ‘assess patient’s
post single unit status” to step “assess patient”, which is a sub-step of “perform
post-infusion work” instead of all references to “assess patient”.
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B.14a If patient infusion exceeds the infusion time limit, must stop in-
fusion
• Discussion: in the process, there is no exception about the infusion exceeding
the time limit. More detail might need to be added to the process.
B.14b If patient infusion exceeds the infusion time limit, must ask blood
bank for further instructions
• Discussion: in the process, there is no exception about the infusion exceeding
the time limit. More detail might need to be added to the process.
B.15 If the blood bank or the physician instructs that the infusion be
discontinued, the infusion must be discontinued
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
receive blood bank OR physician instruction to discontinue
the infusion of a unit of blood product →
confirm physician order to discontinue transfusion COMPLETED
discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED
• Results: no violation found.
B.16 If an infusion has been stopped, it must either be resumed or be
discontinued
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion COMPLETED |
continue transfusion COMPLETED
stop the infusion of unit of blood product →
infuse unit of blood product STARTED
• Results: no violation found.
C. Handling a Suspected Transfusion Reaction
C.1 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, the infusion must be
stopped immediately
• Discussion: this property cannot be verified because it is a timing property.
C.2.1 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, must confirm the
presence of an ID band
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
confirm the presence of an ID band →
confirm the presence of an ID band STARTED
• Results: no violation found.
C.2.2 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, must obtain pa-
tient’s stated name and birth date
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
obtain patient name and birth date STARTED
• Results: violation found. Similar to B.4.2, when the exception ReactionSus-
pected is thrown, the handler “handle suspected transfusion reaction” will reverify
the patient’ identification. Normally only the patient’s name will be obtained by
the step “request patient name”. The step “obtain patient name and birth date”
will be executed only if anything goes wrong during checking the patient’s name.
• Change: major revision of patient id verification sub-process:
Iteration 2:
Note: “obtain patient’s stated name and birth date” correspond to two steps: “ask
patient to state first and last names” and “ask patient to state DOB”. Therefore, two
sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state first and last names STARTED
• Event Binding b:
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suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB STARTED
• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding a:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state first and last names STARTED
• Event Binding b:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
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obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB STARTED
• Result: no violation found for both sets of bindings.
C.2.3 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, must verify ID
band matches patient’s stated name and birth date
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
check patient’s ID bracelet STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
Iteration 2:
Note: “verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match” correspond
to three steps: “confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name on ID
band”, “confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name on ID band”,
“confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB on ID band”. Therefore, three
sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
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verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band STARTED
• Event Binding b:
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band STARTED
• Event Binding c:
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band STARTED
• Result: violations found for all three sets of binding. The violations occur when
the patient is not able to communicate.
• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding a:
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patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band STARTED
• Event Binding b:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band STARTED
• Event Binding c:
patient unable to communicate →
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
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infuse unit of blood product
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band STARTED
• Result: no violations found for all three sets of bindings.
C.2.4a (C.2.1 → C.2.2) Confirm presence of ID band before obtaining
patient’s stated name and birth date
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
obtain patient name and birth date STARTED
request patient name STARTED
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm the presence of an ID bracelet COMPLETED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
• Result: this property holds if two handlers in “reverify” are complete handlers
or continue handlers. Otherwise, there will be violations. See B.5.1 and B.16.
• Change: major revision of production verification sub-process.
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Iteration 2:
Note: “obtain patient’s stated name and birth date” correspond to two steps: “ask
patient to state first and last names” and “ask patient to state DOB”. Therefore, two
sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state first and last names STARTED
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm the presence of an ID bracelet COMPLETED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
• Event Binding b:
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB STARTED
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm the presence of an ID bracelet COMPLETED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
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• Result: no violation found. Note that “obtain patient’s stated name and birth
date” is bound to the STARTED state.
C.2.4b (C.2.2 → C.2.3) Obtain patient’s stated name and birth date be-
fore verifying ID band matches patient’s stated name and birth date
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
obtain patient name and birth date COMPLETED
request patient name COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
check patient’s ID bracelet STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
• Result: this property holds if two handlers in “reverify” are complete handlers
or continue handlers. Otherwise, there will be violations. See B.5.1 and B.16.
• Change: major revision of production verification sub-process.
Iteration 2:
Note “verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match” correspond
to three steps: “confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name on ID
band”, “confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name on ID band”,
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“confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB on ID band”. Therefore, three
sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
• Event Binding b:
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
• Event Binding c:
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obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB COMPLETED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
• Results: no violation found for all three sets of binding.
C.3.1 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, must verify ID
band matches tag affixed to the unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify ID band and tag affixed to unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Result: violation found. To handle the exception ReactionSuspected, during
reverifying the blood unit, the step “check product expiration date & time” might
be executed before “verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet”. If “check
product expiration date & time” throws the exception FailedProductCheck, “verify
product tag matches patient ID bracelet” will not be executed.
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• Change: the property is changed to “If patient has a suspected transfusion
reaction, must verify ID band matches tag affixed to the unit of blood product unless
exception FailedProductCheck is thrown”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
verify ID band and tag affixed to unit of blood product match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
FailedProductCheck is thrown →
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
check product expiration date & time |
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
confirm product type on product tag matches that on patient record
• Result: no violation found.
C.3.2 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, must verify tag
affixed to the unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches product label STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
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Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Result: violation found. Similar to C.3.1, to handle the exception ReactionSus-
pected, during reverifying the blood unit, the step “check product expiration date
& time” might be executed before “verify product tag matches product label”. If
“check product expiration date & time” throws the exception FailedProductCheck,
“verify product tag matches product label” will not be executed.
• Change: the property is changed to “If patient has a suspected transfusion re-
action, must verify tag affixed to the unit of blood product unless exception Failed-
ProductCheck is thrown”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
confirm product label matches product tag STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
FailedProductCheck is thrown →
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
confirm product tag matches patient ID band |
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
check product expiration date & time |
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
confirm product type on product tag matches that on patient record
• Result: no violation found.
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C.3.3 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, must verify that
unit of blood product has not expired
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Result: violation found. Similar to C.3.1 and C.3.2, to handle the exception
ReactionSuspected, during reverifying the blood unit, the step “verify product tag
matches product label” might be executed before “check product expiration date &
time”. If “verify product tag matches product label” throws the exception Failed-
ProductCheck, “check product expiration date & time” will not be executed.
• Change: the property is changed to “If patient has a suspected transfusion
reaction, must verify that unit of blood product has not expired unless exception
FailedProductCheck is thrown”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
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FailedProductCheck is thrown →
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
check blood product by 2 nurses |
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
confirm product type on product tag matches that on patient record
• Result: no violation found.
C.3.4a (C.3.1 → C.3.2) Verify ID band matches tag affixed to the unit
of blood product before verifying tag matches the unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify ID band and tag affixed to unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet COMPLETED
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches product label STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Result: violation found. Since “verify product tag matches patient ID bracelet”
and “verify product tag matches product label” are sub-steps of the parallel step
“verify blood product information”, they could occur in any order.
• Change: this property is removed.
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C.3.4b (C.3.2 → C.3.3) Verify tag matches the unit of blood product
before verifying that unit of blood product has not expired
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time STARTED
verify tag affixed to unit of blood product and
unit of blood product match →
verify product tag matches product label COMPLETED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Result: violation found. Similar to C.3.4a, since “check product expiration date
& time” and “verify product tag matches product label” are sub-steps of the parallel
step “verify blood product information”, they could occur in any order.
• Change: this property is removed.
C.4 If patient has a suspected transfusion reaction, ask physician and
blood bank for further instructions
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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ask physician and blood bank for further instructions →
obtain blood bank evaluation STARTED |
obtain physician order for treatment plan STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Result: this property holds if two handlers in “reverify” are complete handlers
or continue handlers. Otherwise, there will be violations. See B.5.1 and B.16.
• Change: major revision of production verification sub-process.
Iteration 2:
Note: the event “ask physician and blood bank for further instructions” correspond
to two steps: “obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion” and “obtain
blood bank evaluation”. Therefore, two sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
ask physician and blood bank for further instructions →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Event Binding b:
ask physician and blood bank for further instructions →
obtain blood bank evaluation STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
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• Result: no violation found.
C.5a (C.1 → C.2.1) Must stop the infusion before confirming the pres-
ence of an ID band
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm the presence of an ID bracelet STARTED
stop the infusion of a unit of blood product →
interrupt transfusion COMPLETED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Results: this property holds if two handlers in “reverify” are complete handlers
or continue handlers. Otherwise, there will be violations. See B.5.1 and B.16.
• Change: major revision of production verification sub-process.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm presence of exactly one ID band on patient STARTED
stop the infusion of a unit of blood product →
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interrupt transfusion COMPLETED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Results: no violation found.
C.5b (C.2.3 → C.3.1) Must verify ID band matches patient’s stated name
and birth date before verifying tag affixed to the unit of blood product
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
check patient’s ID bracelet COMPLETED
verify ID band and tag affixed to the unit of blood product match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED |
continue transfusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Results: no violation found.
Iteration 2:
Note: “verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match” correspond
to three steps: “confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name on ID
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band”, “confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name on ID band”,
“confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB on ID band”. Therefore, three
sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band COMPLETED
verify ID band and tag affixed to the unit of blood product match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Event Binding b:
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band COMPLETED
verify ID band and tag affixed to the unit of blood product match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
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• Event Binding c:
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band COMPLETED
verify ID band and tag affixed to the unit of blood product match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Results: violations found. They occur when the patient is not able to commu-
nicate.
• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding a:
patient unable to communicate→
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band COMPLETED
verify ID band and tag affixed to the unit of blood product match →
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confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Event Binding b:
patient unable to communicate→
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band COMPLETED
verify ID band and tag affixed to the unit of blood product match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Event Binding c:
patient unable to communicate→
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
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confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band COMPLETED
verify ID band and tag affixed to the unit of blood product match →
confirm product tag matches patient ID band STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Results: no violation found.
C.5c (C.3.3 → C.4) Must verify that unit of blood product has not expired
before asking physician and blood bank for further instructions
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time COMPLETED
ask physician and blood bank for further instructions →
obtain physician order for treatment plan STARTED |
obtain blood bank evaluation STARTED
resume or discontinue the infusion of a unit of blood product →
discontinue transfusion STARTED
continue transfusion STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
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• Results: this property holds if two handlers in “reverify” are complete handlers
or continue handlers. Otherwise, there will be violations. See B.5.1 and B.16.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time COMPLETED
ask physician and blood bank for further instructions →
ask physician and blood bank for further instructions STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
• Result: violation found. During the re-verification, the step “check product
expiration date & time” is a sub-step of a parallel step “verify blood product in-
formation”. When the other sub-step “verify blood product information” throws
exception FailedProductCheck, the step “check product expiration date & time” can
be retracted. Since the re-verification step has a continue exception handler for
FailedProductCheck, the “obtain physician order to continue or discontinue infu-
sion” will be executed.
• Change: the property is changed to “Must verify that unit of blood product has
not expired before asking physician and blood bank for further instructions unless
exception FailedProductCheck is thrown”.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding:
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verify that unit of blood product has not expired →
check product expiration date & time COMPLETED
ask physician and blood bank for further instructions →
ask physician and blood bank for further instructions STARTED
suspect patient is having a transfusion reaction →
Exception ReactionSuspected is thrown by
infuse unit of blood product
FailedProductCheck is thrown →
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
check blood product by 2 nurses |
Exception FailedProductCheck is thrown by
confirm product type on product tag matches that on patient record
• Result: no violation found.
C.6 If an infusion has been stopped due to a suspected transfusion reac-
tion, if the blood bank orders specimens, specimens must be obtained
• Discussion: there are no enough details about the blood bank ordering speci-
mens.
D. Checks That are Done Before Obtaining Specimen(s) from
a patient
D.1 Confirm presence of ID band before obtaining a specimem (before
obtaining a specimen)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step that can be bound to the event “receive
order to obtain a specimen”.
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• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm presence of exactly one ID band on patient COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
D.2 Obtain patient’s stated name and birth date before obtaining a spec-
imen
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step that can be bound to the event “receive
order to obtain a specimen”.
• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
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send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Result: violation found. Similar to the property B.4.2, the step “confirm patient
is able to communicate” throws an exception PatientUnableToCommunicate. The
associated exception hander simply completes the parent step “verify patient ID
to ID band”. Therefore, “ask patient to spell first and last names” is skipped and
eventually the step “obtain blood specimen” is started.
• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding:
patient unable to communicate→
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
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ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
D.3 Verify ID band matches patient stated name and birth date before
obtaining a specimen
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step that can be bound to the event “receive
order to obtain a specimen”.
• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
Iteration 2:
Note: “verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match” actually
corresponds to three steps: “confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB on ID
band”, “confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name on ID band”,
and “confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name on ID band”. So
three sets of binding need to be verified.
• Event Binding a:
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
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verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding c:
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Result: violation found. Similar to the property B.4.2.
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• Change: an exceptional event “patient unable to communicate” is added to the
property. If this event occur, the property is not required to be satisfied.
Iteration 3:
• Event Binding a:
patient unable to communicate→
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding b:
patient unable to communicate→
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
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obtain blood specimen STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Event Binding c:
patient unable to communicate→
confirm patient is able to communicate
throws exception PatientUnableToCommunicate
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
D.4 Verify order to obtain a specimen before obtaining a specimen
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step related to the event “verify ID band and
order to obtain a specimen match”.
• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
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Iteration 2:
Note: In Baystate Medical Center, the order to obtain a specimen is print on
the blood specimen label. Therefore, “verify ID band and order to obtain a specimen
match” is the same as verifying patient ID band against the specimen label.
• Event Binding:
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
verify ID band and order to obtain a specimen match →
verify labels COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
D.5 Verify specimen container label before obtaining a specimen
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step related to the event “verify ID band and
specimen container label match”.
• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
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send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
verify ID band and order to obtain a specimen match →
verify labels COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
D.6a (D.1 → D.2) Confirm presence of ID band before obtaining pa-
tient’s stated name and birth date (before obtaining a specimen)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm the presence of an ID bracelet COMPLETED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
request patient name STARTED |
obtain patient name and birth date STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Result: violation found. The violation trace shows that when “confirm the
presence of an ID bracelet” fails, it throws an exception MissingArmband. The
handler “provide new ID bracelet” will obtain patient’s stated name and birth
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date. In this case, one can obtain patient’s stated name and birth date without
completing the step “confirm the presence of an ID bracelet”.
• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
Iteration 2:
Two sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm presence of exactly one ID band on patient COMPLETED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Event Binding b:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm presence of exactly one ID band on patient COMPLETED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
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D.6b (D.2 → D.3) Obtain patient’s info before verifying ID band matches
patient’s stated name and birth date
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
check patient’s ID bracelet STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
request patient name COMPLETED |
obtain patient name and birth date COMPLETED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Result: violation found. Similar to the property D.2, the violation trace shows
that if the patient is unconscious, step “request patient name” will throw an ex-
ception PatientUnconsious. The handler for this exception is a simple continue
handler, which means that the event “verify ID band and patient’s stated name
and birth date match” will be occur even without obtaining patient’s name and
birthday.
• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
Iteration 2:
Three sets of binding are verified.
• Event Binding a:
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verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-first-name matches patient-first-name
on ID band STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Event Binding b:
verify ID band and patient’s stated name and birth date match →
confirm patient-stated-last-name matches patient-last-name
on ID band STARTED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to spell first and last names COMPLETED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Event Binding c:
confirm presence of ID band →
confirm patient-stated-DOB matches patient-DOB
on ID band COMPLETED
obtain patient’s stated name and birth date →
ask patient to state DOB STARTED
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receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
obtain specimen →
obtain blood specimen STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
D.6c (D.3 → D.4) Verify ID band matches patient’s stated name and
birth date before verifying order to obtain a specimen
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step related to event “verifying order to obtain
a specimen”.
D.6d (D.4 → D.5) Verify order to obtain a specimen before verifying
specimen container label
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step related to event “verifying order to obtain
a specimen”.
D.7 Verify order to obtain a specimen before applying a specimen con-
tainer label
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step related to the event “verify ID band and
order to obtain specimen match”.
D.8 Verify specimen container label before applying a specimen container
label
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding: could not find a step related to the event “verify ID band and
specimen container label match”.
• Change: more detailed “perform Blood Specimen Obtaining process” sub-process
is elicited.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
send specimen to blood bank →
send specimen to lab via tube system STARTED
receive order to obtain a specimen →
order test(s) COMPLETED
apply specimen container label →
apply label STARTED
verify ID band and order to obtain a specimen match →
verify labels COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
D.9 Verify ID band matches order to obtain a specimen before verifying
specimen container label (before applying a specimen container label)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step related to the event “Verify ID band
matches order to obtain a specimen”.
D.10a Nothing can occur between obtaining a specimen and applying a
specimen container label
• Discussion: cannot verify this kind of property.
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D.10b Nothing can occur between applying a specimen container label
and obtaining a specimen
• Discussion: cannot verify this kind of property.
D.11 After obtaining a specimen, must apply specimen container label if
it hasn’t been done yet
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding: could not find a step related to the event “discover specimen
container is not yet labeled”.
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APPENDIX F
BLOOD TRANSFUSION PROCESS FAULT TREE
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Figure F.1. Blood Transfusion Process Fault Tree Part 1
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Figure F.2. Blood Transfusion Process Fault Tree Part 2
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Figure F.3. Blood Transfusion Process Fault Tree Part 3
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Figure F.4. Blood Transfusion Process Fault Tree Part 4
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Figure F.5. Blood Transfusion Process Fault Tree Part 5
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Figure F.6. Blood Transfusion Process Fault Tree Part 6
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Figure F.7. Blood Transfusion Process Fault Tree Part 7
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APPENDIX G
BLOOD TRANSFUSION PROCESS MCSS
Total Number of MCSs: 37
MCS 1 (8 events):
{
Step “aquire blood product” produces wrong “BloodUnit”,
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 2 (8 events):
{
Step “release blood from blood bank” produces wrong “BloodUnit”,
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
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“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 3 (12 events):
{
Step “prepare documentation for blood pick-up” produces
wrong “BloodPickUpDoc”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
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!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 4 (12 events):
{
Step “get validation of type and screen from lab” produces
wrong “BloodTypeAndScreen”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 5 (12 events):
{
Step “lab test blood type and screen” produces wrong “BloodTypeAndScreen”,
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!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 6 (12 events):
{
Step “ask a person to send specimen to lab” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
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!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 7 (12 events):
{
Step “put labeled blood specimen container into biohazard bag and seal
it” produces wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
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bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 8 (12 events):
{
Step “attach specimen label to the specimen container” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
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MCS 9 (12 events):
{
Step “send transport container” produces wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 10 (12 events):
{
Step “enter destination where to send specimen to” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
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“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 11 (12 events):
{
Step “ask a person to send specimen to lab” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
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!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 12 (13 events):
{
Step “contact lab for availability of type and screen” produces
wrong “BloodTypeAndScreen”,
!(Exception “LabUnknown” is thrown by step “contact lab for availability
of type and screen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
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!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 13 (13 events):
{
Step “draw blood specimen” produces wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 14 (13 events):
{
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Step “attach specimen label to the specimen container” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 15 (13 events):
{
Step “draw blood specimen” produces wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
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“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 16 (13 events):
{
Step “place biohazard bag into transport container” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “TubeSystemDown” is thrown by step “place biohazard bag
into transport container”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
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!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 17 (14 events):
{
Artifact “PhycisianOrder” is wrong when step “perform in-patient
blood transfusion” is posted,
!(Exception “NoPhysicianOrder” is thrown by step “confirm physician order
for blood transfusion”),
!(Exception “LabUnknown” is thrown by step “contact lab for availability
of type and screen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
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!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 18 (17 events):
{
Step “gather equipment for specimen collection” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
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!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 19 (17 events):
{
Step “gather equipment for specimen collection” produces
wrong “SpecimenContainer”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
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“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 20 (18 events):
{
Step “collect labels from label printer” produces wrong “BloodSpecimenLabel”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
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!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “obtain blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 21 (18 events):
{
Step “order test(s) on Downtime Requisition form” produces
wrong “DowntimeRequisitionForm”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
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correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “obtain blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 22 (18 events):
{
Step “sign order sheet” produces wrong “PatientChart”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
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from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “obtain blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
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MCS 23 (18 events):
{
Step “tick on checkboxes of test(s) to order” produces wrong “PatientChart”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
320
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 24 (18 events):
{
Step “put patient chart in order rack” produces wrong “BloodTestOrder”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “obtain blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
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!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 25 (18 events):
{
Step “tick on checkboxes of test(s) to order” produces wrong “PatientChart”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “obtain blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
322
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 26 (18 events):
{
Step “collect labels from label printer” produces wrong “BloodSpecimenLabel”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
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!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 27 (18 events):
{
Step “go to the patient’s bed” produces wrong “Patient”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
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!(Exception “PatientUnavailable” is thrown by step “go to the patient’s bed”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 28 (18 events):
{
Step “put patient chart in order rack” produces wrong “BloodTestOrder”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
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correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 29 (18 events):
{
Step “go to the patient’s bed” produces wrong “Patient”,
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
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to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientUnavailable” is thrown by step “go to the patient’s bed”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
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MCS 30 (18 events):
{
Step “sign order sheet” produces wrong “PatientChart”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
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!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 31 (18 events):
{
Step “order test(s) on Downtime Requisition form” produces
wrong “DowntimeRequisitionForm”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
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“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 32 (19 events):
{
Artifact “PhycisianOrder” is wrong when step “perform in-patient
blood transfusion” is posted,
!(Exception “NoPhysicianOrder” is thrown by step “confirm physician order
for blood transfusion”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform Blood
Specimen Obtaining process”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
Blood Specimen Obtaining process”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform Blood
Specimen Obtaining process”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform Blood
Specimen Obtaining process”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “perform Blood
Specimen Obtaining process”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “perform Blood
Specimen Obtaining process”),
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!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 33 (19 events):
{
Exception “ComputerUnavailable” is thrown by step “log into computer”,
Step “determine the need for blood test” produces wrong “PatientName”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
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!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 34 (19 events):
{
Exception “ComputerUnavailable” is thrown by step “log into computer”,
Step “determine the need for blood test” produces wrong “PatientName”,
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
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from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “obtain blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
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MCS 35 (19 events):
{
Artifact “PhycisianOrder” is wrong when step “perform in-patient
blood transfusion” is posted,
!(Exception “NoPhysicianOrder” is thrown by step “confirm physician order
for blood transfusion”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “check for existence of type
and screen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “check
for existence of type and screen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “check for existence of type
and screen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “check for existence
of type and screen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “check for existence of
type and screen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “check for existence of
type and screen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
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!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 36 (20 events):
{
Exception “ComputerUnavailable” is thrown by step “log into computer”,
Artifact “PhycisianOrder” is wrong when step “perform in-patient
blood transfusion” is posted,
!(Exception “NoPhysicianOrder” is thrown by step “confirm physician order
for blood transfusion”),
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “obtain blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
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!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
MCS 37 (20 events):
{
Exception “ComputerUnavailable” is thrown by step “log into computer”,
Artifact “PhycisianOrder” is wrong when step “perform in-patient
blood transfusion” is posted,
!(Exception “NoPhysicianOrder” is thrown by step “confirm physician order
for blood transfusion”),
!(Exception “SpecimenLabelUnavailable” is thrown by step “collect labels
from label printer”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
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!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “verify the correct patient
to get specimen”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “verify the
correct patient to get specimen”),
!(Exception “UnableToPerform” is thrown by step “draw blood specimen”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step
“perform pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform
pre-release checks”),
!(Exception “ReactionSuspected” is thrown by step “assess patient”),
!(Exception “ProblemFoundInPatientHistory” is thrown by step
“assess patient”),
!(Exception “FailedProductCheck” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotMatch” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasMultipleIDBands” is thrown by step “perform
bedside checks”),
!(Exception “InfoNotFound” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”),
!(Exception “PatientHasNoIDBand” is thrown by step “perform bedside checks”)
}
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APPENDIX H
CHEMOTHERAPY PROCESS
338
Figure H.1. Diagram “chemotherapy process”
Figure H.2. Diagram “perform consultation and assessment”
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Figure H.3. Diagram “confirm all necessary information is present”
Figure H.4. Diagram “create treatment plan and orders”
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Figure H.5. Diagram “perform initial review of patient records”
Figure H.6. Diagram “perform Triage MA tasks before giving treatment plan to
Practice RN”
341
Figure H.7. Diagram “perform Practice RN verifications”
Figure H.8. Diagram “confirm pretesting has been done”
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Figure H.9. Diagram “confirm existence and not staleness of height/weight data in
CIS”
Figure H.10. Exception Handlers Used in Diagram “perform Practice RN verifica-
tions”
343
Figure H.11. Diagram “verify doses (practice RN)”
Figure H.12. Exception Handlers Used in Diagram “verify doses (practice RN)”
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Figure H.13. Diagram “perform Triage MA tasks after receiving treatment plan
from Practice RN”
Figure H.14. Diagram “perform pharmacy tasks after receiving treatment plan from
Triage MA”
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Figure H.15. Exception Handlers Used in Diagram “perform pharmacy tasks after
receiving treatment plan from Triage MA”
Figure H.16. Diagram “obtain patient informed consent and install portacath”
Figure H.17. Diagram “perform final tasks on the day before the administration of
chemotherapy”
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Figure H.18. Diagram “perform pharmacy tasks on the day before administration
of chemotherapy”
Figure H.19. Diagram “process individual patient (anonymous)”
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Figure H.20. Exception Handlers Used in Diagram “process individual patient
(anonymous)”
Figure H.21. Diagram “perform verification tasks in MedManager”
348
Figure H.22. Diagram “first day of chemo”
Figure H.23. Diagram “prepare for patient arrival”
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Figure H.24. Diagram “review patient paperwork(anonymous)”
Figure H.25. Diagram “verify treatment plan and orders”
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Figure H.26. Diagram “verify dosages”
Figure H.27. Diagram “handle MissingTreatmentPlanFromPatientChart”
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Figure H.28. Diagram “perform checks on patient before calling pharmacy”
Figure H.29. Diagram “handle low blood counts”
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Figure H.30. Diagram “perform pharmacy tasks and give pre-medications to pa-
tient”
Figure H.31. Diagram “perform first day of chemo pharmacy tasks”
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Figure H.32. Definitions of Steps Used in Diagram “perform first day of chemo
pharmacy tasks”
Figure H.33. Diagram “transcribe and place consult note in patient’s record”
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Figure H.34. Diagram “perform nurse tasks after picking drugs from pharmacy”
355
APPENDIX I
CHEMOTHERAPY PROCESS VERIFICATION REPORT
A Patient Eligibility
A.1 Pathologist must review patient pathology before chemotherapy can
be administered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
pathologist reviews pathology→
verify pathology report COMPLETED
• Result: the property does not hold. The DNL of the property says “‘ad-
minister chemotherapy’ cannot occur unless ‘pathologist reviews pathology’ has al-
ready occurred. ‘pathologist reviews pathology’ is required to occur, but ‘adminis-
ter chemotherapy’ is not required to occur. ...”. So the property does not allow
chemotherapy to be administered without a review. However it also requires that
every execution include an occurrence of the event “pathologist reviews pathol-
ogy”. The counter example trace shows that an exception thrown by an earlier
step terminates the whole process. When this happens, the corresponding steps
for “pathologist reviews pathology” and “administer chemotherapy” will not be ex-
ecuted. In the real world process, this kind of executions should be allowed to
occur. Therefore the property is incorrect.
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• Change: in the property, the option for “is ‘pathologist reviews pathology’ re-
quired to occur at least once?” is changed to “No”. The DNL becomes “‘admin-
ister chemotherapy’ cannot occur unless ‘pathologist reviews pathology’ has already
occurred. ‘pathologist reviews pathology’ is not required to occur, and if it does
not occur, administer chemotherapy can never occur. Even if ‘pathologist reviews
pathology’ does occur, ‘administer chemotherapy’ is not require to occur”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding: the same as Iteration 1.
• Result: no violation found.
Note: in the process, there is not such a step as “pathologist reviews pathology”.
The pathology report is a parameter passed to the chemo process. The step “verify
pathology report” verifies that the pathology report is from Baystate. If the report
is not from Baystate, exception PathologyReportNotFromBaystate is thrown, and the
handler “send path report to baystate pathology for review” will be executed. The
handler has a restart continuation badge. Therefore when “send path report to baystate
pathology for review” completes, “verify pathology report” will be executed again. In
other words, the pathology report will be reviewed within the scope of the chemo
process only if it is not from the Baystate. Depending on which step the event
“pathologist reviews pathology” is bound to, the corrected property could either hold
or not hold. If the event is bound to “verify pathology report” COMPLETED, the
corrected property holds as shown in the Result section. If the event is bound to “send
path report to baystate pathology for review” COMPLETED. The verifier produced a
violation trace showing that if the pathology report is from Baystate, it will not be
reviewed before chemotherapy is administered.
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A.2 Patient must have consult with an Attending MD before chemother-
apy can be administered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
patient has a consult with an attending MD→
perform patient consultation COMPLETED
• Result: the property does not hold. Similar to A.1, this property requires
that every execution include an occurrence of the event “patient has a consult with
an attending MD”. However, the event does not have to happen if any exception
thrown earlier terminates the process.
• Change: in the property, the option for “is ‘patient has a consult with an
attending MD’ required to occur at least once?” is changed to “No”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding: the same as Iteration 1.
• Result: no violation found.
A.3 If the Attending MD decides no cancer diagnosis, chemotherapy
cannot be administered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
attending MD decides no cancer diagnosis→
verify diagnosis of cancer TERMINATED
• Result: no violation found.
Note: the elicitation of the sub-process containing “verify diagnosis of cancer”
is not completed yet. The interface of step “verify diagnosis of cancer” declares an
exception java.lang.Exception might be thrown by this step. This exception should
be given a more specific name later.
B Legal Constraints
B.1 Consult note must be put into patient record before chemotherapy
can be administered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
consult note is put into patient’s record→
file consult note in patient’s record COMPLETED
• Result: violation found. The property requires that every execution include an
occurrence of the event “consult note is put into that patient’s record”. However,
the violation trace shows that this event does not happen if any exception thrown
earlier terminates the process.
• Change: in the property, the option for “is ‘consult note is put into patient’s
record’ is required to occur?” to “No. ’consult note is put into that patient’s
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record’ is not required to occur, if it does not occur, ’administer chemo drug’ is
never allowed to occur”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding: the same as Iteration 1.
• Result: violation found. The step “file consult note in patient’s record” is
executed in parallel with the step “administer chemo drug”. Therefore, “file consult
note in patient’s record” can be executed after “administer chemo drug”. This is
an error in the real process.
B.2 Patient must sign consent form before chemotherapy can be admin-
istered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
patient signs consent form→
request written patient consent COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
B.3 Treatment plan must be present before chemotherapy can be admin-
istered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
treatment plan must is present→
confirm existence of treatment plan in patient chart COMPLETED
• Result: violation found. The step “confirm existence of treatment plan in pa-
tient chart” may throw exception Missing Treatment Plan From Patient Chart.
The exception is handle by step “handle Missing Treatment Plan From Patient
Chart”. This handler step will create a new treatment plan. Therefore, the event
“treatment plan must is present” should be considered to occur when either “con-
firm existence of treatment plan in patient chart” or “handle Missing Treatment
Plan From Patient Chart” is completed.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
treatment plan must is present→
confirm existence of treatment plan in patient chart COMPLETED |
handle Missing Treatment Plan ¿From Patient Chart COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
B.4 Before patient can sign consent form, patient must have consult with
an Attending MD
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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patient has a consult with an attending MD→
perform patient consultation COMPLETED
patient signs consent form→
request written patient consent STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
B.5 Before patient can sign a new consent form, patient must have
chemotherapy teaching
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
patient has chemotherapy teaching→
perform chemo teaching with patient COMPLETED
patient signs consent form→
request written patient consent STARTED
• Result: violation found. Step “perform chemo teaching with patient” and “re-
quest written patient consent” are sub-steps of a parallel step. Therefore, they can
be executed in any order.
• Change: the parent step of “perform chemo teaching with patient” and “request
written patient consent” is changed to a sequential step.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding: the same as Iteration 1.
• Result: no violation found.
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B.6 Patient must have consult with an Attending MD before patient can
have chemotherapy teaching
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
patient has chemotherapy teaching→
perform chemo teaching with patient STARTED
patient has a consult with an attending MD→
perform patient consultation COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
C Development of Treatment Plan and Chemotherapy Orders
C.1a Treatment plan must be approved by Clinic RN before chemother-
apy can be administered the first time
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
clinic RN approves treatment plan→
sign treatment plan COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
C.1b Treatment plan must be approved by Practice RN before chemother-
apy can be administered the first time
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
practice RN approves treatment plan→
sign treatment plan (Practice RN) COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
C.1c Treatment plan must be approved by Pharmacy before chemotherapy
can be administered the first time
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
pharmacist approves treatment plan→
sign and date treatment plan COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
C.2a Chemo order must be verified by Clinic RN before chemotherapy
can be administered for the first time
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
chemotherapy order is verified by clinic RN→
verify treatment plan and orders COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
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C.2b Chemo order must be verified by Practice RN before chemotherapy
can be administered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
chemotherapy order is verified by practice RN→
perform Practice RN verifications COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
C.2c Chemo order must be verified by Pharmacy before chemotherapy
can be administered
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
chemotherapy order is verified by pharmacy→
verify chemo orders COMPLETED
• Result: violation found. Before step “verify chemo orders”, There is a step
“confirm existence of orders for patient” that might throw exception Missing Or-
der For Patient. If this exception is thrown, “verify chemo orders” will not be
executed. The exception handler “hande Missing Order For Patient” will fix the
error. Therefore, we should also consider that the event “chemotherapy order is
verified by pharmacy” occurs if “hande Missing Order For Patient” is completed.
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Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
chemotherapy order is verified by pharmacy→
verify chemo orders COMPLETED |
hande Missing Order For Patient COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
C.6a Chemotherapy orders must be consistent with the treatment plan
before PracticeRN can approve the treatment plan
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
practice RN ensures that chemo order and treatment plan are consistent→
verify doses (practice RN) COMPLETED
practice RN approves the treatment plan→
sign treatment plan (Practice RN) STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.6b Chemotherapy orders must be consistent with the treatment plan
before Pharmacy can approve the treatment plan
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
366
pharmacy ensures that chemo order and treatment plan are consistent→
confirm orders in CIS consistent with treatment plan COMPLETED
pharmacy approves the treatment plan→
sign and date treatment plan STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.6c Chemotherapy orders must be consistent with the treatment plan
before Clinic RN can approve the treatment plan
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
clinic RN ensures that chemo order and treatment plan are consistent→
verify dosages COMPLETED
clinic RN approves the treatment plan→
sign treatment plan STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.6d Chemotherapy orders must be consistent with the treatment plan
before Pharmacy can verify the chemotherapy orders
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
pharmacy ensures that chemo order and treatment plan are consistent→
confirm orders in CIS are consistent with
paper copy of treatment plan COMPLETED |
handle TreatmentPlanAndOrdersDontMatch COMPLETED
chemotherapy order is verified by pharmacy→
verify chemo orders STARTED
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• Result: no violation found.
C.6e Chemotherapy orders must be consistent with the treatment plan
before Clinic RN can verify the chemotherapy orders
• Event Binding: for the clinic RN, checking the consistency of chemo order
and treatment plan and verifying chemo order are performed at the step “verify
treatment plan and orders”. There are no different sub-steps that can be bind to
these two events.
C.6f Chemotherapy orders must be consistent with the treatment plan
before Practice RN can verify the chemotherapy orders
• Event Binding: for the practice RN, checking the consistency of chemo order
and treatment plan and verifying chemo order are performed at the step “perform
Practice RN verifications”. There are no different sub-steps that can be bind to
these two events.
C.7a Chemotherapy drugs must be consistent with cancer diagnosis be-
fore Practice RN can approve treatment plan
• Event Binding: no binding for event “practice RN ensures that chemo drugs
and cancer diagnosis are consistent”
C.7b Chemotherapy drugs must be consistent with cancer diagnosis be-
fore Pharmacy can approve treatment plan
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
pharmacist ensures that chemo drugs and cancer diagnosis are consistent→
confirm treatment plan consistent with diagnosis COMPLETED
368
pharmacist approves treatment plan→
sign and date treatment plan STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.7c Chemotherapy drugs must be consistent with cancer diagnosis be-
fore Clinic RN can approve treatment plan
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
clinic RN ensures that chemo drugs and cancer diagnosis are consistent→
confirm drugs on treatment plan consistent
with diagnosis COMPLETED |
handle TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithDiagnosis COMPLETED
clinic RN approves treatment plan→
sign treatment plan STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.7d Chemotherapy drugs must be consistent with cancer diagnosis be-
fore Practice RN can verify chemotherapy orders
• Event Binding: no binding for event “practice RN ensures that chemo drugs
and cancer diagnosis are consistent”
C.7fe Chemotherapy drugs must be consistent with cancer diagnosis be-
fore Pharmacy can verify chemotherapy orders
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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pharmacist ensures that chemo drugs and cancer diagnosis are consistent→
confirm treatment plan consistent with diagnosis COMPLETED
chemotherapy order is verified by pharmacy→
verify chemo orders STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.7f Chemotherapy drugs must be consistent with cancer diagnosis before
clinic RN can verify chemotherapy orders
• Event Binding: for the Clinic RN, checking the consistency of chemo order and
cancer diagnosis can be bind to step “confirm drugs on treatment plan consistent
with diagnosis” and verifying chemo order can be bind to step “verify treatment
plan and orders”. However, “confirm drugs on treatment plan consistent with di-
agnosis” is a sub-step of “verify treatment plan and orders”.
C.8a Chemotherapy drugs must be in doses that are consistent with pa-
tient data before Practice RN can approve treatment plan
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
practice RN checks that chemo drugs are in doses→
verify doses (practice RN) COMPLETED
practiceRN approves treatment plan→
sign treatment plan (Practice RN) STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.8b Chemotherapy drugs must be in doses that are consistent with pa-
tient data before Pharmacy can approve treatment plan
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
pharmacy checks that chemo drugs are in doses→
confirm manually calculated dose closely
approximates one in CIS COMPLETED
pharmacist approves treatment plan→
sign and date treatment plan STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.8c Chemotherapy drugs must be in doses that are consistent with pa-
tient data before Clinic RN can approve treatment plan
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
clinic RN checks that chemo drugs are in doses→
verify drug dosage COMPLETED
clinic RN approves treatment plan→
sign treatment plan STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.8d Chemotherapy drugs must be in doses that are consistent with pa-
tient data before Practice RN can verify chemotherapy orders
• Event Binding: for the practice RN, checking chemo drugs in doses can be bind
to step “verify doses (practice RN)” and verifying chemo order can be bind to step
“perform Practice RN verifications”. However, “verify doses (practice RN)” is a
sub-step of “perform Practice RN verifications”.
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C.8e Chemotherapy drugs must be in doses that are consistent with pa-
tient data before Pharmacy can verify chemotherapy orders
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
pharmacy checks that chemo drugs are in doses→
confirm manually calculated dose closely
approximates one in CIS COMPLETED
chemotherapy order is verified by pharmacy→
verify chemo orders STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.8f Chemotherapy drugs must be in doses that are consistent with pa-
tient data before Clinic RN can verify chemotherapy orders
• Event Binding: for the Clinic RN, checking chemo drugs in doses can be bind
to step “verify drug dosage” and verifying chemo order can be bind to step “verify
treatment plan and orders”. However, “verify drug dosage” is a sub-step of “verify
treatment plan and orders”.
C.9a Treatment plan cannot be approved by Practice RN if there is stale
or disparate data
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
practice RN checks that data is not stale→
confirm existence and not staleness of
height/weight data in CIS COMPLETED
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practice RN approves treatment plan→
sign treatment plan (Practice RN) STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.9b Treatment plan cannot be approved by Pharmacy if there is stale
or disparate data
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
pharmacy checks that data is not stale→
confirm height and weight are not stale COMPLETED |
confirm height/weight data are not stale COMPLETED
pharmacist approves treatment plan→
sign and date treatment plan STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.9c Treatment plan cannot be approved by Clinic RN if there is stale
or disparate data
• Event Binding: no binding for event “clinic RN checks that data is not stale”.
C.9d Chemotherapy orders cannot be verified by second RN if there is
stale or disparate data
• Event Binding: for the practice RN, checking data is not stale can be bind
to step “confirm existence and not staleness of height/weight data in CIS” and
verifying chemo order can be bind to step “perform Practice RN verifications”.
However, “confirm existence and not staleness of height/weight data in CIS” is a
sub-step of “perform Practice RN verifications”.
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C.9e Chemotherapy orders cannot be verified by Pharmacy if there is
stale or disparate data
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
pharmacy checks that data is not stale→
confirm height and weight are not stale COMPLETED |
confirm height/weight data are not stale COMPLETED
chemotherapy order is verified by pharmacy→
verify chemo orders STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
C.9f Chemotherapy orders cannot be verified by Clinic RN if there is
stale or disparate data
• Event Binding: no binding for event “clinic RN checks that data is not stale”.
D Activities Required Right before Chemotherapy is Admin-
istered
Part 1. Before chemotherapy can be administered to a patient
D.1 That patient must be correctly identified (before chemotherapy can
be administered to a patient)
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
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correctly identify patient→
identify patient COMPLETED
clinic RN gets responsibility for patient→
first day of chemo POSTED
clinic RN ends responsibility for patient→
first day of chemo COMPLETED |
first day of chemo TERMINATED
• Result: the property does not hold. Similar to MP A.1, this property requires
that the event “correctly identify patient” must happen at least once. However, if
any exception is thrown by the step “prepare for patient arrival”, the whole process
will be terminated before “correctly identify patient” could happen.
• Change: in the property, the option for “is ‘correctly identify patient’ required
to occur at least once?” is changed to “No”.
Iteration 2:
• Event Binding: the same as Iteration 1.
• Result: no violation found.
Note: event “incorrectly identify patient”, “make sure that patient has appropriate
I.V. access” and “make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy” are in
the alphabet of this property. However, the property doesn’t restrict their occurrence
in any way. During the verification, I removed these events from the alphabet. I have
sent an email to Rachel about this problem.
D.2a That patient must be well enough to receive chemotherapy
Iteration 1:
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• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
find that patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy→
Exception VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters is thrown by
perform review of systems
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
Handle VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
Iteration 2:
In fact, a patient is consider to be well enough only if all vital signs are within
accepted parameters and the blood counts are sufficient. On the other hand, a patient
is consider not to be well enough if erither all vital signs are not within accepted
parameters or the blood counts are not sufficient. Therefore, two sets of bindings
need to be verified.
• Event Binding a:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
find that patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy→
Exception VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters is thrown by
perform review of systems
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
Handle VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters COMPLETED
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• Event Binding b:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
find that patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy→
Exception LowBloodCounts is thrown by
check blood counts
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
check blood counts COMPLETED |
handle low blood count COMPLETED |
handle LowBloodCount COMPLETED
• Result: the property holds with both sets of bindings.
Note: the step “check blood counts” appears in two different places in the process:
one in the fragment “perform checks on patient before calling pharmacy” and the
other in the fragment “perform first day of chemo pharmacy tasks”. And it has two
different definitions and different handlers (“handle low blood count” and “handle
LowBloodCounts”) in those two places.
D.2b If that patient is not well enough, must wait until that patient is
well enough to receive chemotherapy
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
find that patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy→
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Exception VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters is thrown by
perform review of systems
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
Handle VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters COMPLETED
• Result: the property does not hold. The property says that “make sure that
patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy” must occur between the scope:
after “find that patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy” and before
“administer chemotherapy”. In the scope question tree, it requires that “find that
patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy” is required to occur. However,
the event does not have to happen if any exception thrown earlier terminates the
process.
• Change: The option for “is ‘find that patient is not well enough to receive
chemotherapy’ required?” is changed to “No”. And the modified property holds as
expected.
Iteration 2:
Similar to D.2a, two sets of bindings need to be verified.
• Event Binding a:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
find that patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy→
Exception VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters is thrown by
perform review of systems
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
Handle VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters COMPLETED
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• Event Binding b:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
find that patient is not well enough to receive chemotherapy→
Exception LowBloodCounts is thrown by
check blood counts
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
check blood counts COMPLETED |
handle low blood count COMPLETED |
handle LowBloodCount COMPLETED
• Result: the property holds with both sets of bindings.
D.3a That patient must have appropriate I.V. access
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
make sure that patient has appropriate I.V. access→
check patient IV access COMPLETED
find that patient does not have appropriate I.V. access→
check patient IV access TERMINATED
• Result: no violation found.
Note: in the process, the step “check patient IV access” throws an exceptions.
But there is no exception handler for this exception. If this exception is thrown,
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the whole process will be terminated. If an exception handler step is added into the
process later on, the binding for the event “make sure that patient has appropriate
I.V. access” must be changed, and this property has to be verified again.
D.3b If that patient loses their appropriate I.V. access, new appropriate
I.V. access must be found
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
make sure that patient has appropriate I.V. access→
check patient IV access COMPLETED
find that patient does not have appropriate I.V. access→
check patient IV access TERMINATED
• Result: no violation found.
Note: similar to D.3a, if an exception handler step is added into the process
to handle the exception thrown by “check patient IV access”, the binding for the
event “make sure that patient has appropriate I.V. access” must be changed, and this
property has to be verified again.
D.4a (D.1 → D.2) That patient must be correctly identified before making
sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
correctly identify patient→
identify patient COMPLETED
make sure that patient has appropriate I.V. access→
check patient IV access COMPLETED
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
check blood counts COMPLETED |
handle low blood count COMPLETED |
handle LowBloodCount COMPLETED |
Handle VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters COMPLETED
patient arrives for administration of chemotherapy→
perform checks on patient before calling pharmacy STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
Note: unlike property MP D.2a and MP D.2b, only one set of bindings is created
for this property. This property requires that patient must be correctly identified
before making sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy. Patient
identification must occur before any “make sure that patient is well enough to receive
chemotherapy” event. Therefore, one can simply associate the event “make sure that
patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy” with disjunctive bindings.
D.4b (D.2 → D.3) Patient must be well enough to receive chemotherapy
before making sure that patient has appropriate I.V. Access
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
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administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
correctly identify patient→
identify patient COMPLETED
make sure that patient has appropriate I.V. access→
check patient IV access COMPLETED
make sure that patient is well enough to receive chemotherapy→
perform review of systems COMPLETED |
check blood counts COMPLETED |
handle low blood count COMPLETED |
handle LowBloodCount COMPLETED |
Handle VitalSignsNotWithinAcceptedPrameters COMPLETED
patient arrives for administration of chemotherapy→
perform checks on patient before calling pharmacy STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
Part 2. Checks required for the chemotherapy drugs
D.7a All chemotherapy drugs must be physically suitable for administra-
tion before chemotherapy can be administered
• Event Binding: no binding for event “make sure all chemotherapy drugs must
be physically suitable for administration”.
E Activities Required While Chemotherapy is being Admin-
istered
E.1 If a patient has an adverse reaction to an administration of chemo,
the administration must be stopped immediately
Iteration 1:
382
• Event Binding:
attending MD or attending MD’s delegate decides patient disposition→
call doctor STARTED
patient has adverse reaction to administration of chemotherapy→
Exception AllergicReactionToChemoDrug is thrown
stabilize patient condition→
give emergency meds STARTED
stop administration of chemotherapy→
stop pump STARTED
• Result: no violation found.
E.2 If a patient has an adverse reaction to an administration of chemo,
that patient’s condition must be stabilized
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
attending MD or attending MD’s delegate decides patient disposition→
call doctor STARTED
patient has adverse reaction to administration of chemotherapy→
Exception AllergicReactionToChemoDrug is thrown
stabilize patient condition→
give emergency meds STARTED
• Result: violation found. The property requires that no other events are allowed
to occur after “patient has adverse reaction to administration of chemotherapy”
and before “stabilize patient condition”. In the process, the exception handler
“handle AllergicReactionToChemoDrug” is sequential step that has four sub-steps:
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“stop pump”, “call doctor”, “give emergency meds”, and “send patient home”. It
is obvious that “Attending MD or Attending MD’s delegate decides patient dis-
position” will occur between “patient has adverse reaction to administration of
chemotherapy” and “stabilize patient condition”.
E.3 If a patient has an adverse reaction to an administration of chemo,
that patient’s disposition must be decided
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
attending MD or attending MD’s delegate decides patient disposition→
call doctor STARTED
patient has adverse reaction to administration of chemotherapy→
Exception AllergicReactionToChemoDrug is thrown
• Result: no violation found.
F Activities Required Right After Chemotherapy has been
Administered
F.1a A patient must be well enough to be discharged
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
discharge patient→
discharge patient STARTED
patient becomes too ill to be discharged→
Exception AllergicReactionToChemoDrug is thrown
patient becomes well enough to be discharged→
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check patient OK COMPLETED |
handle AllergicReactionToChemoDrug COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
F.1b If a patient becomes too ill to be discharged, they must become well
enough
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
discharge patient→
discharge patient STARTED
patient becomes too ill to be discharged→
Exception AllergicReactionToChemoDrug is thrown
patient becomes well enough to be discharged→
check patient OK COMPLETED |
handle AllergicReactionToChemoDrug COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
F.2 If a patient needs observation, they must be observed
• Event Binding: no binding for event “patient needs observation”.
F.3 After chemotherapy is administered, all prescriptions for necessary
post-chemotherapy supportive care medications must be given to patient
• Event Binding: no binding for event “give all necessary prescriptions for post-
chemotherapy supportive care medications to patient”.
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F.4 After chemotherapy is administered, all post-chemotherapy instruc-
tions must be given to patient
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
discharge patient→
discharge patient STARTED
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug COMPLETED
give all post-chemotherapy instructions to patient→
provide discharge instructions COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
F.5 After chemotherapy is administered, a follow-up appointment must
be scheduled
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
discharge patient→
discharge patient STARTED
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug COMPLETED
schedule follow-up appointment→
ensure presence of appointment COMPLETED
• Result: no violation found.
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F.6 After chemotherapy is administered, all laboratory results and chemo
administration data must be entered into that patient’s record
Iteration 1:
• Event Binding:
business day ends→
first day of chemo COMPLETED
administer chemotherapy→
administer chemo drug STARTED
enter all patient laboratory results and chemotherapy
administration data into patient record→
chart clinical summary COMPLETED
• Result: violation found. The violation trace shows that after the chemotherapy
is administered, an exception AllergicReactionToChemoDrug may be thrown from
the step “check patient OK”. This exception will be handled by a handler with the
step “handle AllergicReactionToChemoDrug”. The handler has a COMPLETE
badge, which means that the step “chart clinical summary” will not be executed.
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APPENDIX J
CHEMOTHERAPY PROCESS FAULT TREE
388
Figure J.1. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 1
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Figure J.2. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 2
390
Figure J.3. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 3
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Figure J.4. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 4
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Figure J.5. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 5
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Figure J.6. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 6
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Figure J.7. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 7
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Figure J.8. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 8
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Figure J.9. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 9
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Figure J.10. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 10
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Figure J.11. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 11
399
Figure J.12. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 12
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Figure J.13. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 13
401
Figure J.14. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 14
402
Figure J.15. Chemotherapy Process Fault Tree Part 15
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APPENDIX K
CHEMOTHERAPY PROCESS MCSS
Total Number of MCSs: 52
MCS 1 (1 events):
{
Step “handle LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch(call pharmacy)” produces
wrong “ChemoDrug”
}
MCS 2 (2 events):
{
Step “pick up chemo drugs” produces wrong “ChemoDrug”,
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 3 (2 events):
{
Step “put medications on window” produces wrong “ChemoDrug”,
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 4 (2 events):
{
Step “handle LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” produces wrong “ChemoDrug”,
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 5 (2 events):
{
Step “handle LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 6 (3 events):
{
Step “print chemo orders (pharmacist)” produces wrong “ChemoOrders”,
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 7 (4 events):
{
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Step “mix drugs” produces wrong “ChemoDrug”,
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 8 (4 events):
{
Step “handle LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” produces wrong “ChemoDrug”,
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 9 (4 events):
{
Step “handle LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
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!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 10 (5 events):
{
Step “pull out box with medications” produces wrong “ChemoDrug”,
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 11 (6 events):
{
Step “submit verified order in MedManager” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 12 (6 events):
{
Step “fill in rest of the fields in MedManager” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 13 (6 events):
{
Step “access patient info using account number” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
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MCS 14 (6 events):
{
Step “put sticker on armband” produces wrong “PatientArmband”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 15 (6 events):
{
Step “locate sticker with patient name and DOB that match the
obtained patient name and DOB” produces wrong “ArmbandSticker”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 16 (6 events):
{
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Step “obtain name and DOB from patient” produces wrong “PatientBirthday”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 17 (6 events):
{
Step “obtain name and DOB from patient” produces wrong “PatientName”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 18 (6 events):
{
Step “accept patient” produces wrong “Patient”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
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!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 19 (7 events):
{
Step “cross off non-chemo patients from patient roster” produces
wrong “PatientRoster”,
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 20 (7 events):
{
Step “print out patient roster” produces wrong “PatientRoster”,
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
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!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 21 (7 events):
{
Step “print roster” produces wrong “PatientRoster”,
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 22 (7 events):
{
Step “build roster based on location” produces wrong “PatientRoster”,
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
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of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 23 (8 events):
{
Step “take bags with solutions” produces wrong “Solution”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
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MCS 24 (8 events):
{
Step “put labels in the ”day folder“” produces wrong “ChemoDrugLabel”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 25 (8 events):
{
Step “attach labels to solutions” produces wrong “Soution”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
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on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 26 (8 events):
{
Step “print labels” produces wrong “ChemoDrugLabel”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 27 (8 events):
{
Step “put solutions into a patient bin” produces wrong “PatientBin”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
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!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 28 (8 events):
{
Step “prime solutions” produces wrong “Solution”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
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MCS 29 (8 events):
{
Step “take labels from printer” produces wrong “ChemoDrugLabel”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 30 (8 events):
{
Step “take labels for next day” produces wrong “ChemoDrugLabel”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
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on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 31 (8 events):
{
Step “bring labels over to medication counter” produces
wrong “ChemoDrugLabel”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 32 (8 events):
{
Step “calculate volume of chemo drug to be added to solution” produces
wrong “ChemoDrugLabel”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
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!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 33 (8 events):
{
Step “arrange patient drug bins alphabetically by patient name”
produces wrong “PatientBin”,
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on chemo orders matches with info on drug labels”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on labels matches info on chemo orders”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
419
}MCS 34 (13 events):
{
Step “leave stapled treatment plan package in Practice RN’s tray ”
produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 35 (13 events):
{
Step “staple everything together” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 36 (13 events):
{
Step “put signatures box on treatment plan ” produces wrong “TreatmentPlan”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 37 (13 events):
{
Step “print chemo orders ” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 38 (13 events):
{
Step “print face sheet” produces wrong “FaceSheet”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
424
}MCS 39 (13 events):
{
Step “write chemotherapy orders” produces wrong “ChemoOrder”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 40 (13 events):
{
Step “use a careset to generate treatment plan” produces
wrong “TreatmentPlan”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 41 (13 events):
{
Step “pick up newly printed treatment plan” produces wrong “TreatmentPlan”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 42 (13 events):
{
Step “staple everything together” produces wrong “FaceSheet”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 43 (13 events):
{
Step “leave stapled treatment plan package in Practice RN’s tray ”
produces wrong “TreatmentPlan”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 44 (13 events):
{
Step “write treatment plan from scratch” produces wrong “TreatmentPlan”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
430
}MCS 45 (13 events):
{
Step “staple everything together” produces wrong “TreatmentPlan”,
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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}MCS 46 (14 events):
{
Step “perform patient consultation” produces wrong “ConsultNote”,
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“review pathology report (if haven’t done so yet)”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
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on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 47 (15 events):
{
Artifact “Tests” is wrong when step “chemotherapy process” is posted,
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“confirm all necessary information is present”),
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“review pathology report (if haven’t done so yet)”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
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!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 48 (15 events):
{
Artifact “Scans” is wrong when step “chemotherapy process” is posted,
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“confirm all necessary information is present”),
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“review pathology report (if haven’t done so yet)”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
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!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 49 (15 events):
{
Artifact “PathologyReport” is wrong when step “chemotherapy process”
is posted,
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“confirm all necessary information is present”),
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“review pathology report (if haven’t done so yet)”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
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!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 50 (15 events):
{
Artifact “Patient” is wrong when step “chemotherapy process” is posted,
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“confirm all necessary information is present”),
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“review pathology report (if haven’t done so yet)”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
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RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 51 (16 events):
{
Step “measure height/weight in standard fashion” produces
wrong “PatientWeight”,
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“confirm all necessary information is present”),
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“review pathology report (if haven’t done so yet)”),
!(Exception “PatientUnableToStand” is thrown by step “measure
height/weight in standard fashion”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
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“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
}
MCS 52 (16 events):
{
Step “measure height/weight in standard fashion” produces
wrong “PatientHeight”,
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
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“confirm all necessary information is present”),
!(Exception “PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer” is thrown by step
“review pathology report (if haven’t done so yet)”),
!(Exception “PatientUnableToStand” is thrown by step “measure
height/weight in standard fashion”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanInconsistentWithOrders” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “TreatmentPlanNeedsToBeReentered” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “HeightWeightDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “perform Practice
RN verifications”),
!(Exception “StickyNotesTasksNotCompleted” is thrown by step
“perform Practice RN verifications”),
!(Exception “Exception” is thrown by step “obtain patient informed
consent and install portacath ”),
!(Exception “MissingOrdersForPatient” is thrown by step “confirm existence
of orders for patient”),
!(Exception “BSAMismatch” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientDeferred” is thrown by step “evaluate blood counts”),
!(Exception “PatientNotInRoster” is thrown by step “check patient in roster”),
!(Exception “DosagesDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm
manually-calculated drug volume matches the added volume by tech”),
!(Exception “LabelsAndOrdersDontMatch” is thrown by step “confirm info
on drug labels matches info on chemo orders”)
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